BOSNIA - HIGHREP IMPOSES FIRST MEASURES; DODIK

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SARAJEVO 002236 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR EUR(DICARLO),EUR/SCE (FOOKS/STINCHCOMB); NSC FOR BRAUN; OSD FOR BEIN E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/01/2016 TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR EU BK SUBJECT: BOSNIA - HIGHREP IMPOSES FIRST MEASURES; DODIK THREATENS CONFRONTATION REF: A. SARAJEVO 2195 ¶B. SARAJEVO 2041 Classified By: Ambassador Charles English. Reason 1.4(b) and (d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: On October 19, High Representative Lajcak publicly announced three measures designed to improve decision-making in and the functionality of state-level government. After Republika Srpska (RS) PM Milorad Dodik was briefed by OHR in advance of the actions, he called the Ambassador in an effort to blunt their impact. Dodik complained that the measures "favored the Bosniaks" and threatened a confrontation if they were enacted. The Ambassador warned Dodik against embarking on a confrontation with the international community and stressed that the U.S. expected all parties to respect the HighRep's measures. Earlier in the day, the Russians signaled that they opposed the HighRep's actions and accused Lajcak of abandoning OHR's "local ownership" policy. We have issued a statement making clear our support for Lajcak. We anticipate participating in a public diplomacy campaign with other Peace Implementation Council (PIC) Ambassadors over the next two days to underscore the international community's unity. From our perspective, it is critical that we stand firm with Lajcak and support this and subsequent uses of the Bonn Powers designed to confront the political problems we face in Bosnia and get the country back on track. END SUMMARY HighRep Measures to Improve Government Functionality -------------- -------------- ¶2. (SBU) On October 19, the HighRep announced three measures designed to facilitate decision-making by the Bosnian Council of Ministers (CoM) and the Parliamentary Assembly. The first, a decision amending the Law on the Council of Ministers, would: 1) ensure that a Ministry would continue to function in the event of the resignation, dismissal, or permanent inability of a Minister to perform his or her duties; 2) ensure that CoM sessions are held at least once a week; and, 3) allow the CoM to pass issues to Parliament by a majority of those present and voting and take final decisions by a majority of those present and voting provided affirmative votes include at least one representative from each constituent people. These changes go into effect immediately. The HighRep also tabled two sets of amendments to the quorum rules for the House of Representatives and the House of Peoples and gave the two bodies until December 2 to adopt them, warning that if they did not do so, he would impose them. All three measures would make it more difficult for a small group of ministers or parliamentarians to obstruct actions of government institutions. Dodik Cries Foul; Threatens Confrontation -------------- ¶3. (C) Having been briefed in advance by OHR's Banja Luka Office, RS PM Dodik called the Ambassador about the HighRep's measures. (Note: OHR, mindful of the lessons from the botched Potocari imposition, briefed party leaders in advance of the HighRep's public announcement. End Note) Dodik told the Ambassador that the HighRep's proposals "favored the Bosniaks" and claimed that they constituted a betrayal of Serbs. Dodik was most upset about the proposed changes to the Law on the Council of Ministers. He asserted that the imposition was unconstitutional, arguing he supported efforts to improve the functionality of state government, but opposed using the Bonn Powers to do so. Specifically, Dodik complained that Lajcak's proposal would allow the CoM to pass measures with the vote of a Serb from the Federation rather than a Serb from the RS. Dodik urged the Ambassador to contact Lajcak, relay his concerns, and propose an alternative. (Note: The essence of Dodik's "compromise" was to introduce entity voting into the CoM, which we and OHR agreed would make the CoM less functional than it already is. Lajcak rejected it. End Note) Dodik threatened a confrontation if the HighRep went ahead. ¶4. (C) After consulting with the HighRep and Washington, the Ambassador called Dodik again. Dodik told the Ambassador that Lajcak's decision had backed him and the RS into a corner. His only option was to react, Dodik said. Dodik predicted "trouble in Banja Luka" and, claiming to have SARAJEVO 00002236 002 OF 002 consulted with Serb member of the Tri-Presidency Radmanovic and PM Spiric, warned that the HighRep would have to "replace all the Serbs in the CoM and elsewhere in the government." Dodik said that he was "profoundly disappointed with the U.S.," explaining that he had "expected the U.S. to protect Dayton, not allow its violation." The Ambassador replied that the HighRep had the full backing of the USG and cautioned him against embarking on a confrontation with the international community. He stressed that the HighRep's actions were fully consistent with Dayton, adding that OHR and Washington expected all parties to comply with the HighRep's decisions and fulfill their responsibilities under Dayton. Russians Signal Opposition; Other PIC Members Supportive -------------- -------------- ¶5. (C) The HighRep briefed the Steering Board Ambassadors (SBA) in the morning on October 19 of the measures he announced later in the day. Ambassadors from Turkey, The Netherlands, the EC, Spain, and Canada expressed their appreciation for the HighRep's efforts to resolve Bosnia's political problems and supported for his measures. The Russian Ambassador criticized the HighRep and his approach. Later in the day, the Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Titov, who is visiting Sarajevo, accused the HighRep in a private exchange of making a "radical change" to OHR policy by abandoning the "local ownership" policy that had been the hallmark of his predecessor. Titov also accused Lajcak of not trying hard enough to broker a police reform deal. The HighRep rejected Russian criticisms, stressing that his mandate was to secure Bosnia as a multiethnic, functioning and self-sustaining state. OHR had to take action to advance this goal because the Bosnian politicians were unwilling to do so, Lajcak observed. At the SBA, Lajcak also signaled that he wanted the October 30-31 Peace Implementation Council to have a "strategic discussion" about the mission in Bosnia. Comment -------------- ¶6. (C) We have already issued a public statement expressing our strong support for Lajcak and the measures he announced (both of which were contained in the USG non-paper provided to him several weeks ago). We anticipate participating in a series of coordinated press activities with other SBA Ambassadors over the next two days to explain Lajcak's measures to the Bosnian public and make clear that he has the backing of key PIC countries (minus Russia, of course). We will also make clear that we expect all Bosnian political leaders and their parties to respect the HighRep's decisions. Though Dodik left himself with a enough wiggle room in his exchanges with the Ambassador to back away from a confrontation, we are not optimistic that he will. The HighRep anticipated that the risk of a confrontation over his plans to use the Bonn Powers (Ref B) were greatest with the RS and Dodik, and OHR has shared with us a scenarios paper outlining how Lajcak plans to respond to specific provocations (e-mailed to EUR/SCE). From our perspective, it is critical that we stand firm with Lajcak and support this and subsequent uses of the Bonn Powers designed to confront the political problems we face in Bosnia and get the country back on track. ENGLISH