BOSNIA - DODIK-SILAJDZIC PROTOCOL ON POLICE REFORM

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SARAJEVO 002080 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR EUR(DICARLO),EUR/SCE(HOH/FOOKS/STINCHOMB); NSC FOR BRAUN E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/01/2016 TAGS: PGOV PINR PREL KCRM EU BK SUBJECT: BOSNIA - DODIK-SILAJDZIC PROTOCOL ON POLICE REFORM NOT GOOD ENOUGH Classified By: CDA Judith Cefkin. Reason 1.4(b) and (d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Late on Friday, September 28, Republika Srpska (RS) PM Milorad Dodik and Bosniak Member of the Tri-Presidency Haris Silajdzic signed a 3-page "Protocol on Police Reform." The consensus among Bosnian political leaders, OHR and other international community representatives is that the Protocol falls well short of a deal on police reform. It lacks crucial details and several provisions are not consistent with EU police reform principles. Under pressure from Brussels, the HighRep has given Dodik and Silajdzic the opportunity to "clarify" their Protocol, and he has also decided to give Bosnian political leaders "a few more days" to reach a deal that would meet European requirements. We doubt a genuine deal on police reform is possible at this point. If the OHR (or the EU) accepted the Protocol or any other similarly flawed deal, it would quickly find itself enmeshed in a new set of negotiations over issues the deal purported to resolve. In effect, both Silajdzic and Dodik would have been let off the hook, an outcome we are likely to regret down the road. Silajdzic would retreat to his familiar uncompromising rhetorical ground. Dodik would dig in further, having concluded that if he holds out long enough the international community will grant him concession after concession. OHR's credibility would also take yet another hit, perhaps a fatal one. The police reform stalemate is a symptom of a larger political problem in Bosnia - political leaders here cannot or will not reach meaningful compromises on key reforms. Robust engagement by OHR and the international community remains necessary to propel Bosnia towards Euro-Atlantic integration. A bad deal on police reform that emboldens obstructionist politicians and further weakens the credibility of OHR and the international community will make our job harder over the long run. END SUMMARY Dodik and Silajdzic Reach a "Deal" -------------- ¶2. (SBU) On September 28, OHR announced that technical talks on police reform had run their course and that participants lacked the mandate from political leaders to reach a deal. Dodik's Alliance of Independent Social Democrats (SNSD) cemented the collapse by submitting amendments to the Lajcak Protocol that would have institutionalized the RS police as an administrative unit of the RS Ministry of Interior; a proposal that violated the first EU principle and was rejected by all non-Serb parties. (Note: The three EU principles are 1) All competencies for legislative and budget issues concerning police must be vested at the State level; 2) No political interference with police operations; and, 3) Functional local police areas must be determined by technical policing criteria. End Note) The Party for Democratic Action (SDA) made a last ditch effort to find a compromise by announcing it would accept the Lajcak Protocol with "minor amendments," but in the end, only the two Croat parties agreed to it as written. Later in the day, OHR received a fax from the Radon Plaza Hotel containing a 3-page document signed by Dodik and Silajdzic purporting to be an alternative police reform deal. Reading The Fine Print -------------- ¶3. (C) OHR's assessment is that the "Protocol on Police Reform" signed by Silajdzic and Dodik describes only a partial outline of a police model and lacks crucial detail about the responsibilities, relationships, and legal status of the elements of the model. According to OHR experts, several provisions call into question the first EU principle. For example, the document conspicuously omits any reference to Local Police Bodies (LPB) as "administrative organizations of the Bosnian state." The Protocol also fails to specify where budgetary authority for police would reside. The Protocol defers and delays to some later date other controversial points as well, including the territorial organization of local police areas and the names of the LPBs. It lacks any timelines for implementation and omits any reference to transfer of constitutional competencies from the Entities to the State. OHR's analysis is shared by the European Police Mission (EUPM),which has been a participant in police reform negotiations from the beginning. SARAJEVO 00002080 002 OF 003 Protocol Assailed By Other Parties -------------- ¶4. (C) Other Bosniak political leaders were quick to criticize the Dodik-Silajdzic Protocol. SDA President Sulejman Tihic said that "it offered solutions worse than the Lajcak Protocol," adding, "no one in SDA would support it." Social Democratic Party (SDP) Zlatko Lagumdzija publicly attacked Silajdzic for reaching an agreement that failed to explicitly provide for a Srebrenica Local Police Area and claimed the Protocol "legitimized ethnic cleansing." Lagumdzija told us privately that the Protocol was a meaningless political document "without any substance whatsoever," noting that neither Dodik, nor Silajdzic appeared to have made a concession. SDP member and Croat member of the Tri-Presidency Zeljko Komsic told OHR that if the EU accepted the Protocol it would strengthen Silajdzic and Dodik without bringing any real reform. The two Croat political parties also expressed reservations, warning that an agreement required the support of all three constituent peoples. Only Mladen Ivanic's Party for Democratic Progress (PDP),which is part of Dodik's governing coalition in Banja Luka, supported the Dodik-Silajdzic Protocol. Silajdzic On The Defensive -------------- ¶5. (C) Both Dodik and Silajdzic spent the weekend claiming victory, heralding the Protocol as evidence that the two men could sit down and reach agreement on the crucial issues confronting Bosnia, and expressing confidence that their Protocol was sufficient to allow the EU to initial a Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA). Their statements about the implications of Protocol for Bosnia's future policing structure were often at odds, however. Dodik claimed that the Protocol ensured the continued existence of the RS police and RS control over the budget; Silajdzic argued the opposite. With Bosniak political leaders bitterly divided over the Protocol, Silajdzic found it more difficult than Dodik to explain away these inconsistencies. During a September 29 interview with Federation TV, Silajdzic was repeatedly attacked for conceding too much to Dodik; at one point the presenter asked Silajdzic if he would resign if the EU rejected the Protocol. The Mothers of Srebrenica also turned their sights on Silajdzic, attacking his agreement with Dodik as "shameful act" that perpetuated an institution guilty of genocide. As Bosniak opposition mounted over the weekend, the deal with Dodik looked less like a victory for Silajdzic and more like a major blunder. Europeans Vacillate Over Next Steps -------------- ¶6. (C) Over the weekend, there has been an internal debate within OHR about how to respond to the Dodik-Silajdzic Protocol. The HighRep told his staff that it was positive Dodik and Silajdzic met, but agreed that the outcome was not a deal consistent with the EU's three principles on police reform. On September 29, the HighRep decided to ask Dodik and Silajdzic for clarification on key questions their Protocol left unresolved. According to several well-placed OHR staffers, by Sunday, September 30, Lajcak was under pressure from EC Enlargement Commissioner Ollie Rehn to go further and assert that the Protocol was evidence that the "political majority is showing increased willingness to make progress on police reform." Rehn reportedly told Lajcak that the EU would sign an SAA with Montenegro and initial an SAA with Serbia in October and would not want to "leave Bosnia behind." Lajcak rejected Rehn's approach, but agreed to give political leaders "a few more days" to reach an agreement on police reform. (Note: Rehn's approach was not backed by the EC Ambassador or Quint Ambassadors in Sarajevo. End Note) Comment -------------- ¶7. (C) Our assessment is that Dodik and Silajdzic have produced a document that they hoped would allow them to avoid blame for police reform's collapse. Neither man appears to have made a substantive concession, hence the Protocol's vagueness on so many critical issues. To put it another way, SARAJEVO 00002080 003 OF 003 the devil is not in the Protocol's details, but in the absence of any. OHR is right, the Protocol could not provide a legislative basis for meaningful police reform, which means still further negotiation would be required, if it were accepted. The bottom line is that Dodik and Silajdzic have not really agreed to anything. While initialing an SAA would certainly be an important milestone for Bosnia, it is unlikely to transform the country's stubborn ethnic politics. This is particularly true if it is premised on a non-existent, non-implementable political compromise that over the long-term strengthens Dodik, Silajdzic and anti-Dayton/nationalist forces that have rallied behind them on this and so many other issues. We must face the fact that an SAA and the prospect of European Union membership are not enough to overcome the still deep political differences in Bosnia or ensure reform here is self-generating. With this in mind, it will be important for us to continue to press OHR and our European partners to support appropriate use of the Bonn Powers to end the political gridlock in government and get Bosnia back on track. CEFKIN