CHILE ON THE CONTINENT: LOTS OF COMMON INTERESTS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SANTIAGO 000827

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/16/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL CI
SUBJECT: CHILE ON THE CONTINENT: LOTS OF COMMON INTERESTS
BUT FEELING LONELY

REF: SANTIAGO 796

Classified By: DCM Emi Yamauchi for reasons 1.5 (b and d).


1. (C) On May 15 E/Pol Counselor called on Ambassador Juan
Pablo Lira, head of the MFA's Division for South America, to
deliver demarche points on Venezuela-Iran relations (reftel),
a conversation which then turned to Chile's relations with
its fellow South Americans. Chile, Lira said, "often feels
isolated" when its representatives are at meetings with its
Latin brethren. "Who can we talk to," Lira wondered, "when
the discussion turns to subjects such as Chavez' proposal for
a South American Bank to replace the IMF and World Bank?"
This is an idea "absolutely without merit," but which has at
least the rhetorical support of many of Chile's neighbors.
Argentina's Kirchner is "not interested" in foreign affairs.
Uruguay is a "serious country" but, like Chile, small.
Brazil's Lula could offer a counterweight to Chavez - the
agreements signed by the USG and Brazil during President
Bush's visit, especially on energy were welcome signs of
Lula's potential leadership - but Lula's "political
pragmatism" leads him to also support populist positions.
Elsewhere on the continent, Colombia could also offer an
alternative to Venezuelan ambition. Uribe has "done a
tremendous job," but Colombia's ongoing political violence
forces Uribe to remain focused internally.


2. (C) Some Chileans, Lira observed, were "astonished at how
patient" the U.S. is with Chavez. E/Pol Counselor replied
that the USG was interested in working with "like-minded"
countries such as Chile, which offered substantive solutions
to the region's problems, so as to blunt Chavez's appeal.
Lira said Chile understood that approach and, for example,
had the day before concluded a very useful set of meetings
with Ecuador, whose Foreign Minister had led a "high-powered"
delegation of ministers to Santiago. While Ecuadorean
President Correa remained a "wild-card," Chile would use
ministerial and working-level contacts to encourage Ecuador's
better instincts.


3. (C) According to Lira, Chile's relations with Peru are
solid; President Garcia had completed a year in office and
all signs were positive that he was keeping Peru on the
correct economic path. Lira agreed that Garcia's April
meeting with President Bush had been very good. It is
essential that the U.S.-Peru FTA be ratified by the U.S.
Congress. E/Pol Counselor noted that President Bachelet had
sent a letter to House Speaker Nancy Pelosi encouraging
ratification of FTA's for Peru, Colombia and Panama.


4. (C) As to Bolivia, Lira said he was to depart for La Paz
the following day to lead semi-annual talks with the
Bolivians on a "twelve-point" agenda focused on economic,
commercial, and cultural cooperation. These discussions were
going well and could improve the atmosphere for some sort of
agreement on the "thirteenth point" of the Chile-Bolivia
agenda, Bolivia's desire for access to the sea. While such
access could "never" include cession of Chilean territory to
Bolivia, Lira said he saw hopeful signs La Paz might agree to
an (unspecified) formula that enhances Bolivia's access to
Chilean ports and corridor(s) inland, but which falls short
of granting Bolivia sovereignty over either.

KELLY