BOSNIA: SURVEY OF IRAQ DEPLOYMENT REQUIREMENTS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SARAJEVO 002369



SIPDIS



SIPDIS



DEPT FOR EUR (DICARLO, EUR/SCE (HOH, SILBERSTEIN, FOOKS,

STINCHCOMB),PM



E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/31/2017

TAGS: MARR, MOPS, PREL, IZ, BK

SUBJECT: BOSNIA: SURVEY OF IRAQ DEPLOYMENT REQUIREMENTS



REF: STATE 150164



Classified By: DCM Judith Cefkin for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)



1. (C) Bosnian state-level institutions remain weak.

Formulation of foreign and security policy is largely an ad

hoc process based on political agreements among ethnic

interests. The statutory framework for national security

decisions is rudimentary or nonexistent. To date, political

support from key political party leaders was critical to

securing the deployment of the six rotations of Bosnian EOD

teams to Iraq. The decision to continue, or suspend, Bosnian

deployments under a post-UNSCR regime would similarly be the

result of political, rather than legal, calculations. If

Bosnia's role in Iraq continues to enjoy political support,

we believe that the Presidency would be inclined to authorize

a continuation of the current deployment regardless of the

legal framework on the ground in Iraq. If support for the

deployment deteriorates, we can expect that the Bosnian

leadership would seek to enact legal protections for Bosnian

forces that could include the conclusion of a bilateral SOFA

with Iraq. Alternately, a new UNSCR, particularly one

authorizing a new Chapter VII mandate, would provide the

political cover necessary to continue Bosnian deployments.



2. (C) Post provides the following assessments of Bosnian

legal provisions governing deployments in the provided

scenarios:



Scenario A: In order to join as a party to an agreement,

standard Bosnian practices governing treaties and

international agreements would apply. The Bosnian Council of

Ministers would first review the agreement and forward its

recommendation to the Presidency. The Presidency would then

approve the agreement and designate a signatory on behalf of

the Bosnian government. The treaty would then be ratified by

both the House of Representatives and House of Peoples would

then be required to ratify the agreement. The Presidency can

elect to have the agreement enter into force at signing,

pending ratification. This process is analogous to Bosnia's

accession to the Partnership for Peace (PfP) Status of Forces

Agreement, which is currently in process. Based on this

experience, we assess that this process would take 4-5

months.



Scenario B: There is no precedent for Bosnia being awarded

"third-party rights" under an existing bilateral agreement.

There does not appear to be any impediment to concluding such

an agreement by a simple exchange of diplomatic notes between

the Bosnian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the parties.

Alternately, the Presidency could authorize the MFA and

Ministry of Defense to recognize the rights and obligations

of the agreement by executive order.



Scenario C: This scenario involves concluding an agreement,

so the procedures from Scenario A would apply.



Scenario D: This situation seems to mirror the current

provisions governing Bosnia's Iraq deployment. The

deployment itself would be subject to Presidency

authorization and parliamentary approval, but no other legal

action would be required.



ENGLISH