BOSNIA: DODIK AND SILAJDZIC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SARAJEVO 001914 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR EUR (DICARLO),EUR/SCE (HOH/FOOKS),NSC FOR BRAUN E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/04/2017 TAGS: PREL PGOV KCRM KJUS PINR EUN BK SUBJECT: BOSNIA: DODIK AND SILAJDZIC REF: SARAJEVO 1872 Classified By: Ambassador Douglas L. McElhaney. Reasons 1.4 (b),(d)s Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) During separate meetings with Milorad Dodik and Haris Silajdzic, Ambassador urged both leaders to consider the consequences of a police reform collapse on Bosnia's Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) prospects. Ambassador warned Dodik that his rhetoric over recent weeks has crossed the line from provocative to destabilizing, particularly in light of ongoing Kosovo status negotiations. Ambassador warned Dodik that he cannot continue to criticize the functionality of the central government while blocking all attempts to improve it. Silajdzic asserted that High Representative Lajcak's proposal gave major concessions to the Serbs and reiterated the unacceptability of any reform that named the "RS Police." Silajdzic suggested that the EU could consider initialing the SAA if Bosnian parties promised to take up police and constitutional reform in the future. END SUMMARY. Dodik Warned on Rhetoric -------------- ¶2. (C) During a September 3 meeting, Ambassador McElhaney gave Repulika Srpska (RS) Prime Minister Milorad Dodik a stern warning about his recent inflammatory comments on Kosovo and public remarks critical of the integrity of the Bosnian state. In recent weeks, Ambassador noted, Dodik had publicly criticized the role of the central government, promised to review and attempt to reclaim competencies he claims have been transferred "illegally" from the RS to the Bosnian state, and called the Bosnian army a "NATO force" of no interest or use to Bosnia and Herzegovina. He has too characterized the RS a "permanent category" while Bosnia will survive only as long as there is an international interest to support its existence, and has increasingly alluded to linkages between Kosovo independence and the status of the RS. ¶3. (C) Ambassador reminded Dodik of his promise to EUR Assistant Secretary Fried not to bring up Kosovo or to link its future to that of the RS. Ambassador told Dodik that his rhetoric is beginning to create unrealistic expectations among Serbs in the RS that they can somehow follow the Kosovo example and gain independence. This had implications for political stability in BiH and in the region, and crossed every policy redline. Dodik responded characteristically by disavowing the statements and accusing the media of misquoting him. Dodik reiterated his long-standing position that Kosovo negotiations should continue until both sides reach an agreement; and that it would be impossible for Bosnia to recognize a unilateral declaration of Kosovo independence. ¶4. (C) In response to the Ambassador's questioning on transfers of competencies, Dodik replied that the RS could make better and more efficient use of resources at the entity level and it was therefore not in the interest of the RS to relinquish any competencies unless there was a clear and undisputed constitutional reason to do so. Ambassador agreed with Dodik that the state government is weak, but warned Dodik that he cannot continue to publicly criticize the central government, while at the same time blocking all attempts to strengthen and improve its functionality. He told Dodik that his statements were creating a dangerous situation by creating new divisions among Bosnia's Serbs, Croats and Bosniaks. Dodik on Police Reform -------------- ¶5. (C) Turning to the police reform proposal tabled by High Representative Lajcak and rejected by Bosniak and Serb parties (reftel),Dodik asserted he had not intended to publicly reject it, but High Representative Lajcak had asked him to "find a smart way to reject the proposal" in order to counter criticism he has a pro-Serb bias. Dodik showed Ambassador a text message purportedly from Lajcak conveying this request. Noting that the Lajcak plan made significant SARAJEVO 00001914 002 OF 003 concessions to the Serbs and any additional adjustments would remove all remaining substance from the proposal, the Ambassador asked if Dodik had any ideas to salvage the SAA process. Dodik replied that although the proposal is unacceptable it could constitute the basis for further discussions and, "with certain additions," could become acceptable to the Serbs. Silajdzic on Police Reform -------------- ¶6. (C) Ambassador September 4 met with Bosniak Presidency member Haris Silajdzic who complained that Lajcak's proposal made too many concessions to the Serbs. It allowed the RS police to continue to exist, eliminated the Federation police, and created 10 Cantonal police forces. This was a step back for Bosniaks, he added. Devolving existing police competencies from the Federation to the Cantons was "dangerous for Bosnia" and could spark a "latent Bosniak-Croat conflict." Silajdzic claimed the proposal amounts to a Dodik "wish list" by reinforcing the continued existence of the RS police within its own borders and controlling its own budget. He added that the proposal did not meet the three EU principles, and failed to make any reference to the Police Reform Directorate (PRD) report. ¶7. (C) Silajdzic complained that police structures, like the army, must be based on subordination, not "coordination and consensus," and added that the proposal gives no real oversight role to the BiH state. He said that BiH needs a multi-ethnic police force, and added that police in the RS must be recognized as "BiH police in the RS," not "RS police." Silajdzic said he would reject any proposal that allows the RS police to continue to exist, claiming that it remains an "ethnically clean" institution that has "committed genocide" and protected Hague indictees. He accused Dodik of wanting to keep the police as the equivalent of an "RS army." Silajdzic agreed to give us a copy of his official comments to Lajcak on the plan. Silajdzic: Keeping the SAA Alive -------------- ¶8. (C) Silajdzic asked rhetorically why police reform was "so important" to the Europeans, and speculated that the EU now regrets making police reform a pre-condition for signing a stabilization and association agreement (SAA). He inquired whether it could be possible to initial an SAA now with a promise by political parties to address both constitutional and police reforms in the future. Ambassador responded that the U.S. supports the EU decision conditioning the SAA to implementing police reform, a criteria that is unlikely to change. ¶9. (C) Raising Dodik's recent statements supporting the establishment of a Croat entity, Silajdzic said the concept would lead to further divisions in an already divided state. Silajdzic said he wished the RS, the Federation and its Cantons could "disappear tomorrow." He said that he was "ashamed" of the tripartite presidency on which he sits, calling it a "joke." He continued, saying that he "cannot accept the idea that we (Bosnians) cannot live together," and insisted that there must be common interests that can unite the people of Bosnia. Ambassador agreed that the creation of a third entity was not going to happen, and even mentioning it portended renewed instability, threatening the resolution of the problems of governance in Bosnia. Comment -------------- ¶10. (C) Exchanges with Dodik and Silajdzic suggest neither appreciates that their uncompromising positions on police reform are likely to derail SAA negotiations for at least another year, which would constitute a major setback for Bosnia's Euro-Atlantic aspirations. On September 4, the HighRep told Quint Ambassadors that although all political leaders claim to be ready to negotiate, he hopes to keep some semblance of a process alive for at least the next couple weeks. That said, with Dodik and Silajdzic remaining so far apart on fundamentals, the HighRep is under no illusions about the prospects for salvaging a deal. The HighRep would like to allow the current dynamics to play themselves out SARAJEVO 00001914 003 OF 003 through September before taking any action. He will be in Brussels next week to discuss this approach and seek Solana's and Rehn's support. We continue to believe that robust action by the HighRep is required to retrieve a deteriorating political situation and that the U.S. needs to encourage the Europeans to support such an approach. Nonetheless, we should allow the HighRep time he seeks to work the local political leaders before any OHR action. End Comment. MCELHANEY