BOSNIA - CROATS SIGN CONSTITUTIONAL DECLARATION

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SARAJEVO 002057 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR EUR (DICARLO),EUR/SCE (HOH, FOOKS, STINCHCOMB); NSC FOR BRAUN E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/26/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR BK SUBJECT: BOSNIA - CROATS SIGN CONSTITUTIONAL DECLARATION REF: SARAJEVO 1672 Classified By: Political Counselor Michael J. Murphy for Reasons 1.4 (B ) and (D) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: On September 21, the leaders of six Croat political parties finally signed the Croat &Declaration on Principles of Constitutional Reform.8 The final text is notably more nationalistic than previous drafts we had seen. Most notably, the final document includes language on &territorial discontinuity8 for new middle level governing units within Bosnia, a clear allusion to the Croat wartime mini-state, Herceg-Bosna. Public reaction from Serb and Bosniak leaders to the Declaration has been muted, but both have been courting Croat support for their own constitutional reform proposal over recent weeks. Serbs and Bosniaks looking for clues in the Declaration about which way the Croats might jump will find both language they can support and language at odds with their interests. With constitutional talks increasingly unlikely, the Declaration,s significance lies in what it may tell us about Croat politics. First, Croat political leaders were able to put aside their often bitter differences to agree on a text. Second, nationalist sentiment among Croats is increasing, just as it is among Serbs and Bosniaks. END SUMMARY Croats Sign &All Party8 Constitutional Declaration (Finally) -------------- -------------- ¶2. (SBU) On September 21, after months of debate and missed deadlines, the leaders of six Croat political parties signed the Croat &Declaration on Principles of Constitutional Reform8 (Reftel). Signatories included the presidents of the Croatian Democratic Union of BiH (HDZ-BiH),Bosnia,s largest Croat political party, the Croatian Democratic Union 1990 (HDZ-1990),the Croat Peasants Party (HSS),the Peoples Party Working for Progress (RzB),the Croatian Party of Rights-Djapic/Jurisic (HSP-D/J),and the Croat Christian Democratic Union (HKDU). (Note: The HKDU joined the negotiations, which began in May, only in the last few weeks. End Note) The Declaration was signed in the central Bosnian town of Kresevo, which is home of one of the region,s largest Bosnian Croat communities. During the negotiations, several smaller parties had pressed for the Declaration to be signed outside Herzegovina, where the majority of Bosnia,s Croats live, in order to demonstrate the parties, concerns for Croats living in central Bosnia and Posavina. Final Declaration Focused More Equality of Peoples -------------- -------------- ¶3. (C) The Kresevo Declaration went through several iterations before assuming its final form. The document signed by party leaders contains more specifics than earlier drafts, something the smaller parties pressed for during negotiations, and its language is more nationalistic as well. For example, earlier drafts emphasized individual rights and the rights of constituent peoples, but the Kresevo Declaration,s emphasis is much more clearly on the &equality of constituent peoples8 within Bosnia. The Declaration calls for this principle to be reflected in Bosnia,s governing structures, including equality of representation within the executive and judicial branches, rotation of senior positions among the three constituent peoples, and consensus decision-making. While the concepts of parity, rotation and consensus were referenced in earlier the drafts, the Kresevo language is stronger; it even recommends ethnic quotas for the legislative branch. Territorial Discontinuity (read: Herceg Bosna) -------------- - ¶4. (C) The final Declaration calls for an end to the current two entity territorial arrangement, though it calls for Bosnia to maintain three-levels of government -- state, middle, and local. Both of these ideas were expressed in earlier drafts, and the list of criteria for defining the boundaries of middle level units of government is largely the same with one important and critical addition. The final Declaration declares that &territorial discontinuity of certain units8 should be an option for drawing Bosnia,s new SARAJEVO 00002057 002 OF 003 internal boundaries. &Territorial discontinuity8 was a founding principle of Herceg Bosna, the war-time Bosnian Croat mini-state. When we spoke with Croat party representatives in August, it was clear that many had such an entity in mind when drafting the declaration, but only the smaller parties were pressing for a specific reference to &territorial discontinuity8 in the declaration. That the two HDZs have agreed in the end to include a specific reference to it in the final declaration probably reflects hardening nationalist sentiment among the Croat general public rather than a decline in the larger parties, political power relative to the small parties. Serb and Bosniak Reactions Muted -------------- ¶5. (C) The public reactions from Serb and Bosniak political leaders to the Kresevo Declaration were muted. Republika Srpska (RS) PM Milorad Dodik commented only that the declaration &lacks details.8 Several observes speculated that Dodik,s &subdued8 reaction may reflect concern about the Kresevo Declaration,s call for abolishing the two entities, but in our private exchanges with them, most Croat party representatives have implied their bottom-line was a Croat federal unit within Bosnia, an outcome that did not preclude the RS as a federal unit. We suspect Dodik has received similar messages from Croat leaders. Bosniak member of the Tri-Presidency Haris Silajdzic stressed that ethnicity should not drive new constitutional arrangements, adding that creation of a third entity would harm Croat interests. Silajdzic,s Legal Advisor Damir Arnaut added that it would be better if one of the new middle levels of government encompassed the Posavina region (i.e., the current Posavina Canton and those municipalities from historic Posavina that are now part of the RS). Something for Serbs and Bosniaks -------------- ¶6. (C) A major impetus behind the Kresevo Declaration were concerns among leading Croats, particularly the Catholic Church, that splits among Croat political parties going into this fall,s anticipated constitutional reform talks would limit Croat leverage at the negotiating table. (Note: The HighRep has said that the international community will not take up constitutional reform if police reform fails, which appears likely. End Note) As Croat positions converged during negotiations over the declaration, both the Serbs and the Bosniaks have sought to secure Croat support for their constitutional reform positions. Dodik has been the most aggressive suitor, publicly supporting creation of a Croat-dominated federal unit in Bosnia. Haris Silajdzic and Sulejman Tihic, President of the Party for Democratic Action (SDA),have consulted with Croat leaders about their &Bosniak Platform for Constitutional Reform,8 which they expect to complete soon. ¶7. (C) The Kresevo Declaration contains language that Serbs and Bosniaks could each interpret as evidence that Croats would side with them during constitutional reform talks. The Serbs will welcome the Declaration,s emphasis on constituent peoples, their rights, and the importance of equality of rights among constituent peoples; its call for a decentralized state with a strong middle level of government; and the proposal to create a Sarajevo District, which Bosniaks generally read as code for dividing the country into three ethnic-based entities. The Bosniaks will welcome the Declaration,s criticism of the country,s current two entity structure and its calls for an entirely new constitution rather than amendments to the Dayton constitution. Comment -------------- ¶8. (C) In 2000, Croats issued the Novi Travnik Declaration, an uncompromising nationalistic document that essentially launched the third entity movement. As we noted in the past, Croats have learned since 2001 that they must repackage their nationalist agenda in more politically acceptable language. The Kresevo Declaration appears to us to be an attempt to do SARAJEVO 00002057 003 OF 003 that. It is significant that bitter political rivals Dragan Covic, President of HDZ, and Bozo Lubic, President of HDZ-1990, could agree on the Declaration,s text. We do not think it heralds a merger of the two parties, but it does suggest both men wanted to ensure that Serbs and Bosniaks do not set the agenda for future constitutional reform talks at the expense of Croats. The decision to include language on territorial discontinuity in the final text, the Declaration,s most overt appeal to Croat nationalism, underscores arguments we have made previously, namely that the nationalist rhetoric of Dodik and Silajdzic, has emboldened Croats to challenge Dayton as well. CEFKIN