CAFTA: ARIAS ADMINISTRATION FLEXES LEGISLATIVE

UNCLAS SAN JOSE 000175 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS For WHA/CEN and WHA/EPSC STATE PASS TO USTR FOR AMALITO E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: ETRD EINV ECIN PGOV CS SUBJECT: CAFTA: ARIAS ADMINISTRATION FLEXES LEGISLATIVE MUSCLES REF: A. 2006 SAN JOSE 1792, ¶B. 2006 SAN JOSE 2617, ¶C. 2006 SAN JOSE 2779 ¶1. (U) SUMMARY. After a seemingly slow start this month, prospects for CAFTA ratification have taken a leap forward. The Arias administration used its 38-seat working coalition and creative interpretation of parliamentary rules to limit the number of sessions for CAFTA debate, making full ratification more likely by May 2007. The Arias administration similarly expedited consideration of legislation to break the telecom monopoly, one of the most difficult components of the CAFTA implementation agenda. These rule changes were accompanied by public calls from MinPres Rodrigo Arias and 2nd VP Kevin Casas for Costa Ricans to "take their destiny in their hands" and move forward (using majority rules) instead of pursuing "the dangerous mirage of consensus." Min. Arias even expressed hope that CAFTA could be ratified and implemented by October 2007. The combination suggests a (welcome) Arias administration offensive not only to ratify/implement CAFTA, but to make the Legislative Assembly more effective, taking advantage of public disillusionment with the "just say no" PAC-led opposition. There will no doubt be bumps in the road ahead, however. Union leaders and other CAFTA opponents have called for a national strike in late February. END SUMMARY. -------------- A SLOW START . . . -------------- ¶2. (U) As the Legislative Assembly resumed business after the holiday recess, it appeared the CAFTA momentum which had built slowly in late 2006 (reftels) had softened. The PAC-led opposition waited until January 12, the last possible day, to submit its nearly 500-page minority report from the International Relations Committee. This tactic, along with the sheer bulk of the Committee's overall report (which totaled nearly 4,000 pages),delayed the required publication in the official GOCR gazette, which in turn slid the projected January 26 start of the CAFTA debate. ¶3. (SBU) One veteran Assembly staffer told us the PAC maneuver, plus the likely flood of motions expected from the opposition, likely would lead to CAFTA ratification in late-May or mid-June, unless the GOCR exercised more legislative discipline. On January 18, in a strategy meeting organized at Embassy behest, the GOCR's CAFTA team from the Ministry of Foreign Trade (COMEX) was slightly more sanguine. The COMEX team believed it would be possible for legislative rules to be interpreted to permit the first of two required ratification votes by early April, just before the Easter Week recess. The final vote would then take place in May, following the required 30-day Supreme Court review of constitutionality. The COMEX team described a parallel effort to have Assembly committees begin action on the implementing legislation. -------------- . . . THEN, A QUICK RECOVERY -------------- ¶4. (U) The COMEX assessment proved accurate. In parliamentary moves that obviously caught the opposition off guard, the Arias administration began to wield its 38-seat coalition as a super-majority, changing legislative rules to accelerate the CAFTA process. On January 18, the PLN-led coalition (also including the ML, PUSC and two single-seat parties) voted to move two telecom bills from the standing committee, where they had languished, to a newly formed special committee that was given one month to hold hearings and vote the matters up or down. The maneuver took place so quickly that PAC legislators, trying to walk out of the Assembly to prevent a quorum, found themselves technically voting in favor of the rule change (since an "aye" vote is registered by legislators standing up). ¶5. (U) On January 22, the PLN-led coalition proposed another rule change, which would limit the plenary debate on CAFTA to 22 sessions, with a possible one-time extension of six additional sessions, after which a vote must take place. The proposed rule change was approved in committee on January 24 and is expected to be approved by the full plenary, again using the administration's 38-seat working coalition, early the week of January 29. Depending on how many sessions are devoted to CAFTA debate, the 26-session limit should make the first ratification vote possible by late March or early April, as the COMEX team predicted. One experienced PUSC staffer told us January 23 she had never seen any Costa Rican legislature act so quickly. -------------- TIME FOR POLITICS, NOT PERFECTION -------------- ¶6. (U) In public comments the week of January 22, Minister of the Presidency Rodrigo Arias, 2nd Vice President Kevin Casas and Assembly President Fernando Pacheco articulately framed the political debate. In an op-ed, Arias challenged Costa Rica to "take our destiny in our hands", construct "broad political agreements", and move the country ahead with support of the majority. Directly targeting PAC, he warned that pursuit of a unanimous national consensus would be a "dangerous mirage" and "interminable debate" of any initiative, CAFTA or not, would only be a "tangible demonstration of our dysfunctional politics." Casas and Pacheco gave similar messages to a legislative law seminar, stressing that perfect consensus was elusive, the Costa Rican people wanted results from their representatives, and there was "no contradiction" between "speed and quality" in the Assembly. ¶7. (U) Minister Arias capped the week with a lengthy newspaper interview printed on January 27. He explained how PAC intransigence in the International Relations Committee had energized the administration's efforts to build an effective working coalition, so Costa Rica could get beyond CAFTA, a key component, but only one component of President Arias's broader development agenda. Minister Arias said the administration had to focus on its priorities, and was working with all its coalition partners on issues of interests to them (in exchange for their CAFTA support). Arias was cautiously optimistic that the rule changes would stand up to Supreme Court scrutiny, and he expressed hope that, using the revised rules and maintaining coalition unity, CAFTA could be approved and ratified by October 2007. Minister Arias also left the door open to work with the PAC on issues other than CAFTA. -------------- . . . BUT IT WON'T BE EASY -------------- ¶8. (U) As expected, union leaders and other CAFTA opponents have called for a national protest, including strike action, for late February. (Their target date is February 26.) The pressure tactics have begun already. Following the first rules change (which would accelerate legislation to open the telecom sector),leaders of the telecom and electricity workers union packed the Assembly gallery and warned pro-CAFTA legislators, such as Jose Mario Echandi of the one-member National Union Party, "we know where you live." (Echandi told the media he has requested extra police protection in his neighborhood.) The opposition is also likely to challenge the rule changes in the Supreme Court, but coalition legislators and Assembly staffers tell us that the GOCR is pro-actively consulting the Court already, in anticipation of challenges. In his January 27 interview, Minister Arias threw down the gauntlet to opponents, noting that demonstrations would be permitted, but roadblocks would be dealt with "respectfully but forcefully." -------------- COMMENT: FINALLY, SOME MUSCLE -------------- ¶9. (SBU) This combination of words and deeds is welcome and illustrates the sort of disciplined, organized "realpolitik" leadership the Arias administration must continue to demonstrate in order to ratify and implement CAFTA. Making the Legislative Assembly more effective, taking advantage of current public disillusionment with the "just say no" PAC-led opposition, would also have long-term positive benefits for Costa Rica, and has found resonance with coalition legislators who do not want this legislature to be perceived as feckless, as was the case with the previous one. The consensus ideal will not fade quickly (or quietly) here, however, and the Costa Rican political system still offers far more ways to get to no than to yes, whether in the legislature, in the Supreme Court, or on the streets. Nevertheless, the Arias administration, in its own way, has started 2007 on the political offensive. That by itself is significant. LANGDALE