Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07SARAJEVO1872
2007-08-31 15:46:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Sarajevo
Cable title:  

BOSNIA - BOSNIAKS TORPEDO PROSPECTS FOR POLICE

Tags:  PREL PGOV KCRM KJUS PINR EUN BK 
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PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHVJ #1872/01 2431546
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 311546Z AUG 07
FM AMEMBASSY SARAJEVO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6957
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/JCS WASHINGTON DC
RUFOAOA/USNIC SARAJEVO
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SARAJEVO 001872 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR(DICARLO),EUR/SCE(HOH/FOOKS),NSC FOR
BRAUN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/29/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV KCRM KJUS PINR EUN BK
SUBJECT: BOSNIA - BOSNIAKS TORPEDO PROSPECTS FOR POLICE

REFORM

REF: A. SARAJEVO 595

B. SARAJEVO 1663

C. 06 SARAJEVO 3271

D. 05 SARAJEVO 2374

Classified By: DCM Judith B. Cefkin. Reasons 1.4 (b),(d)s

Summary
-------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SARAJEVO 001872 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR EUR(DICARLO),EUR/SCE(HOH/FOOKS),NSC FOR BRAUN E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/29/2017 TAGS: PREL PGOV KCRM KJUS PINR EUN BK SUBJECT: BOSNIA - BOSNIAKS TORPEDO PROSPECTS FOR POLICE REFORM REF: A. SARAJEVO 595 ¶B. SARAJEVO 1663 ¶C. 06 SARAJEVO 3271 ¶D. 05 SARAJEVO 2374 Classified By: DCM Judith B. Cefkin. Reasons 1.4 (b),(d)s Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) Since assuming office in July, High Representative Miroslav Lajcak has stated publicly that his first major task would be concluding an agreement on Police Reform in September, allowing Bosnia to initial an SAA with the EU. Lajcak circulated a draft of the proposal in private talks this week with Quint embassies and Bosnian political parties. The draft walks back some of the more politically contentious elements of previous proposals in an effort to bring Bosnian Serbs on board but remains, according to the EU, consistent with the three EU principles on policing. The day after meeting the High Representative, Haris Silajdzic and Sulejman Tihic publicly rejected the Lajcak proposal. Milorad Dodik and Serb party leaders followed suit one day later. The rejection of the proposal on which Lajcak has publicly staked his credibility represents a serious challenge to the new High Representative. Unless he acts quickly and forcefully to reassert his authority, Lajcak faces being ignored by Bosnian politicians for the remainder of his tenure. End Summary. Silajdzic and Tihic Reject Lajcak's Police Reform Proposal -------------- -------------- ¶2. (C) High Representative Miroslav Lajcak on August 27 shared with Quint Ambassadors a new proposal for a police reform agreement. Citing instructions from Brussels, Lajcak said he had made police reform his top priority and that he aimed to conclude an agreement by September 30 (Ref B). Lajcak told the Quint that a deal before October would allow the EU to initial a Stabilization and Association Agreement by the end of the year. On August 30, Silajdzic and Tihic held a joint press conference in which they rejected Lajcak's proposal. Their press conference came just one day after Lajcak had presented the proposal to them and before Lajcak had even completed his consultations with other party leaders. ¶3. (C) Silajdzic and Tihic claimed that they remained committed to police reform, noting that they had accepted previous proposals
(e.g., the Martens Report, the Vlasic Agreement, and the Police Reform Directorate Report),but asserted that Lajcak's proposal violated all three principles the EU said must guide police reform. (Note: The three principles are: 1) All legislative and budgetary competencies for all police matters must be vested at the State level, 2) No political interference with operational policing, 3) Functional local police areas must be determined by technical policing criteria, where operational command is exercised at the local level. End Note.) Lajcak's proposal represented further concessions to the RS, both Silajdzic and Tihic said. ¶4. (C) In addition to their "technical objections" to Lajcak's proposal, Silajdzic and Tihic also raised political concerns. They argued that the reform would impact the Federation only by forcing it to disband Federation Police while leaving in place the RS and Cantonal police forces. Silajdzic also repeated previous claims that the International Court of Justice had found the RS guilty of genocide, stressing that he could not support reforms that legitimated these crimes, the institutions that committed them, or the "ethnocracy" that resulted from them. Silajdzic defiantly acknowledged that the Bosniaks were taking a risk in publicly rejecting Lajcak's proposal before talks had even begun, but asserted that in doing so they were defending a "multiethnic Bosnia." ¶5. (U) The following day, Republika Srpska President Milan Jelic and other representatives of Serb political parties met to discuss the proposal. In a public statement released following the meeting the Serb parties announced they also found the Lajcak proposal unacceptable and would forward their own draft law on police reform to the state parliament. SARAJEVO 00001872 002 OF 003 Serb parties described the Lajcak proposal as "unconstitutional." The press release stated that the Serb proposal would leave existing police structures in the RS and the Federation intact and simply establish a consolidated national police budget. ¶6. (C) At the weekly meeting of the PIC Steering Board, a clearly disconcerted High Representative commented that the reaction by Silajdzic and Tihic was unfortunate, unfair and had violated assurances of confidentiality under which he had discussed the proposal with party leaders. He stated, however, that the negotiation process on the agreement would continue. EC Ambassador Kourkoulas said that Brussels had taken note of the actions of Silajdzic and Tihic and Olli Rehn was preparing a strongly worded response adding that the "European perspective of the country is at stake." He noted that the assertion by Tihic and Silajdzic that the proposal was inconsistent with the three EU principles was spurious and that it was the EU, not Bosnian leaders, that is charged with making this assessment. Steering Board ambassadors expressed support for the High Representative and pledged to use bilateral contacts to press political leaders to sign on to the agreement. One State-level Structure -------------- ¶7. (C) Under the Lajcak proposal all local police districts will fall under the authority of the State-level Ministry of Security and be governed by State-level legislation. As with earlier proposals, an office of the Director of Police would be established to oversee and coordinate the work of local police operations. The Director would have three subordinate Assistant Directors responsible for policing in the territory of the RS, Federation, and Brcko District. The Lajcak proposal sidesteps the contentious issue of the continued existence of the entity Interior Ministries but implicitly provides them with a "consultative role" through a new Ministry of Security "Collegium". Silajdzic's staff told us that they view the Collegium, despite its advisory role, as providing an avenue for RS leaders to exercise political influence over police operations ¶8. (C) The current proposal is silent on the politically sensitive issue of naming local police units, specifically whether to retain the name RS Police. During the last round of negotiations (Ref A),Silajdzic rejected any agreement that would allow retention of the name RS Police, labeling it a "genocidal institution." The current report simply refers to Local Police Bodies on the territory of the Republika Srpska, the Federation, and the Brcko District. However, it also refers to "RS Police Administration," which Silajdzic's staff told us is unacceptable. They argue that it confirms the RS police's continued existence despite the new State-level control of Local Police Bodies. Softening the Line on Local Police Areas -------------- ¶9. (C) To date, the EU has maintained that local police areas must be based on technical criteria without regard for the current inter-entity boundary line (IEBL). The RS strongly opposed police zones crossing the IEBL, and as a result, OHR and EU concessions reduced the number of IEBL crossings until, by the March proposal, it was crossed only in the greater Sarajevo metropolitan area. The Lajcak proposal eliminates any provisions for cross-IEBL police zones calling simply for more than one local police body in the RS and the Federation, and one in Brcko. The Lajcak proposal does call for a local police area covering the Srebrenica municipality. It is debatable whether this provision is in line with the requirement for "technical efficiency" in the second principle. Concessions on Police Budgets -------------- ¶10. (C) The Lajcak plan's most significant concessions to the RS are related to budgetary control. To date, OHR and the EU have insisted on state-level control of the police budget. In a February 22 letter to RS Prime Minister Milorad Dodik, former High Representative Christian Schwarz-Schilling wrote SARAJEVO 00001872 003 OF 003 that "there is no room under (the first) principle for entity and cantonal institutions to exercise budget responsibility of any kind." However, in an effort to bring the RS on board, the Lajcak proposal seeks to create the appearance of a role for the entities and cantons. The proposal calls for local police districts to prepare draft budgets for approval by the RS National Assembly, Cantonal Assemblies, and Brcko District Assembly. Assemblies would then forward budget proposals to the Ministry of Security. The Ministry of Security Collegium would approve them by consensus or majority (as long as the majority includes a representative of each Entity and each constituent people). Separate escrow accounts would be created for the RS, each of the Cantons, and the Brcko District. Funds earmarked to cover the expenditures of the local police bodies located in the RS, the Cantons, and Brcko District would be channeled through them. Comment -------------- ¶11. (C) It is not surprising that Silajdzic and Tihic have objections to Lajcak's proposal. It does include further concessions to the RS beyond those already offered in a series of negotiations which ended unsuccessfully on March 14 (Ref A). It is also weaker than even the model suggested in the Police Reform Directorate Final Report (Ref C),and it is a far cry from the technical criteria envisioned in October 2005 when the EU principles were established. Nonetheless, their decision to publicly blast the High Representative's proposal before talks began raises profound concerns about their willingness to make the compromises necessary for Bosnia to sign a Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA). ¶12. (C) Our judgment is Silajdzic and Tihic, now joined by Serb parties, have virtually eliminated any prospect for a police reform deal in September, which admittedly were never all that bright to begin with. The High Representative now finds himself at a pivotal point in his tenure. He staked his reputation, credibility and authority on a September police reform deal. The Bosniak challenge over police reform comes on the heels of RS PM Dodik's anti-Dayton rhetoric and decision to essentially ignore a warning from Lajcak to cease and desist. Lajcak's staff have told us that the High Representative understands he must react. "Do nothing is not an option," one aide told us. The aide is right, and given the disdain Serbs and Bosniaks have displayed, Lajcak's response will need to be robust. We need to indicate our full support for any action Lajcak takes and help him stiffen the resolve of the Europeans to confront both Dodik and Silajdzic. MCELHANEY

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