BOSNIA: SILAJDZIC SIGNALS WILLINGNESS TO MAKE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SARAJEVO 001042 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR EUR (DICARLO),EUR/SCE(HOH/FOOKS),P FOR BAME NSC FOR BRAUN, USNIC FOR WIGHTMAN E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/14/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR KAWC KJUS BK SUBJECT: BOSNIA: SILAJDZIC SIGNALS WILLINGNESS TO MAKE HEADWAY ON POLICE, CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM IN WASHINGTON Classified By: Ambassador Douglas McElhaney for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) President Haris Silajdzic says that he views his trip to Washington the week of May 21 as a good opportunity to reach basic agreements on police and constitutional reform. Silajdzic said that the concurrent visit of Republika Srpska (RS) Prime Minister Milorad Dodik to Washington would allow senior State Department officials to facilitate agreements on long-standing points of contention, and meetings in the Department would "raise the stakes" for failure to compromise. On police reform, Silajdzic says that he would accept the Police Reform Directorate's Report, and agree to hold off pushing for an accord on the name of the police forces. On constitutional reform, Silajdzic said he "would go halfway" and accept a deal that abolished entity voting at the state-level, except for issues involving the transfer of competencies and shared competencies. He also said he wanted the "dissolution clause" of the U.S.-brokered package of amendments modified. Ambassador pledged to reach out to Dodik in the near-term to determine if Silajdzic's proposals could form the base for an agreement in Washington. End Summary. WASHINGTON VISIT: FORCE A DEAL -------------- ¶2. (C) Silajdzic told the Ambassador in a meeting on May 14 that his upcoming visit to Washington, which coincides with Dodik's visit, would probably be the best time to reach an agreement on police and constitutional reform. Silajdzic told the Ambassador that meeting with high-level State Department officials would "raise the stakes" for failure to agree to the reforms, adding that he could no longer afford to look like he wanted "to destroy everything." Silajdzic conceded that ideally he would like to dismantle the entire Bosnian state and entity apparatus and lay the foundations for a new, more centralized and just state, but considering the broader political realities, he realized that was no longer an option. He said that he was prepared to work these issues as long as it takes to hammer out an agreement, and suggested that high-level Washington officials be involved if an agreement is reached. POLICE REFORM: ACCEPT THE REPORT, HOLD OFF ON THE NAME -------------- -------------- ¶3. (C) Silajdzic said that, if Dodik agreed, substantial progress on police reform could be realized and the EU Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) could be signed following the Washington visit. Silajdzic agreed to sign off on the Police Directorate Report and accept the timeline that it contains, in exchange for Dodik agreeing to delay reaching an agreement on the name of the police forces. Silajdzic said that the only issue was "timing," and delaying the decision on the name could allow all parties to reach an acceptable long-term solution to the reform. Silajdzic told the Ambassador that he thought this agreement was "doable," but the Ambassador would have to strongly lobby Dodik. CONSTITUTIONAL REFORMS: REDUCE ENTITY VOTING -------------- ¶4. (C) Silajdzic also told the Ambassador that he was willing to deal on constitutional reform, and, that in a professed effort at transparency, he would share his "bottom line." Silajdzic said that he was willing to agree on the U.S. brokered package of amendments if two of his long-standing grievances with the package were addressed. Silajdzic said that any reform would have to expressly remove the ability of any minority bloc of deputies, meaning from the RS, to dissolve parliament and the government (i.e. the so-called "dissolution clause"). Second, Silajdzic said he could accept a deal that maintained entity voting only on the transfer of competencies from the entities to the state and on matters involving shared competencies. Silajdzic said he would not make an issue of some of his other previous objections, including the powers of the President and Prime Minister. Silajdzic told the Ambassador that by making "concessions," he was moving "more than halfway," and Dodik should be expected to reciprocate. Echoing some of his familiar lines, Silajdzic reminded the Ambassador that organs of the RS had been found "guilty of genocide" and that Dodik should be willing to offer political compromise as a remedy for these crimes. HOW TO MANAGE THE EUROPEANS -------------- ¶5. (C) Silajdzic professed that it might be easier to secure Dodik's support for his proposals than to deal with the political fallout among European partners to any agreement brokered in Washington. Silajdzic noted that police reform in particular had long been the purview of the EU, and that the USG should try to avoid the appearance of working around its authority. Silajdzic at first suggested inviting High Representative Schwarz- Schilling to the meetings in Washington, but quickly backed away from the idea when he realized that it may be counter-productive. In closing, an optimistic Silajdzic suggested that both he and Dodik could fly to Brussels after reaching agreement on the reforms in Washington and be on hand for the signing of the SAA. In that way, the Europeans could be made "to feel part of the process." COMMENT -------------- ¶6. (C) To gauge whether there is some mileage in making a major push on the reforms prior to Silajdzic and Dodik being in Washington next week, we will talk with Dodik May 14 as well. It could well be that the two could come to a meeting of the minds on the issues over the next several days, but it is too early to say whether the deadlock can be broken anytime soon. MCELHANEY