BRAZIL: POLITICAL SCIENTISTS OFFER GLOOMY PROGNOSIS, SEE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 SAO PAULO 000834 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS STATE FOR WHA/BSC, INR/IAA, INR/R/AA STATE PASS USTR FOR KATE DUCKWORTH NSC FOR TOMASULO TREASURY FOR JHOEK USDOC FOR 4332/ITA/MAC/WH/OLAC USDOC ALSO FOR 3134/USFCS/OIO DOL FOR ILAB SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD USAID FOR LAC/AA E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV PINR ECON BR SUBJECT: BRAZIL: POLITICAL SCIENTISTS OFFER GLOOMY PROGNOSIS, SEE LITTLE HOPE FOR REFORM REF: (A) BRASILIA 1745; (B) SAO PAULO 749; (C) SAO PAULO 48 (D) SAO PAULO 777 SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED - PLEASE PROTECT ACCORDINGLY -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (SBU) At a September 28 lunch with Emboffs, two prominent political scientists offered a gloomy outlook on the current political situation. According to them, chances for meaningful political reform seem dead, and the ongoing scandals involving Senate President Renan Calheiros (ref A) offer all too clear a picture of how the incentives and rewards system works for politicians. From the academics' perspective, opposition parties are unable to mount a serious challenge to the governing coalition, and the likelihood is that, with or without President Lula, the forces currently in power will remain there indefinitely. The two experts differed on whether Lula will seek a Constitutional amendment to enable him to run for a third term in 2010. The assessment presented by these two analysts reflects a growing consensus among the political, media, and business elite in Brazil. At this point, however, the growing sense of malaise among the elite has not coalesced in any clear call for reform. End Summary. ¶2. (U) Emboffs lunched September 28 with political scientists Bolivar Lamounier and Jose Augusto Guilhon de Albuquerque to discuss the current political scene. Both academics have published widely on Brazilian political issues; Lamounier taught for many years at the University of Sao Paulo (USP) and the Catholic University (PUC) and now has his own political consulting firm. Guilhon de Albuquerque, also an USP Professor Emeritus who specialized in international affairs, is an advisor to Vaz de Lima, President of the Sao Paulo State Legislative Assembly (ALESP). Both are associated with the opposition Social Democracy Party of Brazil (PSDB). -------------- PSDB BLUES -------------- ¶3. (SBU) Lamounier and Guilhon believe that the current situation, in which President Lula's 13-party governing coalition dominates Congress and receives little effective opposition from the PSDB and its own coalition partner, the Democratic Party (DEM),is bad for Brazilian democracy. The PSDB is in a difficult position for various reasons, not the least of which is its inability to oppose many of Lula's policies as he has taken many aspects of the PSDB's center-left agenda and made it his own. Opposing Lula would therefore be tantamount to renouncing the PSDB's own history and record. The second reason is that the two most prominent PSDB leaders, Governors Jose Serra of Sao Paulo and Aecio Neves of Minas Gerais, both want to run for President in 2010. Consummate politicians, they both understand the dangers of criticizing a very popular sitting president and his administration. Furthermore, political differences aside, both are on friendly terms with Lula and don't want to confront or challenge him openly. ¶4. (SBU) Lamounier believes that Lula's two main pillars of support - his own Workers' Party (PT) and the Brazilian Democratic Movement Party (PMDB) - will remain in power for some time to come regardless of the outcome of the 2010 presidential election. These parties have entrenched themselves throughout the federal bureaucracy through political appointments to various jobs. There are almost SAO PAULO 00000834 002 OF 004 20,000 non-career "Cargos de Confianca" (positions filled by political appointees) in the Executive Branch, including some 4,000 officials named directly by the President. In addition, the parties are benefiting from a generally strong economy and the popularity of social programs like "Bolsa Familia." ¶5. (SBU) Compounding the problem is that while most parties don't have any viable presidential candidates, the PSDB has two and a half - Serra, Neves, and 2006 nominee Geraldo Alckmin - and still no democratic system for choosing among them. (When Serra and Alckmin were competing for the party's 2006 presidential nomination, there was widespread perception that three PSDB leaders - Neves, former President Fernando Henrique Cardoso (FHC),and party president Tasso Jereissati - were the sole arbiters of the nomination. While PSDB officials insist that the triumvirate consulted extensively with many state and local officials and other representatives of the party's base before announcing the candidate, the image of the PSDB as an undemocratic and elitist party, out of touch with the people, has lingered.) Essentially, the party has too many candidates and not enough new ideas, not a recipe for success. ¶6. (SBU) Even if the PSDB works through its problems and its nominee wins the 2010 presidential election, the PMDB will still hold the balance of power, Lamounier said. The new president will have no choice but to seek an alliance with the PMDB, which will likely require control over certain Ministries and a large amount of pork and patronage. The PMDB, Lamounier cautioned, is always the problem, never the solution, because it has no political identity or ideology and exists for the sole purpose of advancing the personal interests of its members. -------------- LULA TO RUN AGAIN? -------------- ¶7. (SBU) Guilhon believes Lula is willing to do whatever is necessary to remain in power and may, despite his repeated denials, be positioning himself to run for a third term. He said that in light of the paucity of potential candidates of presidential stature, the political climate after the 2008 municipal elections might permit the PT to introduce the necessary proposal to amend the Constitution, and that the PMDB could help garner the votes needed for it to pass twice in each house before October 2009. (Note: Rule changes introduced within one year of an election generally do not enter into force until the following election. End Note.) Lamounier disagreed, commenting that such a move would make Brazil look like Venezuela and would thus be unacceptable to the people, the political class, and Lula himself, who prides himself on his democratic credentials. For Lamounier, the question is who will be Lula's preferred candidate in 2010. -------------- ...OR DESIGNATE AN HEIR? -------------- ¶8. (SBU) Both commentators agreed, without debate, that the PT has "nobody" to run as Lula's successor. They quickly ticked off the weaknesses of various "petistas" whose names have been mentioned. This led them to consider, as Lula is reportedly doing, possible candidates from other parties in the governing coalition. Guilhon mentioned federal deputy Ciro Gomes of the Brazilian Socialist Party (PSB),who finished third with about 11% of the vote in 1998 and fourth with about 12% in 2002 and went on to serve as Minister of National Integration in Lula's first term. Lula is known to think highly of him, and he might be able to win a lot of votes in the SAO PAULO 00000834 003 OF 004 populous northeast. When the PT in early September issued a resolution at its National Congress calling for a PT candidacy (ref B),a bloc of left and center-left parties in the governing coalition - the Communist Party of Brazil (PC do B),the PSB, the Democratic Labor Party (PDT),and several smaller configurations - organized themselves into a "Left Bloc" with a view to putting Gomes forward as an alternative candidate. ¶9. (SBU) Lamounier agreed that Gomes might run but predicted he would be "christianized". This is a term of art named after Christiano Machado, nominated for president in 1951 by the Social Democratic Party (PSD) but subsequently abandoned when his party decided to throw its support to former dictator Getulio Vargas of the Brazilian Labor Party (PTB). Likewise, in 1989 the Liberal Front Party (PFL) and the PMDB nominated candidates but then "christianized" them and supported Fernando Collor de Mello. Lamounier thinks Lula may support a Gomes candidacy but then abandon him to support the PSDB's Aecio Neves (who may or may not switch parties) or somebody from the PMDB, which despite being Brazil's largest party has not run a presidential candidate since 1994. -------------- REFORM REMAINS UNLIKELY -------------- ¶10. (SBU) Neither Lamounier nor Guilhon expected much to come of the PT's proposal to create a Constituent Assembly with limited authority to design and enact political reform. They agreed that the system needs to be reformed, citing the proportional vote in legislative elections as a major weakness that isolates office-holders from the voters and renders them unaccountable. Lamounier expressed support for a direct representation bill creating Congressional districts, such as the one proposed by federal deputy Arnaldo Madeira (PSDB-SP) (ref C),but was not optimistic about its chances. While everyone agrees the current system encourages and rewards corruption and fecklessness, it is so beneficial to the office-holders that they would never approve a fundamental reform with teeth. -------------- ECONOMIC CONCERNS -------------- ¶11. (SBU) The two experts' concern over the health of the political system extends to the economic realm as well. They see government expenditures increasing rapidly due to social programs such as "Bolsa Familia," of which they were both critical. When the program was introduced by Fernando Henrique Cardoso (FHC),Guilhon said, recipients had to meet conditions to qualify, such as keeping their children in schools and vaccinating them. Under Lula, it has grown so large and inclusive (between 45 and 50 million beneficiaries) that even if the requirements were still on the books, the government would be unable to enforce them. In effect, he opined, the program has become a cash giveaway. Lamounier believes the government's lack of fiscal discipline will lead to a crisis within the next ten years and speculates that this is the reason Lula doesn't really want a third term. -------------- COMMENT -------------- ¶12. (SBU) Though the PT was founded in Sao Paulo and still has support among the working class, the business community and large portions of the academic community favor the PSDB. Many of these SAO PAULO 00000834 004 OF 004 "tucanos", as members of the PSDB are called, are frustrated with their party's failure to articulate a credible alternative to the Lula administration, and the statements from these political commentators are in line with this sentiment. While a third consecutive Lula Presidency is unlikely, and the PT appears to have few viable candidates, the PSDB is similarly in disarray. ¶13. (SBU) The gloomy assessment presented by these two analysts reflects a growing consensus among the political, media, and business elite in Brazil-as evidenced, for example, by the creation of the "Cansei" movement (ref D). Until recently, the general sentiment among the elite has largely been one of relief that Lula maintained orthodox economic policies and has been willing to work within the political system. Now, many are focusing on the future. More aware than most Brazilians of the pace at which the world is changing, the elite are beginning to realize that the political and economic systems that worked well for them prior to globalization may well become a serious impediment to economic growth and political modernization. At this point, however, the growing sense of malaise among the elite has not coalesced in any clear call for reform. Nor is it clear that the broader Brazilian population, content with economic stability, appeased by government handouts, and dismissive of corruption, sees any need for it. End Comment. ¶14. (U) This cable was coordinated with Embassy Brasilia. WHITE