ASSESSMENT OF COSTA RICAN SECURITY REQUIREMENTS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SAN JOSE 001618 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE FOR WHA/FO:GSNIDLE, WHA/CEN AND INL/LP: AMARTIN E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/29/2017 TAGS: CS KJUS PGOV PINS PREF PREL PTER SNAR SUBJECT: ASSESSMENT OF COSTA RICAN SECURITY REQUIREMENTS REF: A. STATE 107145 ¶B. SAN JOSE-WHA/CEN EMAILS OF 08/08/2007 AND 08/24/2007 Classified By: Ambassador Mark Langdale per 1.4 (d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Costa Rica remains a significant transshipment point for drugs, people, currency and weapons. A successful comprehensive regional security strategy for Central America must include appropriately trained and equipped Costa Rican forces, willing and able to cooperate with counterparts in neighboring countries, both civilian and military. The GOCR is moving in the right direction; Costa Rica,s dependence on USG security assistance gives us some leverage to nudge the GOCR further. Eventually, Costa Rica could model an effective, non-military security force capable of dealing with transnational criminal activity and violent domestic crime. We suggest a list of prioritized initiatives (see para 8),in support of USG and GOCR law enforcement objectives, consistent with the SICA regional security strategy, and built upon on-going GOCR initiatives. Our list concentrates on public security/law enforcement as well as counternarcotics/border security initiatives, in order to equip Costa Rica to make full use of its location and existing assets. This would have a significant and positive impact on regional security, in our view. END SUMMARY. =========== THE SETTING =========== ¶2. (SBU) Costa Rica remains a significant transshipment point for drugs, people, currency and weapons being smuggled between the U.S. and South America. GOCR authorities seized a record 25.5 MT of cocaine in 2006, for example, including 14 MT seized off Costa Rica,s coasts by U.S. assets, under the terms of the 1998 Bilateral Maritime Agreement. The trend has continued into 2007. In July and August alone, joint USG-GOCR efforts intercepted four go-fast boats, and forced a fifth to turn back towards Panama. The results: more than three MT of cocaine seized or sunk, and 13 individuals detained. Ashore, USG-GOCR law enforcement cooperation uncovered a probable fuel depot for go-fasts and a cocaine cache which netted another two MT of cocaine, over 1200 gallons of fuel and three more arrests. ¶3. (SBU) Since January 1, the GOCR has tallied nearly 30 MT of narcotics seized, plus $3 million in cash, $2.4 million alone hidden in a tractor-trailer attempting to enter Costa Rica from Nicaragua in July. These successes point to the underlying flow of narcotics and currency through Costa Rica and its waters by traffickers who are overwhelmingly Colombian and increasingly violent. A group targeted Minister of Public Security Berrocal in June, for example, further fueling the widespread public concern about domestic security. Meanwhile, crime rates continue to rise, remaining a top concern in opinion polls. ¶4. (SBU) The flow of illegal immigrants, in particular Chinese, has also posed challenges for the GOCR. In October 2006 and April 2007, 185 Chinese were rescued from two crippled smuggling vessels in Costa Rican waters. The last of these are only now being repatriated to China. The GOCR,s June 1 recognition of China, and the rush to establish full relations, including easing restrictions on Chinese businessmen coming to Costa Rica or Chinese visiting with a valid US or EU visa, have raised the specter of even greater human smuggling flows to and through Costa Rica. ============== OUR ASSESSMENT ============== ¶5. (C) A successful comprehensive regional security strategy for Central America therefore must include appropriately trained and equipped Costa Rican forces, willing and able to cooperate with counterparts in neighboring countries, both civilian and military. The GOCR is moving in the right direction, and is beginning to reform its antiquated and ineffective domestic security apparatus. Costa Rican security forces remain the least corrupt in Central America, but they are significantly under-funded and under-trained, relying heavily on U.S.- supplied training and equipment, as well as on-going investigative, operational and technical support. In addition, Costa Rica,s sense of exceptionalism has made them historically reluctant to embrace regional initiatives, while their historic &allergy8 to most things SAN JOSE 00001618 002 OF 003 military has limited their cooperation with armed forces. ¶6. (C) Costa Rica,s dependence on USG security assistance gives us some leverage to nudge the GOCR further towards the goal of having an effective domestic security force that ultimately can serve as a regional model for combating transnational criminal activity and violent domestic crime without a military. Any new USG assistance, like our current programs, should build on what the GOCR is already doing, and have synergistic applications for counter-narcotics, counter-crime and counter-terrorism efforts. While our assistance flow (especially if increased) gives us additional influence over Costa Rica,s security forces in the short- to medium-term, our long-term objective should be to enhance Costa Rica,s independence on security issues, not fuel dependence. To face the transnational threats confronting the region, Costa Rica must learn to rely more on its own means, working more closely with its neighbors. ================ SOME SUGGESTIONS ================== ¶7. (C) In light of the above, Post,s Law Enforcement Committee suggests the following initiatives, in support of USG and GOCR law enforcement objectives and consistent with the SICA regional security strategy. Our suggestions are intended to encourage Costa Rica,s partnership, inter-operability, intelligence and information sharing, as described in Reftel. These suggestions also build upon on-going GOCR initiatives, in order to maintain GOCR buy-in and support. Our Law Enforcement Committee concluded that existing and projected INCLE and IMET could support our ®ular8 initiatives (e.g., police training and equipping key units). Although higher than recent funding levels, we believe the assistance described below would have a significant and positive impact on regional security by equipping Costa Rica to make full use of its location and existing assets. We realize that any non-IMET military assistance to support the programs described below would require the GOCR to enact Article 98 legislation or an APSA waiver from the USG. ¶8. (C) PRIORITIZED LIST OF NEW USG ASSISTANCE (USD) A) COMPLETE THE NATIONAL WIRETAP FACILITY (700K): Although the GOCR has budgeted USD 700K for this project, in addition to USD 100K available from INCLE pipeline funds, the latest DEA technical survey estimates the total project price at approximately USD 1.5 million. The GOCR already endorses this project, which builds upon existing, but nascent GOCR use of wiretaps and offers important law enforcement and case-building synergy, including for cases in US courts, across the full spectrum of counter-narcotics, counter-terrorism and counter-criminal investigations and prosecutions. This facility would mesh with a similar, newly-started facility in Panama and planned future facilities in Nicaragua and Guatemala. B) REFIT INOPERABLE COAST GUARD 65-FT PATROL BOATS (1 million): Refitted engines, communications and radar equipment and repaired/replaced hulls on the GOCR,s two 65-foot patrol boats would increase the Coast Guard,s primary maritime assets (from three to five),greatly enhancing Costa Rica,s ability to patrol its waters, working with USG assets under the Bilateral Maritime Agreement. C) REFIT COAST GUARD 82-FT PATROL BOATS (425K): Major maintenance and needed upgrades for the three 82-foot patrol boats are overdue, to the point that one boat is inoperable and the safe operation of the other two will soon be in question. In our view, refitting the two 65-foot vessels out of service, as noted above, is a higher priority for any new USG assistance. But, also refitting the 82-ft vessels would mean that five of the Coast Guard,s major assets would be fully functioning. This would maximize the GOCR,s maritime resources and greatly enhance Costa Rica,s patrol and surveillance capabilities, thereby improving Costa Rica,s contribution to regional counter-narcotics and counter-trafficking efforts. This assistance would be in addition to the USD 75K requested in FY 2009 INCLE funding to begin refurbishing these vessels, and the FY 2009 IMET requested for maintenance training. D) INSTALL FORWARD LOOKING INFRARED RADAR (FLIR) ON AIR UNIT SURVEILLANCE AIRCRAFT (17-25K PER AIRCRAFT): This would also maximize use of existing assets in arguably the SAN JOSE 00001618 003 OF 003 best-maintained, equipped and utilized unit within the Ministry of Public Security. FLIR installation would enhance the detection of trafficking activity, especially along the porous border with Panama, essentially wide open now to illegal traffic of all types. This would be another GOCR contribution to regional security efforts. The Air Unit has three aircraft that could be FLIR equipped. E) REFIT INOPERABLE COAST GUARD 105-FT PATROL BOAT (2 million): Although less of a priority than refitting the existing 82-foot assets or the out-of-service 65-foot vessels, putting this largest patrol craft into operation would greatly enhance Costa Rica,s maritime capabilities, enabling the Coast Guard to operate as far offshore as Cocos Island. But, it is less important to our current maritime counter-narcotics focus, which is in areas closer to shore. F) PLACE A PERMANENT REGIONAL RADAR/COMMUNICATIONS INSTALLATION IN COSTA RICA (USD 1 million to install, plus annual operating costs): Costa Rica,s location and topography offer an ideal setting for air- and surface-search radar. Equipment could also be installed to provide a remote communications capability for JIATF-South and a remote data link entry point for information received from airborne and ship borne surveillance platforms. AFSOUTH has already surveyed the former CBRN site at Cerro Azul for TDY deployment of a counter-narcotics radar suite in 2008. The AFSOUTH deployment would include automatic equipment which could be monitored remotely and not require a large, military footprint. A permanent installation, again with a small, non-military footprint, could be operated by select Costa Rican personnel. Information from the site would be shared around the region via CNIES. Senior GOCR security personnel are enthusiastic about the AFSOUTH TDY, and we believe would also endorse a permanent operation. LANGDALE