Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07SAOPAULO129
2007-02-15 10:41:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Consulate Sao Paulo
Cable title:  

PT INTERNAL DISPUTE FORESHADOWS 2010 ELECTION

Tags:  PINR PGOV ELAB BR 
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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6446
INFO RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 7539
RUEHAC/AMEMBASSY ASUNCION 2930
RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES 2640
RUEHMN/AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO 2273
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RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
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RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC
RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 SAO PAULO 000129 

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

STATE FOR WHA/FO, WHA/BSC, DRL, IL, INR/IAA, INR/R/AA
STATE PASS USTR FOR CRONIN
STATE PASS EXIMBANK
STATE PASS OPIC FOR DMORONESE, NRIVERA, CVERVENNE
STATE ALSO PASS TDA FOR ANGULO AND MCKINNEY
NSC FOR FEARS
TREASURY FOR OASIA, DAS LEE AND JHOEK
USDOC FOR 4332/ITA/MAC/WH/OLAC
USDOC FOR 3134/ITA/USCS/OIO/WH/RD
SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD
USAID FOR LAC/AA

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PINR PGOV ELAB BR
SUBJECT: PT INTERNAL DISPUTE FORESHADOWS 2010 ELECTION

REFS: (A) BRASILIA 208; (B) BRASILIA 107;

(C) SAO 06 SAO PAULO 1264 (D) 06 SAO PAULO 1105;
(E) 06 BRASILIA 727; (F) 05 SAO PAULO 1110

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED - PLEASE PROTECT ACCORDINGLY

-------
SUMMARY
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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 SAO PAULO 000129 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS STATE FOR WHA/FO, WHA/BSC, DRL, IL, INR/IAA, INR/R/AA STATE PASS USTR FOR CRONIN STATE PASS EXIMBANK STATE PASS OPIC FOR DMORONESE, NRIVERA, CVERVENNE STATE ALSO PASS TDA FOR ANGULO AND MCKINNEY NSC FOR FEARS TREASURY FOR OASIA, DAS LEE AND JHOEK USDOC FOR 4332/ITA/MAC/WH/OLAC USDOC FOR 3134/ITA/USCS/OIO/WH/RD SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD USAID FOR LAC/AA E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PINR PGOV ELAB BR SUBJECT: PT INTERNAL DISPUTE FORESHADOWS 2010 ELECTION REFS: (A) BRASILIA 208; (B) BRASILIA 107; (C) SAO 06 SAO PAULO 1264 (D) 06 SAO PAULO 1105; (E) 06 BRASILIA 727; (F) 05 SAO PAULO 1110 SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED - PLEASE PROTECT ACCORDINGLY -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (SBU) Summary: The 2010 presidential election, in which President Lula will not be a candidate for the first time since 1985, is the apple of discord behind the current conflict between various factions and tendencies of the ruling Workers' Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores - PT). The different ideological groups in the party are fighting for a better political position within the government during Lula's second term and in the PT's governing National Directorate (DN). The two main rivals are the Majority Faction ("Campo Majoritario"),heavily influenced by former Minister Jose Dirceu, and leftist tendencies represented by Tarso Genro, Minister of Institutional Relations. In regional terms, the Campo Majoritario is dominated by PT members from Sao Paulo, while the leftists who oppose them are from various other states, with Rio Grande do Sul heavily represented. The immediate occasion for the dispute is the celebration of the 27th anniversary of the party's founding, but it is expected to play out through the 3rd National PT Congress, scheduled for July, and PT internal elections for President and DN, which are scheduled for late 2008 but are expected to be moved up to late 2007. Ultimately, this power struggle and its outcome are likely to have a major impact on the PT's 2010 candidate and campaign. End Summary. ¶2. (U) The PT's performance in the 2006 national elections, when it won 83 seats (out of a total of 513) in the Chamber of Deputies and became the second-largest political force in the Congress, just behind the Brazilian Democratic Movement Party (PMDB),gave the party a new lease on life and a new perspective. Instead of being humiliated and punished by voters for the various corruption
scandals of 2005-6, as many analysts predicted, the PT recovered strength and optimism. With these, not surprisingly, came an appetite for more power. In January, the party decided to put forward its own candidate for President of the Chamber of Deputies (Speaker of the House equivalent) in the person of Arlindo Chinaglia of Sao Paulo, who led government forces in the last Congress (see ref B). This decision challenged a previous agreement between the President Lula and member parties of his governing coalition to maintain Aldo Rebelo (Communist Party of Brazil - PCdoB) in the presidency. When the new Congress was seated February 1 (ref A), Chinaglia defeated Rebelo in the second round and became the new Chamber President as a result of an alliance with the PMDB and some unexpected support from the opposition Brazilian Social Democracy Party (PSDB). -------------- CAMPO MAJORITARIO VS. LEFTISTS -------------- ¶3. (SBU) Chinaglia represents the Campo Majoritario, the largest faction in the PT, and was supported by a group of prominent traditional representatives of the influential Sao Paulo PT. These include Jose Dirceu, President Lula's former Chief of Civil Household (Chief of Staff equivalent),who resigned in June 2005 at the height of the "mensalao" (vote-buying) scandal and was later expelled from Congress and deprived of his political rights for eight years, and indicted by the Attorney General (AG); former Sao Paulo Mayor Marta Suplicy, considered by some a possible successor to Lula; former Finance Minister Antonio Palocci, another senior administration figure who resigned due to corruption allegations; SAO PAULO 00000129 002 OF 004 former president of the Chamber of Deputies Joao Paulo Cunha, accused in the "mensalao" scandal of receiving dirty money but acquitted by Congress, though he remains under indictment by the AG; and PT National President and former Labor Minister Ricardo Berzoini, who stepped down as Lula's campaign manager last September at the height of the "dossier" scandal and only recently returned to the party's presidency after a semi-voluntary leave of absence. Marco Aurelio Garcia, Lula's foreign policy advisor and PT First Vice President who replaced Berzoini both in the campaign and (temporarily) in the party's top job, is also affiliated with the Campo Majoritario, but owes his loyalty directly to Lula. Senator Aloizio Mercadante, the PT's unsuccessful candidate for Governor of Sao Paulo, is another prominent Campo Majoritario figure close to Lula. His clout has been diminished, however, by both his poor showing in the election and his centrality to the "dossier" scandal, in which PT operatives, including Mercadante campaign staffers, are accused of paying about USD 870,000 for a smear campaign against Mercadante's opponent, now-Governor Jose Serra. ¶4. (U) Chinaglia's victory in the Chamber election demonstrated not only that the PT as a whole is back on track, but that the Campo Majoritario is still very powerful within the party, though somewhat fragmented. Leftist groups and social movements within the PT hold the Campo Majoritario responsible for the mensalao scandal and more generally for betraying the party's history and social responsibility. They have been particularly critical of the Lula administration's orthodox macro-economic policies as implemented by former Finance Minister (now Federal Deputy) Palocci; they believe Brazil's high interest rates stifle growth and hurt the poor. More generally, they believe President Lula has not devoted enough attention or resources to social programs or to redistribution of wealth. The Campo Majoritario has controlled the National Directorate and thus the party for almost fifteen years and is credited with developing the party apparatus that made possible Lula's 2002 victory. The mensalao scandal, however, had given the internal opposition the opportunity to overthrow the Campo and gain more seats in the National Directorate; in the September 2005 internal elections for PT President and Directorate, leftist candidates Valter Pomar (now PT Secretary for International Relations) and Raul Pont (Rio Grande do Sul state legislator and, until last week, PT Secretary-General - see ref D) gave Ricardo Berzoini of the Campo Majoritario a run for the money. Berzoini won in the second round and the Campo retained its majority, but it was a close call. One immediate result of these elections was the defection of several prominent leftists to Heloisa Helena's Socialism and Liberty Party (PSOL) (ref F). The results of the 2006 presidential, gubernatorial, and legislative elections, however, followed by Chinaglia's victory in the Chamber, made it clear that the Campo Majoritario is still very much alive. -------------- TARSO'S MANIFESTO -------------- ¶5. (U) The dispute between the two groups, though no secret, came into the full glare of the public and media spotlight in early February when leftist groups, with the support of more moderate groups, launched the first draft of a document called "Message to the Party." Signed by 214 party officials and orchestrated by Minister of Institutional Relations Tarso Genro, the document is a preliminary version of a proposal to be presented in July at the 3rd PT National Congress. It calls for a new internal party organization in which the Campo Majoritario would no longer be the core element. Furthermore, it suggests that the 3rd PT Congress should address corruption within the party and punish those involved in the mensalao scandal as part of an effort to "recreate" or "re-found" the party. The manifesto was clearly an attack on the group beholden to Jose Dirceu, many of whose members have been SAO PAULO 00000129 003 OF 004 involved in the ethical scandals of recent years. Until his spectacular fall, Dirceu was considered the evil political genius of the Lula administration and the PT; many believe the activities that led to the scandals were motivated by Dirceu's desire to generate the funds necessary to perpetuate the PT's hold on power. ¶6. (U) Dirceu, who is prohibited from running for or holding any government office but not barred from behind-the-scenes activity, reacted angrily to the document and asked Lula to weigh in on his behalf. Tarso Genro then rewrote the document, removing provocative words like "corruption" and "party re-creation", but the overall message of profound dissatisfaction remained, albeit less explicitly. An important subtext of the imbroglio is Dirceu's ongoing effort to have the Chamber of Deputies rescind its December 2005 expulsion of him and removal of his political rights; while he has strong support in some quarters, many in the PT believe this would be an inappropriate, indeed scandalous, use of the party's political resources. Dirceu may also eventually want an amnesty to protect him from the AG's charges (ref E) that he was the mastermind of a sophisticated criminal organization that engaged in bribery, money-laundering, and illicit payoff schemes, but for the time being he appears content to let the judicial process take its course; he says he is innocent and wants his day in court. ¶7. (U) The division between the Campo Majoritario and the leftist groups is an old story. The novelty in this episode is that there is a new configuration of the Campo Majoritario itself. The 2006 election brought to the forefront new faces in the party, such as the new Governor of Bahia, Jacques Wagner, and the new Governor of Sergipe, Marcelo Deda. (Note: Deda signed the "Message to the Party" but Wagner did not. End Note.) Popular in their states, they both belong to the Campo Majoritario but are not within Dirceu's sphere of influence. They also cannot be considered close to the leftists from Rio Grande do Sul. They represent new forces from the Northeast which want the region to have a larger role in party deliberations. They also believe that the PT must face up to its ethical shortcomings and responsibilities. With President Lula's support, they propose the creation of a new Campo Majoritario, which is being referred to informally as the New Political Camp ("Novo Campo Politico). It would remain a majority but would not leave power concentrated in the hands of the one small group - especially not a group controlled by Dirceu. -------------- THE 2010 ELECTION -------------- ¶8. (SBU) Gathered together for the celebration of its 27th anniversary in Salvador (Bahia) last weekend, the PT also revealed that its relationship with President Lula is not what it used to be (see ref C). Lula gave a speech asking the party to avoid internal disputes and to unite in support of his government. At the end of the gathering, however, the PT National Directorate issued a note saying that the party wants a larger and more substantive presence in Lula's second-term government. They would like to control such Ministries as Communications and Health, currently in the hands of Lula's PMDB coalition partners. Indeed, Lula is faced with the challenge of distributing Ministries and other important positions to representatives of his eight-party coalition without significantly reducing the PT presence in the government. The Directorate also criticized the government's macroeconomic policies, especially the high (albeit declining) interest rates maintained by the Central Bank. The PT has often accused the Central Bank of being too independent and out of tune with the country; the leftists especially believe the Bank should hew more to the government and party line. ¶9. (SBU) The content of the Directorate's communique reveals that SAO PAULO 00000129 004 OF 004 the party is trying to play both government and opposition roles, since it is seeking more power within the government while at the same time posing as an independent government critic. In the past, the PT, even when critical of Lula, has remained on his side and defended him against outside criticism. Now the balance of forces between Lula and "his" party is more delicate. The PT seems determined to run its own candidate for president in 2010 instead of supporting somebody from another party in the coalition, which would be President Lula's first choice if he can't find a successor to his liking from within the PT. On the other hand, Lula is determined to have a strong influence over future elections. As Lula increasingly becomes a lame duck - a process expected to accelerate after the 2008 municipal elections - his interests are likely to match the PT's goals and priorities less and less. -------------- COMMENT -------------- ¶10. (SBU) The internal dissension in the PT is not as simple as it might appear from the description above. Following the "Message to the Party," the Campo Majoritario put out its own message, and various smaller groups, including Valter Pomar's Axis of the Left, weighed in with their own perspectives. These papers may be viewed on the PT's website, www.pt.org.br. The various "tendencies" appear to be staking out territory. The PT is scheduled to hold internal elections in 2008, but Pomar told us recently that the National Congress is likely to move the date up to September 2007, before the municipal election campaign begins. ¶11. (SBU) Tarso Genro, the most vocal "dissident" against Campo Majoritario rule, is believed to be close to Lula but otherwise unpopular in the party. A former Mayor of Porto Alegre, he served as Education Minister until Lula asked him in 2005 to help pull the PT back together after scandal decimated its senior ranks. He would have run for PT President but was unwilling to do so as long as Dirceu remained a candidate for the National Directorate. After resisting the pressure for some time, Dirceu eventually withdrew his name, but the hard-fought battle made it clear to Genro that even as party president he would not be in charge, so he stepped aside to let Ricardo Berzoini run. Genro is often spoken of as a short-listed candidate to replace Marcio Thomaz Bastos as Minister of Justice, but Lula has been in no hurry to implement his long-awaited Cabinet shuffle. Now Genro may have burned too many bridges in the party to be named to the Cabinet. For his part, the PT's most famous founding member, President Lula, is clearly not happy about the PT's internal conflicts, but appears to be taking the same lackadaisical approach to party affairs as to governing: he's essentially watching the world pass by. End Comment. ¶12. (U) This cable was cleared/coordinated with Embassy Brasilia. WOLFE

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