CONTINUED NECESSITY TO MAINTAIN US MILITARY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SARAJEVO 001980 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR EUR (DICARLO),EUR/SCE (HOH, FOOKS),EUR/RPM; DOD FOR FATA, BEIN; NAPLES FOR ADMIRAL ULRICH, AMBASSADOR CURRAN; USNIC FOR WIGHTMAN E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/15/2017 TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR BK SUBJECT: CONTINUED NECESSITY TO MAINTAIN US MILITARY LEADERSHIP, PRESENCE IN BOSNIA Classified By: Ambassador Douglas McElhaney for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary. Replacing the US military commander of NATO HQ Sarajevo with a European is premature and would adversely affect US interests in Bosnia. Turning over NATO HQ to the Europeans would make the organization virtually indistinguishable from EUFOR, and undermine its standing and influence among Bosnians who do not see EUFOR as a credible partner. This would slow progress in implementing defense reform, Bosnia's largest state- building success post-Dayton. Furthermore, removing the remaining US military presence here sends the wrong message about our security commitment to the country and region, at a time when the Bosnian political climate is deteriorating and tensions over Kosovo are mounting. We are convinced that a final US military drawdown risks jeopardizing the gains realized from our substantial military, political, and financial investment in establishing a democratic, stable, and prosperous state here. End Summary. FINAL DRAWDOWN -------------- ¶2. (C) We are aware that in the regular course of personnel review drawing down our remaining military presence in Bosnia at NATO HQ Sarajevo is under consideration. It is our understanding that the current NATO HQ Commander, a US Army Major General, could be replaced by a European, or less likely a US officer at the Colonel rank, when his term expires in the early spring. The departure of the US general officer commanding NATO HQ would lead to the departure of the US HQ staff, and would almost certainly result in the closing of the US National Intelligence Cell (USNIC) and National Support Element (NSE). The trickle down effect of removing the US general officer would reduce the US military footprint in Bosnia to almost zero, with the exception of our DATT and ODC office and any remaining personnel assigned to the NATO Advisory Team (NAT). We believe that this plan would adversely affect US interests for several important reasons. SENDING A POLITICAL MESSAGE -------------- ¶3. (C) The departure of the US general officer from the NATO HQ command would undoubtedly be viewed by the Bosnian government and public alike as the final exit of the US military mission that has been on the ground since 1995. For the past decade and a half, the US has been the glue that has held Bosnia together. More specifically, no other institution or actor has been able to project the level of power and credibility of our Armed Forces, which have been the key to establishing the security environment necessary for post-war reconstruction and state-building. The United States remains the single greatest force for change on the ground here, and the need for our continued active engagement is universally recognized by all parties as crucial for the long-term development of a democratic, stable, and prosperous Bosnia. While the security environment has vastly improved since the days of IFOR and SFOR, the political climate here has greatly deteriorated in the past eighteen months. Removing the US military commander, and with him our last remaining military presence here, would spread the perception that we are "abandoning" Bosnia. IMPACT ON REGIONAL SECURITY -------------- ¶4. (C) While we remain hopeful that the Kosovo final status decision will have limited spillover effects here, we must recognize that the possibility exists for serious reactions in Republika Srpska (RS). One of the more recent troubling developments is the reemergence of RS Prime Minister Milorad Dodik's rhetoric linking the status of Kosovo and the RS. Dodik and other senior Bosnian-Serb politicians have told us that such statements are to placate the base of RS voters who feel strongly, as Serbs, about Kosovo independence. We and our European partners have made clear in our private discussions with the RS leadership that we are prepared to respond to any regional contingencies, but EUFOR's decision to remove nearly all of its operational forces from the RS this past Spring has undercut this message. In this context, the departure of the last vestiges of the US military presence in the midst of the Kosovo process would further weaken an already weak hand in terms of the credibility of our message to senior RS politicians. US LEADERSHIP REQUIRED FOR DEFENSE REFORM -------------- ¶5. (C) Bosnian defense reform has been one of the biggest post-Dayton success stories for the country. Defense reform has succeeded in merging the two former adversarial armies and creating a functioning state-level Ministry of Defense. The resulting improved security situation in the country allowed for the drawdown of US operational military forces and the turning over of key military installations to the new Bosnian Armed Forces. Progress in implementing defense reform also led to NATO's decision to extend an invitation to Bosnia to join the Partnership for Peace (PfP),Bosnia's only real anchor in Euro-Atlantic institutions. Without a doubt, defense reform would not have been possible without the strong US leadership exercised through the NATO HQ command. The US general officers at the helm of NATO HQ have played a key and highly visible role in pushing the political actors here to make the hard choices necessary for defense reform to succeed. While much has been realized to date, defense reform remains unfinished and continued US direction and attention are required to complete it. The Europeans do not have the clout or credibility, nor have they demonstrated the political interest in doing the heavy-lifting to move defense reform forward. Absent strong US leadership on defense reform through NATO HQ, we expect slippage in the implementation process. MORE TIME NEEDED -------------- ¶6. (C) Our strong recommendation is to maintain the US military presence through NATO HQ at its approximate level for the near future. This would require the replacement of the current NATO HQ commander with a US general officer and the continuation of his headquarters staff, the USNIC, and NSE. With normal rotations in place, this would allow for a re-evaluation our position and the security situation in early to mid-2009 when the next commander is due to depart Bosnia and when the NATO/EUFOR "Camp Butmir" is slated to be transferred to host government control. This would certainly present a better opportunity to determine if we have "weathered the storm" here and ensure that Bosnia is more firmly on the path towards full NATO integration. We certainly understand the current, acute resource demands on our Armed Forces, but we remain convinced that the United States needs to maintain a small but important presence here to ensure the huge investment we have made here is protected. MCELHANEY