AMBASSADOR DISCUSSES HAITI, SOFA, THE ICC AND

C O N F I D E N T I A L SANTIAGO 000075 SIPDIS SIPDIS NOFORN E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/12/2017 TAGS: PREL MARR PGOV MOPS ETRD CI SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR DISCUSSES HAITI, SOFA, THE ICC AND MILITARY PROCUREMENT WITH MINISTER OF DEFENSE REF: A. SANTIAGO 02666 ¶B. SANTIAGO 02629 ¶C. SOUTHCOM DRAFT REPORT ON DCDR MEETING WITH CHILEAN UNDERSECRETARY FOR THE ARMY GARCIA 13DEC2006 ¶D. SANTIAGO 02581 ¶E. STATE 184599 ¶F. SANTIAGO 02382 Classified By: Ambassador Craig Kelly for reasons 1.4(b) and (d). ¶1. Summary: (C) Minister of Defense Vivianne Blanlot told the Ambassador January 10 that Chile wanted to see Haiti progress to a point where MINUSTAH'S withdrawal would not initiate a "backslide to ground zero." Chile, along with Argentina and Brazil, were looking for an international commitment that would lead to effective development and a shift from MINUSTAH's primary reliance on the military to civilian policing. She made a strong plea for an effective maritime interdiction regime for Haiti. Blanlot said Post's request for short-term SOFA-like protections was in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the MOD had little role to play in that process. The MOD had cleared an administrative hurdle for SOFA-enabling legislation, and although the legislative process would be slow she did not foresee congressional opposition to the measure. Congressional delays on Chile's ratification of the International Criminal court could continue until the end of 2007. In response to the Ambassador's advocacy for U.S. helicopter manufacturers, Blanlot said she was confident that the Air Force's upcoming procurement decision would be taken on sound and transparent technical grounds, and the other branches (police, army and navy) would likely follow the Air Force's lead. End Summary. ¶2. (C) The Ambassador invited Minister of Defense Blanlot and her top advisors to a lunch at his residence January 10. Blanlot appeared tan and rested after her recent vacation in Cuba. Accompanying Blanlot were Undersecretary for the Army Gonzalo Garcia, Air Force General and Chief of the Joint Staff Juan Fabry, and senior advisors Rodrigo Atria and Maria Inez Ruz. The Ambassador was accompanied by DCM, Poloff, DATT, MILG Commander and visiting Chile desk officer. CHILE PRESSING FOR RENEWED HAITI COMMITMENT -------------- ¶3. (C) While not suggesting Chile was looking at a withdrawal date as some GOC interlocutors have recently intimated (refs A-C) Blanlot noted that Chile's commitment there could not be open-ended. If MINUSTAH were to withdraw today, things would rapidly regress and it would be only a matter of time before the international community would again be forced to intervene. Chile would not make any changes in its force levels or commitments without prior consultation with Brazil and Argentina (a message Poloff also received from the MFA). However, domestic support for Chile's role in Haiti was waning, with increasing congressional opposition. Chilean forces were undertaking riskier operations in Cite de Soleil, increasing the chances of a fatality -- something Chile has never experienced in a peace-keeping operation. Blanlot said she could not gauge the political effect if a Chilean were killed in MINUSTAH operations. ¶4. (C) Blanlot said Chile's commitment in Haiti would be increasingly difficult to sustain without significant short-term improvements in both security and economic development. She was emphatic that an effective naval interdiction force was critical to these goals -- Haitian gangs smuggled contraband and drugs out to pay for weapons to be smuggled back in. Naval interdiction would cut the gang's lifelines and allow civil authorities to exert greater control. She also expressed concern at the slow pace and relatively ineffective training of the Haitian National Police (HNP). 15 HNP officers are slated for training in Chile, but that was "a drop in the ocean." The Preval government is now saying the entire judiciary needs to be replaced, a move she considers both impractical and unnecessary. ¶5. (C) Argentina, Brazil and Chile will be meeting in Buenos Aires January 17 to discuss common positions for the 9 1 meeting to be held February 5 in Lima, before the UN vote to renew MINUSTAH's mandate. Chile will push for a mechanism to ensure that donor pledges are honored and in the near-term; for a shift in MINUSTAH's security forces from military to civilian police; and for the creation of an effective maritime cordon around Haiti. SOFA, THE ICC AND ASPA -------------- ¶6. (C) The Ambassador noted that we were keen to establish protected status for U.S. / DOD personnel Q Chile for exercises and exchanges in 2007, preferably a Status of Forces Agreement or a temporary agreement providing SOFA-like protections. It was standard for these agreements to include permission to enter and depart using military ID and orders, given the nature of our deployments. Stressing the high level of bilateral trust we have in the GOC and Chilean military, he highlighted the Department's concern that "lowering the bar" for one country raises expectations in other countries that the USG will agree to similar provisions. Unaware of the current sticking points in our discussions with the MFA (ref D) Blanlot anticipated that State and the MFA could simply renew the latest agreement. She said the MOD had little role in the proposed exchange of diplomatic notes. (NOTE: On January 9, Deputy Director of Special Policies Pedro Suckel told Poloff that a reply to our request for equivalent Administrative and Technical status (ref E) was on the Foreign Minister's desk for signature. Suckel said the counter proposal would not include travel waivers, without elaborating on its other provisions. End note.) ¶7. (C) Blanlot said Garcia had convinced Treasury to sign off on the SOFA-enabling legislation that would allow the GOC to negotiate bilateral SOFAs without further congressional authority (ref F). The Ambassador asked if, given the transversal opposition to concluding an Article 98, there would be problems in passing the legislation. Blanlot did not anticipate the legislation would encounter opposition, saying the congressional commissions that would consider the legislation were aware it would be in Chile's best interest to enter into these types of agreements. However, she noted that other branches of the GOC did not seem to share the MOD's sense of urgency about passing this legislation. ¶8. (C) Blanlot said the Chilean Congress would not move quickly to ratify the International Criminal Court. There was an agreement to thoroughly assess potential damage from sanctions under the American Servicemembers Protection Act (ASPA) before moving forward. Additionally, legislators on the right had concerns about the possibility of politically motivated prosecutions once Chile ratified. Although it could be ratified this year, for now the legislation was "sleeping the sleep of the just." The Ambassador further noted that the ASPA exemptions for IMET to 22 countries signed by President Bush did not include Chile, and that the exemption in the Defense Authorization Act could disappear in the next budget cycle. ¶9. (C) Garcia expressed concern that Chile still faced cuts in Foreign Military Finance (FMF) and Excess Defense Articles (EDA) under ASPA. Poloff informed that Chile's current exposure to application of ASPA sanctions was approximately USD 74 million, mostly tied to the transfer of KC-135 and S-3 aircraft. This figure could rapidly grow given pending Chilean navy requests for an oiler, as well as requests from the other branches. MILITARY PROCUREMENTS -------------- ¶10. (C) The Ambassador asked Blanlot about Chilean plans to buy helicopters, noting that the two U.S. companies with active bids on the procurement offered service and support service and support packages far superior to those of the other contenders. Blanlot said the Air Force would soon make a recommendation to the MOD about a purchase, likely to be followed by orders from the Chilean Police and eventually the Army. MOD efforts to convince the services to make a joint decision and purchase had not succeeded, but the feeling was that both Police and Army would be influenced by what the Air Force decided (although the Army may have different requirements). She expressed confidence the purchase decision would be made transparently, based on firm technical assessments. Asked about a pending procurement for Air Force training aircraft, General Fabry said the decision was not imminent. The Air Force was in the early stages of assessing the technical data. PKO ASSISTANCE AND DEMINING IN AFGHANISTAN -------------- ¶12. (C) Blanlot was aware of our interest in Chilean demining assistance to Afghanistan. Blanlot said the will to assist with Afghani demining effort was certainly there. However, given Chile's outstanding commitments to domestic demining operations and limited demining resources, it would be difficult for the GOC/MOD to send deminers to Afghanistan. Chile is already far behind on its Ottawa demining obligations, and does not expect to complete demining before ¶2016. Acknowledging the Ambassador's point about the similarities in climate and terrain, Blanlot suggested a better solution would be to bring Afghan deminers to Chile to train in the northern deserts. Rodrigo Atria noted that the MOD had received a specific training assistance request from the Guatemalan-based CFAC (Central American peacekeeping center) for assistance in April, and was analyzing whether the request fit with the CECOPAC (Chilean peacekeeping center) training schedule. UNDER THE CARIBBEAN SUN -------------- ¶13. (C) Blanlot said she had just returned from a vacation in Cuba, where she was entertained in style by various members of the GOCuba. The Embarcadero was replete with European tourists, enjoying the (artificial) Cuban experience. She noted that there was considerable restoration work underway in historic downtown Havana. While cruising on a state-owned yacht, with the someone who "might have been Director of Cuba's natural resources authority," she observed one marina was undertaking a major expansion of its berthing and support infrastructure. The manager of the facility told her it was in anticipation of a surge in recreational yachting business, without explicitly stating "of tourists from the U.S." Blanlot said clearly the Cuban people expect some major transformations in the very near future. The weather and the island were beautiful, and it was a shame that the country and economy weren't more open. COMMENT -------------- ¶14. (C) Blanlot continues to be well disposed toward the United States, and seemed to enjoy spending time with the Embassy, becoming more animated as the meal progressed. As she was leaving for her next appointment, she pulled the Ambassador aside to request a one-on-one meeting, which is being arranged. Ambassador believes Blanlot wishes to discuss further her trip to Cuba, where she met with Raul. KELLY