EL SALVADOR: SURVEY OF IRAQ DEPLOYMENT REQUIREMENTS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SAN SALVADOR 002249

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR PM, WHA/CEN, NEA/I-PM(SEPSTEIN)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/07/2017

TAGS: ES MARR MOPS PREL
SUBJECT: EL SALVADOR: SURVEY OF IRAQ DEPLOYMENT REQUIREMENTS

REF: SECSTATE 150164

Classified By: Ambassador Charles Glazer for reason 1.4(d)


1. (C) As requested reftel, we provide the following
assessment of the political and legal challenges El Salvador
would face in order to deploy troops to Iraq in 2009 without
the umbrella of a United Nations (UN) Chapter VII mandate.


2. (C) The government of El Salvador (GOES) has maintained a
military presence in Iraq since August 2003. Besides the
U.S., it is the only troop-contributing nation in this
hemisphere. To date the Armed Forces of El Salvador (ESAF)
have rotated nine contingents through Iraq, and are presently
in the process of formalizing a tenth. According to the
Salvadoran constitution, the President does not need
Legislative Assembly approval to deploy the ESAF abroad. In
order to confer the maximum political legitimacy possible,
however, President Saca sought and obtained (most recently in
August 2006) a Legislative Assembly vote in support of
allowing the ESAF to remain in Iraq until the termination of
the current UN Chapter VII mandate.


3. (C) President Tony Saca has stated on numerous occasions
that the decision to deploy troops to Iraq is an expression
of gratitude for the U.S. "standing by" the GOES during the
Salvadoran civil war. He has also indicated that Salvadoran
troops will remain in Iraq "for as long as they are needed."


4. (C) While we have no reason to doubt President Saca's
resolve, there are several possible impediments to continuing
his seemingly open-ended commitment of Salvadoran troops to
Iraq. In terms of possible scenarios, a UN Security Council
resolution would be the ideal means of securing any continued
Salvadoran military presence in Iraq. Scenarios based on
anything other than a UN resolution, while not impossible,
would certainly prove far more difficult vehicles for
continuing an ESAF presence.


5. (C) Moreover, while Legislative Assembly approval is not a
legal prerequisite to an ESAF Iraq deployment, it is, most
likely, a political necessity. Furthermore, the Salvadoran
Legislative Assembly seems unlikely to vote in favor of the
deployment of Salvadoran forces to Iraq in the absence of a
legitimizing UN resolution or other mechanism, such as a
bilateral Iraqi request for a continuing troop contribution.
In a recent interview in national daily La Prensa Grafica,
Minister of Defense Otto Romero stated that the lack of
either a UN mandate or Legislative Assembly approval would
necessitate a Salvadoran withdrawal from Iraq. Saca has
pulled back Romero in the past when necessary. However,
Romero's analysis does preview the difficulties the GOES will
face in trying to continue the ESAF deployment absent a UNSC
resolution.


6. (C) In light of the apparent necessity for both a UN
mandate and Legislative Assembly approval, El Salvador does
not strike us as likely to deploy troops to Iraq under either
scenarios A or D outlined in reftel. Some variant of
scenarios B or C, under which El Salvador either negotiates a
bilateral agreement with Iraq (scenario C reftel),or
acquires third party right and obligations pursuant to a U.S.
bilateral agreement with Iraq (scenario B reftel),may be
workable. We would need to formally broach the issue with
the GOES, as well as engage Foreign Ministry lawyers on the
finer points of the various potential deployment scenarios
proposed in reftel, before being comfortable enough to give
an authoritative answer.


7. (C) Reftel also requests an assessment of the domestic
political challenges host government might face in agreeing
to a post-UN mandate deployment to Iraq. El Salvador is
entering an electoral cycle that will feature municipal and
legislative elections in January 2009, followed by
Presidential elections in March 2009. In these elections,
the ruling right-of-center National Republican Alliance
(ARENA) will square off against the opposition left-wing
Farabundo Marti Liberation Front (FMLN) in what promise to be
hotly contested elections. Entering into an agreement to
deploy Salvadoran forces to Iraq under anything other than UN
auspices on the cusp of key national elections could prove
politically difficult for the ruling ARENA party, as well as
potentially damaging to the ARENA Presidential ticket's
electoral prospects. It is doubtful that President Saca's
stated resolve to stand fast in Iraq would easily outweigh
domestic electoral considerations.


8. (C) On the other side of the political spectrum, the FMLN
has consistently opposed sending Salvadoran forces to Iraq,
even under the current UN mandate. Should the FMLN win the
2009 Presidential elections, and/or gain an upper hand in the
Legislative Assembly, they will almost certainly move to
terminate El Salvador's military deployment to Iraq in short
order.


9. (C) Mission will continue to monitor and report on
executive, legislative, and electoral developments that could
impact any future Salvadoran deployments to Iraq.


10. (C) Comment: The GOES would certainly be more likely to
send a tenth rotation in the absence of a UN resolution with
the prior granting of Major Non-NATO Ally Status (MNNA).
Post strongly urges the granting of MNNA as soon as possible.
End comment.
Glazer