BOSNIA - LAJCAK DELIVERS POLICE REFORM STRATEGY TO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 SARAJEVO 001987 SIPDIS SIPDIS LONDON FOR DICARLO, EUR/SCE (HOH/FOOKS),NSC FOR BRAUN E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/18/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL KCRM PINR EUN UN RS BK SUBJECT: BOSNIA - LAJCAK DELIVERS POLICE REFORM STRATEGY TO QUINT AMBASSADORS REF: SARAJEVO 1872 Classified By: DCM Judith B. Cefkin. Reasons 1.4 (b),(d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: High Representative Miroslav Lajcak presented to Quint Ambassadors on September 18 his strategy for securing a deal on police reform. OHR will continue with technical talks on police reform while maintaining political pressure on party leaders to compromise. After a two-hour meeting on September 17, Lajcak doubts Bosniak Member of the Tri-Presidency Haris Silajdzic is prepared to compromise. However, he told Quint Ambassadors that senior members of the Party of Democratic Action (SDA) have signaled to OHR staff that party President Sulejman Tihic may be prepared to break with Silajdzic on police reform. With this in mind, Lajcak will spend the next two weeks trying to isolate Silajdzic and urging Tihic and Dodik to reach a deal on police reform. Lajcak characterized this approach as the "last chance" for a deal before October and said if it failed, he was not prepared to continue with business as usual in Bosnia, commenting that he "refused to be a spectator here." He presented Quint Ambassadors with a non-paper detailing his plans for the police reform end game and asked them to share it with Political Directors prior to the September 19 Quint meeting in London (see paragraph EIGHT below). On a separate issue, Lajcak reported that the Russian Ambassador to Bosnia had told him that his government opposed Bosnian entry to NATO and was determined to see OHR close in June 2008. END SUMMARY Ongoing Technical Police Reform Talks -------------- ¶2. (C) Lajcak opened his meeting with Quint Ambassadors by offering a somewhat positive assessment of the ongoing technical talks on police reform. The session held today (September 18) had been more constructive than the initial exchanges on September 12, he claimed. Lajcak said that the Croats, particularly HDZ-BiH representative Minister of Justice Barisa Colak, have been helpful in promoting consensus, while SNSD representative RS Minister of Interior Stanislav Cadjo was slightly more constructive this week than last. The biggest problem remained the SBiH representatives, Damir Arnaut and Sejfudin Hodzic, both of whom are on Silajdzic's staff and are not SBiH members. (Comment: We have a representative at the talks. While we share Lajcak's view about the unhelpful approach taken by Arnaut and Hodzic, our appraisal of today's talks is less sanguine than OHR's For example, after an hour of discussion, the group was unable to reach consensus on an issue as minor as a central law enforcement database. End Comment) ¶3. (C) OHR plans to continue the talks next week with sessions scheduled for September 24 in Sarajevo and September 27 in Banja Luka. (Note: The Serbs have complained about traveling to Sarajevo for them. End Note.) These might be followed by a round of talks in Mostar as well. The talks will continue to focus on less contentious issues before turning toward more politically charged issues involving budgeting and the name of the RS police. Lajcak does not believe that the technical talks will bear any results by October 1, but what happens next is unclear. At one point, Lajcak told Quint Ambassadors that the European Commission had approved a two-week extension of the talks, but he later claimed there would be no extension. Instead, he would make a statement on October 1 noting that OHR/EUSR remained ready to facilitate talks, but would no longer make police reform a priority because the parties had demonstrated that they were not willing to engage seriously or constructively. He would also announce that there would be no constitutional reform talks this fall and that OHR would turn its attention to outstanding Dayton implementation issues. Plan to Separate Tihic from Silajdzic -------------- ¶4. (C) Lajcak told Quint Ambassadors that he had met with Silajdzic on September 17 for two hours to discuss police reform. Lajcak left the meeting convinced that Silajdzic will never support a police reform deal. Silajdzic repeatedly claimed that he was ready to deal with technical issues, but each time Lajcak raised one, Silajdzic responded SARAJEVO 00001987 002 OF 004 with his traditional rhetoric about the RS and Dodik. On the other hand, Lajcak informed Quint Ambassadors that senior members of SDA had signaled to his staff that the party might be prepared to break with Silajdzic over police reform. According to OHR staff, senior SDA figures had expressed concern about the appearance that their party was nothing more than a shill for Silajdzic and his agenda. They did not want to be blamed for blocking Bosnia's path towards Euro-Atlantic integration. With this in mind, Lajcak wants to try and persuade SDA President Sulejman Tihic to break with Silajdzic. ¶5. (C) Based on OHR analysis, Lajcak believes Tihic can be convinced to abandon Silajdzic if four conditions are met. First, Tihic will want guarantees that he will not be criticized within the SDA for shifting his position on police reform. Second, Tihic will want overt political support for his decision from the Head of the Islamic Community Reisu-l-Ulema Mustafa effendi Ceric as well as Dnevni Avaz owner Fahrudin Radoncic. Third, Tihic will want public acknowledgment and support from the international community. Fourth, OHR and the international community press for a split with Silajdzic on police reform only. As part of this strategy, Lajcak said that OHR plans to use SDA's membership in the European People's Party to pressure Bosnian SDA members and Tihic to deal on police reform. Lajcak maintained that Tihic could reach a deal with Dodik if he had such political cover, though he conceded that Dodik might balk given his previous Serb refusals (other than on March 14) to finalize a police reform deal. Additional IC Lobbying required -------------- ¶6. (C) Lajcak told Quint Ambassadors that he will deliver speeches on police reform over the next two weeks to the RS National Assembly and the Federation Parliament. Lajcak believes that political leaders are already under considerable pressure to compromise from the public and the media and his speeches will be calculated to ratchet up that pressure. (Comment: We do not share OHR's assessment that political leaders are in danger of any public backlash if they fail to reach a police reform deal. End Comment). Lajcak asked individual Quint Ambassadors to conduct bi-lateral meetings on police reform and asked the U.S. to approach Dodik and Tihic. Lajcak also related that the European Union would not drop police reform as a condition for signing a Stabilization and Association Agreement. Lajcak noted that Foreign Minister Sven Alkalaj has proposed to several EU capitals that the political leaders be allowed to sign a political declaration on police reform instead of concluding a deal; Lajcak asked the UK, German, Italian and French Ambassadors to make clear to Silajdzic and Alkalaj that this was unacceptable. Non-Paper on Next Steps Should Police Reform Fail -------------- -------------- ¶7. (C) In the face of tough question from Ambassadors, Lajcak conceded that the prospects for a police reform deal were slim, but that he wanted to make one last push before abandoning OHR's most recent effort. If talks failed, Lajcak stressed that OHR and the international community would have to change its approach to Bosnia. "Business as usual" was not an option, he said, adding that he "would not remain in Bosnia as a spectator or lame duck." He presented the Quint Ambassadors with a non-paper outlining some of his assumptions and conclusions related to police reform and the way ahead and asked that they share it with their Political Directors prior to the September Quint meeting in London. He asked for their strong support for his strategy for the next two weeks and any actions he might take over the next several weeks. ¶8. (SBU) BEGIN TEXT OF NON-PAPER: BIH - POLICE REFORM AND WAY AHEAD ASSUMPTION: -- There is a significant risk that the talks on police reform will not be successful by end September despite the SARAJEVO 00001987 003 OF 004 best efforts of OHR/EUSR and the broader IC. -- There is no alternative to the approach taken by HR/EUSR Lajcak. There is no other proposal that could serve as the basis for agreement and none that would stand any chance of being adopted by all three parliaments (state and entity). -- Police reform as a precondition to the initialing/signing of the SAA will not be dropped by EU Institutions and EU Member States. -- The BiH municipal elections in October 2008 will not improve the atmosphere for police reform in BiH. -- There are a considerable number of outstanding Dayton implementation issues that are time-critical, that have been pending during the focus on police reform. CONCLUSIONS: -- OHR/EUSR will do its best to facilitate an agreement by end September. In support of these efforts and to underline what is at stake, support from Embassies is requested in lobbying key players. -- While it is clear that SBIH will not change its position, we assess we may be able to exert pressure on SDA and SNSD to support the Protocol. -- At the same time, OHR/EUSR and the wider IC must be fully prepared for a possible failure of the negotiation effort. -- If one or several parties block adoption of an agreement, HR/EUSR will choose a mechanism to highlight who specifically carries responsibility. HR/EUSR will highlight that he is working to mediate an agreement, but that an agreement cannot be reached without political will of local politicians. It must be clear for the citizens of BiH and also for IC that the politicians are responsible for the failure of the Police reform and not signing the SAA. -- If the negotiation effort does fail at the end of September, there must be an immediate reaction by the IC. The goal would be to increase pressure on the parties with a view to reaching agreement prior to publication of the Commission's Progress Report (early November). -- If there is no negotiated resolution on police reform, we assess that there is no chance of an agreement on constitutional change or any other state-building issue. We can expect a deterioration of the political climate, especially in the light of any Kosovo Final Status settlement. OHR would therefore move to focus on outstanding issues aimed at strengthening the state and fully implementing the Dayton Agreement. -- OHR would need to be backed up strongly by Brussels and the PIC, particularly the Quint. There is a significant chance that such a strategy would need to involve use of the Bonn Powers, given likely non-agreement or compliance on the part of one or more groups of politicians. -- We aim to produce a strategy aimed at gradually asserting OHR's authority and tackling these issues in turn. We would start with low risk issues and build up to outstanding issues that we assess a higher risk. -- We will share a detailed issues paper in the coming weeks, and will ask for your support well in advance of any action. -- In parallel, HR/EUSR would continue to highlight the European perspective for BiH and the need for political parties to conclude the SAA. HR/EUSR would aim to seek an agreement on police reform as soon as the political conditions allow it. END TEXT OF NON-PAPER A Short Note on the Russians -------------- ¶9. (C) Following the exchange on police reform, Lajcak SARAJEVO 00001987 004 OF 004 reported that he met recently with the Russian Ambassador to Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Russian Ambassador had told him that while Russia supports Bosnia's entry into the EU, it opposes Bosnian membership in NATO. The Russian Ambassador blamed Silajdzic alone for the failure of reforms and was adamant that OHR must close in June 2008. According to Lajcak, the Russian Ambassador signaled that his government planned to use the UN Security Council's consideration in November of a resolution extending EUFOR's mandate in Bosnia to lay the groundwork for OHR's closure. Comment -------------- ¶10. (C) Most of the Quint Ambassadors, including us, were skeptical that Lajcak could secure a police reform deal in the next several weeks. We believe that his staff has presented him with an overly optimistic assessment of the technical talks, and we believe that there is little basis for OHR's assessment that Tihic is ready to break with Silajdzic on police reform. Just a few weeks ago, Tihic explicitly stated that he would follow Silajdzic's lead on police reform, a posture the SDA negotiator has maintained during the technical talks. That said, we read Lajcak's non-paper as intended to begin the process of building support among the Europeans for his use of the Bonn Powers in the wake of the talks, collapse. We would have preferred Lajcak present a harder hitting paper as well as one that makes the case for tough action based on the overall deterioration of the political climate. Nonetheless, this was a welcome first step. We remain concerned that Lajcak and OHR are moving too slowly, however. A clear plan of action needs to be in place well before we reach the police reform talks end game, which is only eight days away (assuming Lajcak sticks to his September 30 deadline). The Quint talks in London present an opportunity to press the Europeans to take a more robust approach to Bosnia and underscore our support for the HighRep. MCELHANEY