SCENESETTER FOR DASD CAGAN VISIT TO SARAJEVO

S E C R E T SARAJEVO 002047 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEFENSE FOR FATA, BEIN; STATE FOR EUR (DICARLO),EUR/SCE (HOH, FOOKS); EUR/RPM; NSC FOR BRAUN; USNIC FOR WIGHTMAN; TIRANA PLEASE PASS TO CAGAN E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/25/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL MARR PINR BK SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR DASD CAGAN VISIT TO SARAJEVO SEPTEMBER 28 REF: A. SARAJEVO 1584 ¶B. SARAJEVO 1929 Classified By: CDA Judith Cefkin for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (S) Summary. Bosnia has provided valuable assistance to coalition operations in Iraq over the past two years with the deployment of its Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) unit. After the visit of DAS Butler (Reftel A),we secured approval from civilian and military officials at the Ministry of Defense to provide the EOD unit with counter-Improvised Explosive Device (c-IED) training, which would prepare the EOD unit to take on an expand IED mission should the coalition authorities in Iraq believe it necessary. We have also reiterated that the coalition authorities may request that the AFBiH provide security for the UN at its Baghdad headquarters. Minister of Defense Cikotic and CHOD LTG Podzic are personally committed to greater Bosnian participation in both the Iraq and Afghanistan missions, but the deteriorating political climate here will make it more difficult to secure political support for either a change in the current EOD mission or an additional large-scale deployment. An expanded EOD mission or new deployment would require approval by the Presidency and the Parliament, and neither would be a sure thing. In order to maximize the prospects for securing additional Bosnian commitments, we must have clear priorities about requirements before presenting any formal requests to the Bosnian government. End Summary. IRAQ: BOSNIAN BOOTS ON THE GROUND FOR OVER TWO YEARS -------------- -------------- ¶2. (S) The sixth rotation of Bosnia's EOD unit departed for Iraq September 24. When the rotation finishes its mission next spring, the EOD unit will have been deployed in Iraq for nearly three years. While our successful advocacy to extend the mandate of the previous rotation initially met stiff political resistance, primarily from President Haris Silajdzic, opposition to the EOD unit's deployment has subsided. In a well-publicized trip, all three Presidency members visited the Bosnian troops at Camp Echo in Iraq in May. At the time they told us that they would look favorably on extending the deployment's mandate through the end of 2008 to allow for a seventh rotation. Continued Bosnian government support for coalition operations remains one of our highest priorities. TRAINING FOR OF C-IED -------------- ¶3. (S) After the visit of DAS Butler, we encouraged MOD Cikotic and LTG Podzic to authorize c-IED training for the EOD unit, explaining it as an opportunity to develop an important niche capability that might be needed in Iraq, Afghanistan, and future coalition missions. Cikotic and Podzic, consistently strong allies of our bi-lateral security agenda, agreed to authorize the training, but stressed that it could not be directly tied any change of mission in Iraq. After looking into the issue, both agreed that c-IED activities would be a substantive change of mission for the EOD unit, and would require Presidency and Parliamentary approval. (Note: At the time of DAS Butler,s visit, Cikotic was unsure about this request. End Note.) Cikotic and Podzic pointed out that the level of risk associated with a c-IED mission, particularly the possibility of casualties, could draw political opposition; hence our decision to focus now on training only. UN GREEN ZONE PROTECTION -------------- ¶4. (S) We also continued our informal conversations with Cikotic and Podzic about the potential deployment of an infantry company to Iraq to fulfill the UN request for coalition security forces at its Baghdad headquarters. Both Cikotic and Podzic told us that this mission would be feasible. However, they noted that it would take time to stand-up and train an appropriate multiethnic unit to perform the mission. Cikotic and Podzic would need to create a new multiethnic company from Bosnia's nine infantry battalions, which remain ethnically segregated. (Note: We agree with their assessment that this would be the best way to meet a formal request from coalition authorities in Baghdad. End Note). UNCERTAIN POLITICS OF DEPLOYMENTS -------------- ¶5. (C) Following up on DAS Butler,s visit, we raised informally the possibility of the expanding the EOD,s c-IED mission and a UN Protection mission with Presidency members and their senior staff. Based on these conversations, we believe that both Presidents Komsic and Silajdzic would initially balk at approving the c-IED mission. President Komsic also expressed some hesitance about the UN Green Zone deployment. Both men are concerned about the prospect of casualties. The reactions of both Komsic and Silajdzic suggest that securing Presidency approval for a more robust Bosnian role in Iraq would be difficult in the best political circumstances. Bosnia,s deteriorating political environment exacerbates the challenge. It is easy to imagine any deployment becoming mired in the ugly ethnic politics that have become the norm. MATERIAL SUPPORT -------------- ¶6. (C) Bosnia maintains a large stockpile of surplus arms, ammunition and weapons systems. While the state-level and entity governments would certainly prefer to sell these items, we have pushed them to consider donating some of the surplus items to Iraqi and Afghan security forces. We have discussed the possibility of donating surplus M84 tanks to Iraq with Minister Cikotic (Reftel B),and seek additional guidance as to how to proceed on this issue. We should also be looking for further opportunities to donate surplus items to the Iraqi and Afghan governments, which has the added benefit of removing potentially dangerous items from what remains an unstable region. COMMENT -------------- ¶7. (C) Bosnia has developed into a reliable security partner for the United States. Despite simultaneously undertaking comprehensive defense reform, Bosnia has provided important support to coalition operations. We want to see Bosnia continue to develop its capacity to "export security" and have quietly encouraged the Bosnian government to consider additional missions it might undertake to support coalition operations in Iraq or Afghanistan. We look forward to welcoming DASD Cagan to Sarajevo, and see her visit as an opportunity to advance USG objectives in Bosnia. However, given the deteriorating political environment here and the controversial nature of additional missions in Iraq, we must proceed carefully. The Bosnians will want a clear explanation of deployment priorities, and the risks associated with them. We believe that we have an opportunity in the near-term to shape Bosnia,s overseas deployments for the next several years, and we should take this opportunity to develop a set of deployment priorities consistent with the AFBiH,s expanding capacities, but cognizant of the political dynamics here. CEFKIN