Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07SARAJEVO211
2007-01-30 06:33:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Sarajevo
Cable title:  

BOSNIA - DODIK HEARS CLEAR U.S. MESSAGE TO DESIST

Tags:  BK PGOV PINR PREL 
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VZCZCXRO2056
OO RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHVJ #0211/01 0300633
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 300633Z JAN 07
FM AMEMBASSY SARAJEVO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5352
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JCS WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SARAJEVO 000211 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR(DICARLO),EUR/SCE(HOH/FOOKS); NSC FOR
BRAUN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/29/2017
TAGS: BK PGOV PINR PREL
SUBJECT: BOSNIA - DODIK HEARS CLEAR U.S. MESSAGE TO DESIST
FROM DESTABILIZING LANGUAGE ON KOSOVO

REF: A. A) SARAJEVO 199

B. B) SARAJEVO 131

C. C) SARAJEVO 200

Classified By: Ambassador Douglas McElhaney. Reasons: 1.4 (B and D).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SARAJEVO 000211 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR EUR(DICARLO),EUR/SCE(HOH/FOOKS); NSC FOR BRAUN E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/29/2017 TAGS: BK PGOV PINR PREL SUBJECT: BOSNIA - DODIK HEARS CLEAR U.S. MESSAGE TO DESIST FROM DESTABILIZING LANGUAGE ON KOSOVO REF: A. A) SARAJEVO 199 ¶B. B) SARAJEVO 131 ¶C. C) SARAJEVO 200 Classified By: Ambassador Douglas McElhaney. Reasons: 1.4 (B and D). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: We met with Republika Srpska (RS) Premier Milorad Dodik January 25 to deliver a stern warning that the USG had lost patience with his destabilizing rhetoric, especially on Kosovo status, as well as with press statements like the recent article in Croatia,s &Globus8 which strike at Bosnia and Herzegovina,s ethnic harmony or call for the introduction of a third (Croat) entity for Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH). Ambassador told Dodik that if such rhetoric did not cease, the USG would be forced to support punitive measures currently under consideration by the Office of the High Representative (OHR). We also raised concerns about media freedom in the RS, war crimes issues, and the economy. Dodik was contrite and said he had received and understood the message. END SUMMARY. CLEAR U.S. WARNING -------------- ¶2. (C) In the course of a two-day visit to Banja Luka, the Ambassador met RS Premier Milorad Dodik for over one hour January 25 (REF A). He noted the history of working relations between the USG and Dodik,s party, warning that the future of those relations had been placed at risk by Dodik,s campaign rhetoric on RS status referenda as well as by implied linkages between Kosovo status and the RS. The Ambassador stated that the success of the Kosovo status process and the sovereignty and territorial integrity of BiH were among the highest policy priorities of the USG in the Balkans, and statements and actions which placed either at risk were direct opposition to U.S. policy and would not be tolerated. ¶3. (C) The Ambassador made particular reference to remarks Dodik made in a recent edition of the Croatian periodical &Globus,8 namely, support for a third (Croat) entity in BiH, threats to respond to removal by OHR with mass demonstrations and intimations that Bosniaks were welcome in Banja Luka, as long as they didn,t rebuild mosques. The Ambassador told Dodik that such statements were a direct challenge to the High Representative, were detrimental to the stability and ethnic harmony in BiH and, most importantly, &
#x000A;had to stop. ¶4. (SBU) The Ambassador told Dodik that the U.S. had not pressed as hard as we might have during the BiH election period, in the expectation that Dodik,s election would be a net plus for BiH. No such latitude remained. Dodik must cease and desist from talk of RS status referenda, of Kosovo status, and from calls for a third entity. If Dodik did not stop, but rather jeopardized USG policy priorities by continued inflammatory public statements, the USG would be forced to support punitive measures currently being considered by Bosnia,s High Representative Christian Schwarz-Schilling. The Ambassador told Dodik that the USG did not seek confrontation -- confrontation that would jeopardize the foreign investment and economic growth that were Dodik,s priorities -- but to avoid such a confrontation, the destabilizing rhetoric had to stop. DODIK -- NO INTENTION TO COMPLICATE MATTERS -------------- ¶5. (C) In response, Dodik said that he would rather not have to think about Kosovo at all, but that as a politician some topics were difficult to avoid. No matter what the eventual decision on Kosovo,s future status was, Dodik said he didn,t see any reason to expect excess. Dodik claimed that he had never connected calls for an RS referendum to the issue of Kosovo status, nor had he called for demonstrations in response to this issue. Here the Ambassador interjected that Dodik,s frequent promises that the &RS would put down any demonstrations8 that resulted from Kosovo,s independence looked like an invitation for BiH Serbs to oppose the Ahtisaari plan. Dodik said that he took responsibility for his statements, but felt that the OHR and the International Community had blown his statements out of proportion by constantly repeating them. Ambassador also SARAJEVO 00000211 002 OF 003 warned him that splitting hairs and word games were inappropriate -- we read the newspapers and had seen for ourselves Dodik's unacceptable statements. ¶6. (C) On the issue of Kosovo status itself, Dodik expressed particular concern for public reaction in the RS and the region should Kosovo be declared independent outside of the framework of a UN Security Council Resolution. He also cautioned against seeking swift BiH recognition of an independent Kosovo in such a case, warning that it would be difficult for Serb politicians in BiH to contribute to consensus on this. The Ambassador noted that it remained the intention of the USG to seek affirmation of a Kosovo status settlement via the UN Security Council. ¶7. (C) Touching on the issue of his relations with the U.S., Dodik said that as a politician and a person, he had always valued good relations with the U.S. and that he tried to gauge his actions with consideration for how they would be received there. Dodik said he had no intention to complicate matters by making destabilizing statements. He added, however, that he should not be expected to be silent in the face of personal attacks. Dodik said that he understood the Ambassador,s message and asked that from now on, concerning statements, we judge his future behavior and not rehash the past. AMBASSADOR EXPRESSES CONCERNS OVER RS BHT BOYCOTT -------------- -------------- ¶8. (SBU) The Ambassador expressed his concern over media freedom issues in the RS, particularly the RS Government,s decision to boycott BiH,s nationwide public broadcaster BHT1 (REF B). Asking why everyone had made such a fuss over this move, Dodik said that the RS Government had decided not to give statements to BHT1 journalists in response to what he claimed was the station,s unprofessional conduct and constant negative coverage of the RS. Dodik said that he had neither blocked BHT1 from covering RS Government events nor encouraged citizens to withhold payment of the radio and television tax, but rather had merely decided that RS Government representatives would not give direct statements to this outlet. Dodik said that RS Deputy Prime Minister Anton Kasipovic would be meeting with newly appointed BHT1 Director Mehmed Agovic and said he hoped the RS Government,s relations with BHT1 would be &fully normalized8 in the coming days. Dodik told the Ambassador that it was important that BHT1 become a more serious media outlet, a public service for all of BiH,s three constituent peoples. The Ambassador noted that politicians everywhere disagree with the presentation and content in media, but that it was important to use established channels for complaints, like the BiH Communications Regulatory Agency, rather than to take steps which limit freedom of the press. (NOTE: At our insistence, BHT1 journalists were present to cover the Ambassador,s meeting with Dodik and the press statements that followed. END NOTE.) WAR CRIMES ISSUES -------------- ¶9. (C) The Ambassador also addressed aspects of RS Government action to resolve outstanding war crimes issues. Premier Dodik said that he planned to meet the wife of fugitive ICTY indictee Radovan Karadzic early in February, to once again encourage her to seek his surrender to authorities. Dodik also said that he had met Esma Palic, widow of Colonel Avdo Palic, twice since October. Dodik said that Mrs. Palic had given him several names of persons she wanted included in the RS Government Commission to uncover the fate of her husband and that he had included them. Moreover, Dodik said that he had approved and transferred 100,000 Bosnian Marks to the Commission for its work. DODIK ON HIGHWAYS, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT -------------- ¶10. (SBU) The interest of several American companies in investment in the RS was a welcome sign, the Ambassador noted. In particular, the Ambassador mentioned the interest of AES (energy),Balkan America (wood products) and General Electric (railroads) in significant projects in the RS. Dodik said that he would travel to the European headquarters SARAJEVO 00000211 003 OF 003 of General Electric in Genoa for meetings January 29 and that he hoped that GE would take part both in revitalization of the RS railroads and in work on developing the RS, hydroelectric power potential. ¶11. (SBU) Dodik briefly touched on the RS Government,s road building plans. He said that the RS would finance the construction of a highway connecting Banja Luka and the BiH border crossing with Croatia at Gradiska. He added that the RS had agreed in principle with the Austrian construction firm Strabag that in exchange for the right to administer/collect tolls from this well-traveled North-South route, Strabag would be responsible for building other highways in the RS, including the East-West connections Banja Luka-Kupres and Banja Luka Doboj. Dodik told the Ambassador that while discussions were well advanced with Strabag, binding contracts had not yet been signed, and that he would be happy to entertain offers from interested American firms like Bechtel. On the issue of the Corridor 5-C project, Dodik said that the RS was prepared to construct those portions of the Corridor 5-C that crossed RS territory but he emphasized that all of the work on these sections would be according to the location, size and quality specifications set up by BiH state plans for Corridor 5-C. WARNINGS REAFFIRMED IN ONE-ON-ONE FINALE -------------- ¶12. (C) At the conclusion of the meeting, the Ambassador asked that note-takers and staff be excused from the room in order to re-emphasize with Dodik, in private, U.S. warnings to avoid rhetoric linking Kosovo status and the RS, on RS status referenda or on a third entity for BiH. The Ambassador told Dodik that his public statements, including his recent appearances with Serbian Premier Vojislav Kostunica, had put him squarely in opposition to U.S. objectives in the Balkans. The Ambassador repeated his warning to Dodik to cease and desist from such statements. Dodik said that he had received and understood the message. COMMENT -------------- ¶13. (C) The Ambassador delivered this message to Dodik against the backdrop of the BHT1 boycott controversy and the imminent release of the Ahtisaari plan for Kosovo status. It is important to continue to make these points with Dodik and other RS politicians so that they are perfectly clear that Kosovo status is not an issue they should attempt to use for domestic political gain. The attention of the public, and of RS politicians, was very much focused on the decision of High Representative Christian Schwarz-Schilling to depart his post at the conclusion of his mandate in June. The announcement of Schwarz-Schilling,s June departure, though welcome, weakens an already weak High Representative, placing more of a burden on the U.S. in the search both for stability and for progress on key reforms. END COMMENT. MCELHANEY MCELHANEY

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