Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07SAOPAULO58
2007-01-24 09:32:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Consulate Sao Paulo
Cable title:  

HELPING SAO PAULO AUTHORITIES RESPOND TO SECURITY THREATS

Tags:  PGOV SNAR ASEC PREL BR 
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VZCZCXRO6652
PP RUEHRG
DE RUEHSO #0058/01 0240932
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 240932Z JAN 07
FM AMCONSUL SAO PAULO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6309
INFO RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 7388
RUEHAC/AMEMBASSY ASUNCION 2904
RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES 2602
RUEHMN/AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO 2257
RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ 3191
RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO 1966
RUEHRG/AMCONSUL RECIFE 3322
RUEHRI/AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO 7727
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC
RUEAWJC/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC
RHMCSUU/FBI WASHINGTON DC
RHMFIUU/TSA HQ WASHINGTON DC
RUEABND/DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMIN HQ WASHDC
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 SAO PAULO 000058 

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

STATE FOR WHA/BSC, INL
STATE ALSO FOR DS/IP/WHA, DS/DSS/ITA, DS/DSS/OSAC
NSC FOR FEARS
DOJ FOR BRUCE SWARTZ
TREASURY FOR OASIA, DAS LEE AND JHOEK
DHS HQ FOR PLCY/OIA - KEVIN O'REILLY
BUENOS AIRES FOR TSA/JOCHOA
USAID FOR LAC/AA

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV SNAR ASEC PREL BR
SUBJECT: HELPING SAO PAULO AUTHORITIES RESPOND TO SECURITY THREATS
TO PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM

REF: (A) SAO PAULO 36; (B) SAO PAULO 6

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED - PROTECT ACCORDINGLY

-------
SUMMARY
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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 SAO PAULO 000058 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS STATE FOR WHA/BSC, INL STATE ALSO FOR DS/IP/WHA, DS/DSS/ITA, DS/DSS/OSAC NSC FOR FEARS DOJ FOR BRUCE SWARTZ TREASURY FOR OASIA, DAS LEE AND JHOEK DHS HQ FOR PLCY/OIA - KEVIN O'REILLY BUENOS AIRES FOR TSA/JOCHOA USAID FOR LAC/AA E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV SNAR ASEC PREL BR SUBJECT: HELPING SAO PAULO AUTHORITIES RESPOND TO SECURITY THREATS TO PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM REF: (A) SAO PAULO 36; (B) SAO PAULO 6 SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED - PROTECT ACCORDINGLY -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (SBU) Consul General met January 17 with Sao Paulo State Secretary of Metropolitan Transportation Jose Luiz Portella and his SIPDIS team to follow up on Governor Serra's request (ref A) for security assistance in the subway and train systems. Portella described the challenges these systems face and outlined existing operating procedures. In response, DHS/ICE Attache asked a number of questions and offered to bring in an expert to provide an assessment. TSA representative in Buenos Aires is scheduled to visit Sao Paulo January 24 as a first step in providing targeted technical assistance to state security officials. End Summary. ¶2. (SBU) Consul General (CG),accompanied by DHS/ICE Country Attache, RSO, and poloff, met January 17 with Secretary of Metropolitan Transportation (STM) Jose Luiz Portella and numerous officials. Portella was accompanied by Deputy Secretary of Public Security Lauro Malheiros Neto; Military Police Sub-commander Colonel Jose Roberto Martins Marques; STM Security Coordinator Colonel Marco Antonio Moyses; Conrado Grava de Souza, Director of Operations for the Sao Paulo Metropolitan Company (Metro); Jose Luiz Bastos, Chief of the Security Department of Metro; Atilio Nerilo, Director of Operations and Maintenance for the Sao Paulo Company of Metropolitan Trains (CPTM); Colonel Leopoldo Augusto Correa Filho, Director of Security for the CPTM; and others. "Metro" refers to the subway system in Sao Paulo and environs, and CPTM is the more extensive commuter rail system. ¶3. (SBU) Secretary Portella, who, like most state government officials, is in his third week on the job, described the safety and security challenges his office faces. On the afternoon of January 12, there was a major cave-in on the construction site of a new subway line in the city; as of January 17, the bodies of two victims had been found, with at least five people still missing, and t
he unstable ground and fears of further landslides were impeding recovery efforts. Four more bodies have been recovered since then, and rescue operations continue, plagued by rainfall and mud. (Note: The "yellow line" Metro project was inaugurated amid great fanfare in December 2005 as Sao Paulo's first public-private partnership (PPP) project. End Note.) ¶4. (SBU) More to the point, there have been a number of recent security incidents in the public transportation system as reported reftels. On December 23, a device exploded near the Ana Rosa metro station in south-central Sao Paulo; nobody was injured. Early in the morning of December 25, a bomb exploded on a CPTM train at the downtown Itapevi station, killing one person. A second device was found on that train and was deactivated and taken to a Military Police explosive storage facility. However, it was apparently not effectively deactivated, because on January 2, a police sergeant was killed when it exploded while he was tinkering with it (ref B). In addition, there have been several bomb scares that turned out to be false alarms. For these reasons, Governor Serra had asked the Ambassador for any available U.S. expertise and assistance, and the Secretariat for Metropolitan Transportation (STM) had submitted a SIPDIS list of operational questions for subway authorities in New York and Washington, DC. DHS and other USG authorities are currently working on responses to those questions. ¶5. (SBU) The Attache described the department of Homeland Security's (DHS) composition and his agency's and authority. He SAO PAULO 00000058 002 OF 003 further explained that in DHS, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is the subject matter expert in the area of security on airplanes, trains, and other modes of transportation and that TSA has a Regional Attache in Buenos Aires. The Attache believes Sao Paulo transportation security officials would benefit from a visit to major cities in the U.S. to see how the job is done there, or, alternatively, DHS/TSA can arrange for the visit of an expert from the U.S. ¶6. (SBU) Portella and his team responded to a series of questions prepared by the ICE and DHS Attaches. The system encompasses more than 3,000 kilometers of rail. Metro has 54 stations and CPTM has ¶88. The only real difference between the two systems is that CPTM is almost entirely above ground. Metro carries 3 million passengers per day, versus 1.6 million for CPTM. Metro's red line carries 75,000 passengers per hour in each direction during morning and late afternoon peak periods. Trains are inspected thoroughly before beginning a day's service, and controls were strengthened after the December 23 Metro station bomb incident. Authorities of both Metro and CPTM are finding an increasing number of unusual or suspicious packages, each one requiring an inspection and a determination. Many of them turn out not to be a threat, but "even an empty box can cause problems." Even if it's just an empty laptop case, or a bag of bananas or dirty laundry, Metro and CPTM have to take precautions until they determine it is not lethal, which can be extremely disruptive. Sometimes it's merely vandalism by youth gangs or by individuals or groups interested, for their own parochial reasons, in harming the rail system. ¶7. (SBU) Metro has about 1,000 security personnel, and CPTM has 1,200. In addition to these, there are contractors and police officers. Metro has 650 video cameras and CPTM 866, but many of these cannot record. Ultimately the companies would like to have 24-hour camera coverage of all stations. In the event of a security threat or incident, the appropriate company's security personnel respond, along with military police, civil police, and the Fire Department. The military police have training in bomb detection and in explosive ordnance disposal. Officials of other agencies have varying degrees of security training. Portella's answer to the CG's question whether there was an inter-agency task force for dealing with security issues was unclear, but it appears that they do not. More than anything, officials would like an expert to review and diagnose the threats they face and the procedures they have in place to address them. Training appropriate to their local situation could follow. They would also like updated guides and manuals from USG security and law enforcement agencies. ¶8. (SBU) The device found December 23 in the Ana Rosa Metro station was a pipe bomb. The bomb used in the December 25 CPTM train incident was an incendiary device. The device that exploded January 2 at a Military Police Battalion (ref B),killing a police sergeant, appeared to be made of sandy, greasy matter. Authorities believe the organized crime gang First Capital Command (PCC) may be responsible for the recent spate of attacks and have arrested one PCC member, who was reportedly responsible for the murder of a judge in 2002. ¶9. (SBU) Bringing the meeting to a close, CG summed up the state of play. DHS and RSO are seeking answers to the questions submitted by Secretary Portella's staff on January 10. DHS/ICE Attache promised SIPDIS to arrange a visit by the Regional TSA Attache in Buenos Aires, who can obtain the guides and manuals requested by Portella's staff. (Note: This visit has been scheduled to take place January 23-26. End Note.) The Secretariat should identify key employees to send for training in the U.S. Portella designated Military Police Colonel Jose Roberto Martins and Metro Security Director Conrado Grava de Souza as POCs for follow-up with USG. SAO PAULO 00000058 003 OF 003 ¶10. (SBU) Comment: The meeting was cordial and productive. It helped define problems and identify practical measures to address them. Per ref A, Governor Serra has indicated that money is not the problem, and that what the state government needs is equipment, training, and expertise. Assisting Sao Paulo state deal with its security challenges could be a cost-effective way of generating good will. End Comment. ¶11. (U) This cable was cleared by DHS/ICE Attache in Brasilia. MCMULLEN

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