Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07SARAJEVO1862
2007-08-30 14:53:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Sarajevo
Cable title:  

BOSNIA - AMBASSADOR DELIVERS STERN MESSAGE TO

Tags:  PGOV PREL PINR BK 
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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6947
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SARAJEVO 001862 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR(FRIED/DICARLO),EUR/SCE(HOH/FOOKS); NSC
FOR BRAUN; OSD FOR FATA, BEIN; USNIC FOR WIGHTMAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/29/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR BK
SUBJECT: BOSNIA - AMBASSADOR DELIVERS STERN MESSAGE TO
PRESIDENT RADMANOVIC OVER SERB RHETORIC

REF: SARAJEVO 1839 (NOTAL)

Classified By: Ambassador Douglas McElhaney. Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SARAJEVO 001862 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR EUR(FRIED/DICARLO),EUR/SCE(HOH/FOOKS); NSC FOR BRAUN; OSD FOR FATA, BEIN; USNIC FOR WIGHTMAN E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/29/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR BK SUBJECT: BOSNIA - AMBASSADOR DELIVERS STERN MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT RADMANOVIC OVER SERB RHETORIC REF: SARAJEVO 1839 (NOTAL) Classified By: Ambassador Douglas McElhaney. Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: The Ambassador met with Bosnian Serb member of the Presidency Nebojsa Radmanovic August 29 to deliver a strong message that the USG was growing increasingly concerned by recent comments from Republika Srpska Prime Minister Milorad Dodik, radmanovic himself, and other senior Alliance of Independent Social Democrats (SNSD) leaders. In the past two weeks, Dodik and others have directly linked the Kosovo final status process with the possibility of holding an RS independence referendum and made a series of comments that appear aimed at undermining Bosnian state-level institutions. Ambassador told Radmanovic that this strident and patently anti-Dayton rhetoric was reminiscent of the attitudes of the Serb Democratic Party (SDS) and warned that it could not continue. Radmanovic claimed that "Bosnian Serb citizens" were increasingly concerned about Kosovo and this put "tremendous political pressure" on Dodik and others to comment. He added these comments were designed to "manage the situation." Radmanovic described his and Dodik's comments on competencies as only intended to highlight the inefficiency of state-level institutions and raise the issue of whether certain functions could not be handled more effectively at the entity level. The Ambassador also urged Radmanovic to support High Representative Miroslav Lajcak's police reform proposal. In a seperate meeting, the Ambassador also urged Party for Democratic Action (SDA) President Sulejman Tihic to support Lajcak's efforts to conclude a police reform deal in September. With both men, the Ambassador stressed the importance of police reform to Bosnia's future and as a test of the country's political leaders willingness to reach the compromises necessary to restart the stalled reform process. END SUMMARY WHERE DOES SNSD STAND? -------------- ¶2. (C) Noting that recent comments by PM Dodik and other senior SNSD officials were "highly unacceptable" to the USG (Reftel),the Ambassador sternly informed President Radmanovic that SNSD and the RS leadership risked a serious reaction from the United States a
nd our international partners if they continue. Ambassador told Radmanovic that his party's rhetoric was futher polarizing an already tense political environment. In recent weeks, SNSD rhetoric rivaled, and perhaps even exceeded, some of the worst statements from former SDS governments, the Ambassador observed. Ambassador stated that aside from just verbally challenging the core of the Bosnian state as constructed under Dayton, the RS had also recently taken concrete steps, such as blocking demarcation of the Sava River, to undermine state institutions and prevent them from functioning. In essence, SNSD was preventing the state from doing its job and then turning around and attacking it for inefficiency. The U.S. was also unhappy with the implications of SNSD's recent comments that state-level competencies, including those outlined as such in the Dayton Constitution, needed to be returned to the entities. U.S. officials were now questioning whether SNSD were the reformers they claimed to be and how the party ought to be treated if, as their recent rhetoric suggests, they were actually anti-Dayton obstructionists determined to block the development of functioning state structures. CROSSING RED LINES ON KOSOVO -------------- ¶3. (C) On Kosovo, the Ambassador told Radmanovic that Dodik's August 20 comment linking the final status process to an RS referendum was a threat to stability throughout the region, not just in Bosnia, and warned that this type of comment must stop now. The Ambassador reminded Radmanovic that Dodik had pledged to A/S Fried during his April visit to Bosnia that he would not publicly mention Kosovo or renew calls for a referendum. The Ambassador warned that Dodik's statements only served to make the U.S. effort to resolve Kosovo final status more difficult. Radmanovic responded by noting that SARAJEVO 00001862 002 OF 003 he, as a President of Bosnia, had never once linked Kosovo's status with that of the RS, and that he had consistently and publicly said that Kosovo was an issue for Serbia, not Bosnia. Radmanovic said that he understood Kosovo and the RS were entirely different. In an attempt to defend Dodik, Radmanovic claimed RS politics "compelled" Dodik to comment on Kosovo. "99% of Serbs in the RS feel the same way about Kosovo as Serbs do in Serbia," Radmanovic explained, and the RS political leadership had to "at least rhetorically recognize this sentiment." The Ambassador countered that Dodik and other RS officials had repeatedly told him and other U.S. officials that the opposite was true -- that Bosnian Serbs were not concerned at all with Kosovo. Radmanovic shrugged but said both he and Dodik support U.S. efforts to resolve Kosovo status peacefully. QUESTION OF COMPETENCIES -------------- ¶4. (C) The Ambassador directly challenged comments by Dodik that Bosnia was an "interest category" and temporary, and statements by both Dodik and Radmanovic that dozens of competencies had been illegally transferred from the entities to the state and were subject to return. The Ambassador asked Radmanovic what specific competencies he and Dodik were referring to; for example, did they include such state-level competencies as defense and foreign affairs? Radmanovic attempted to defend the statements by claiming that Dodik and he were only speaking of competencies that were being poorly administered by the state and could be better executed at the entity-level. Radmanovic asserted that an "independent team of analysts and experts" working for the RS government and RS President had researched the topic and identified the competencies, many of which were being filled by "bureaucrats in Sarajevo making large salaries and doing no work." ¶5. (C) The Ambassador pressed, but Radmanovic declined to name a single competency transferred illegally to the state. Instead, he suggested that there were legal questions surrounding those institutions created by the HighRep using his Bonn Power. To the Ambassador's question as to whether he or the rest of the RS leadership were challenging the legality of the Bonn Powers, and by inference the Dayton Accords, Radmanovic demurred saying only that he only hoped that the Bonn Powers would be gone one day. The Ambassador pointed out that the Bosnian Serbs have consistently blocked the creation of many state-level institutions associated with state-level competencies under Dayton, which has forced the High Representative to use his Bonn Powers. The RS leadership then turns around and complains about the imposition even while arguing OHR is no longer necessary because Bosnian leaders can reach agreement on reforms without international community pressure. (Note: We have also raised the issue of competencies with Dodik's and Radmanovic's staff several times in the past week. No one has been able to provide us a single example of the "dozens" of competencies to which the SNSD leadership has been referring. End Note.) IGNORE POLITICAL TALK -------------- ¶6. (C) Not surprisingly, Radmanovic also claimed that much of Dodik's rhetoric was in response to the words and actions of leading Federation politicians. In particular, Radmanovic criticized Silajdzic's anti-RS rhetoric and said SDA President Tihic's comments that "no more concessions would be made to the RS" required a political response from Bosnian Serb leaders. Radmanovic also criticized President Komsic's August 27-28 visit to the United Nations where he, claiming to speak on behalf of the Bosnian Presidency, publicly threw the state's support behind a letter written by him and President Haris Silajdzic requesting UN remedies against Serbia and RS institutions based on their interpretation of the ICJ genocide verdict. In closing, Radmanovic, regaining his usual composure, expressed his hope that the United States recognized that the SNSD leadership was moderate and committed to a future RS within a Bosnian state. While professing not to be "Dodik's advocate," Radmanovic said that SARAJEVO 00001862 003 OF 003 the PM often made extreme and outlandish statements for political purposes that should not be taken seriously. URGING THE SERBS TO SUPPORT POLICE REFORM -------------- ¶8. (C) The Ambassador also urged Radmanovic to support High Representative Lajcak's new police reform proposal, which Radmanovic confirmed the HighRep has presented to him earlier in the day. The Ambassador told Radmanovic, who will be the RS's representative in upcoming talks, that the plan attempted to address many RS concerns by linking local police to the territory and institutions of the RS. With regards to the name, the Ambassador said that the HighRep's proposal was similar to what was tabled during the May Washington talks between Dodik and Silajdzic. The Ambassador urged Radmanovic to engage constructively on police reform. Radmanovic replied that he had not yet had time to review Lajcak's proposal, but would give it full consideration. Radmanovic predicted that he would seek changes to the plan, however, based on his cursory review, and warned that it would ultimately have to be acceptable to the RS National Assembly. Radmanovic doubted that the HighRep would meet his self-imposed September 15 deadline for concluding an agreement. AMMBASSADOR PRESSES TIHIC ON POLICE REFORM -------------- ¶9. (C) In a separate meeting on August 28, the Ambassador also raised police reform with Bosniak SDA Party President Tihic. (Note: Quint Ambassadors had met on the 27th and agreed to begin lobbying party leaders on police reform. End Note.) The Ambassador underscored that Lajcak's proposal would secure a police reform in which only the Bosnian state would pass laws related to policing. In addition, all bodies, including the local police bodies in the RS, would be legally defined as organizations of the Bosnian state, but the name issue would be deferred. The Ambassador stressed that Lajcak viewed the upcoming police reform talks as a test of each political leaders willingness to compromise and play a constructive role in the reform process. It was in Bosniak political leaders interest to keep the international community's pressure focused on Dodik and the Bosnian Serbs. With this in mind, the Ambassador urged Tihic be flexible, particularly with regard to the name - the issue on which Silajdzic had allowed a police reform deal to collapse in March MCELHANEY

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