COSTA RICA FOILS COLOMBIAN CARTEL ASSASSINATION

S E C R E T SAN JOSE 001317

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

WHA FOR JASON MACK

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/09/2017
TAGS: PINR PREL PTER SNAR XK
SUBJECT: COSTA RICA FOILS COLOMBIAN CARTEL ASSASSINATION
PLAN


Classified By: CDA DHENIFIN For Reason 1.4 (d)




1. (S) SUMMARY. In late June, the GOCR foiled a plan by
traffickers linked to the Colombian Norte del Valle cartel to
assassinate Minister of Public Security Fernando Berrocal,
apparently in retaliation for the recent (and notable)
counternarcotics successes of the Arias administration.
Elements of the national intelligence service (DIS),the
Drug Control Police (PCD),the Judicial Police (OIJ),the
Special Immigration Police, and the regular police (Fuerza
Publica) combined forces to break up the plot. Despite GOCR
public statements suggesting that other cabinet-level
officials were also at risk, Berrocal was the real target,
with some lower-level police officials also in the cross
hairs. A down payment of USD 50,000 had been paid to the hit
men, who were to receive an additional USD 100,000 upon
success. Five Colombian citizens --the supposed hitmen --
were deported to Bogota on June 30, but released shortly
after arriving in Colombia since they had technically broken
no law in either country. We hope this near-miss will be a
wake-up call to re-energize GOCR efforts to build a more
effective domestic security as part of a coordinated national
domestic security strategy. END SUMMARY.

GOCR ACTION
============

2. (U) Since the start of the Arias administration in May
2006, over 45.5 metric tons of narcotics have been seized in
unilateral GOCR or joint US-Costa Rican actions in Costa
Rican territory. This underscores the success of the Arias
administration,s anti-drug efforts, its commitment to combat
drug trafficking, but also the magnitude of the problem.
Additionally, large amounts of currency (over one million USD
since 2005),marijuana, and Ecstasy pills have been seized.
According to Vice-Minister of Public Security Rafael
Gutierrez, 52 Colombian citizens have been arrested in the
past year for those and other crimes.

TRAFFICKER REACTION
====================

3. (S) The GOCR,s efforts , in particular the seizure of
two Central Valley caches totaling over 4 mts, apparently had
a significant enough impact on a Choco-based operation linked
to the Norte de Valle cartel to prompt a reaction. A
five-member hit team was dispatched to Costa Rica, with plans
to also send a larger surveillance team. Minister Berrocal
was the only confirmed cabinet-level target, although the
media mentioned Minister of the Presidency (and the
president,s brother Rodrigo Arias as a target. (Of note,
Attorney General Franciso Dall,anese erroneously inisisted
to the media that he, too, had been targeted.) The hitmen
were also reportedly gunning for key vice ministerial-level
figures, according to Public Security Minister Berrocal.

GOCR RESPONSE
==============

4. (S) Tipped off by intelligence information, key elements
of the national intelligence service (DIS),the drug control
police (PCD),the judicial police (OIJ),the immigration
police, and the regular police (Fuerza Publica) broke up the
plot. A US-vetted DIS unit played the leading role. Three
Colombians were arrested on June 28 in Alajuela, with two
more in Esparza on June 29. Of the initial three arrestees,
who had been in the country for up to one year, two had
married local prostitutes in an attempt to legalize their
immigration status (a common practice in Costa Rica). Their
marriages were not yet recorded, however, affording them no
special immigration status. The third subject had applied
for political asylum, which was denied. The other two
arrestees had been in the country for just a few weeks.


5. (C) The five Colombians were held on public security and
immigration charges, then deported on June 30, in careful
coordination with the GOC. Because the deportations were
based primarily on intelligence and not law enforcement
information, and because there were no charges or warrants
against the five in Colombia, they were released on July 1.
On July 2, Berrocal issued a statement which respected the
GOC decision and added that &on-going investigations
continued8 in both countries. Vice Minister Gutierrez added
that the GOCR could not charge the Colombians "because we

only had indications that they were going to do something."
Privately, GOCR authorities are satisfied that the detentions
and deportations have stopped the assassination plot, despite
the quick release in Colombia.

WHY BERROCAL?
===============

6. (C) In addition to the GOCR,s counter-drug cooperation
and successes (which continue this week against two go-fast
boats off Costa Rica,s Pacific Coast),we assess that
Berrocal was targeted for three reasons. First, the
traffickers probably considered any Costa Rican official to
be a relatively soft target, certainly by Colombian
standards. Second, Berrocal was the logical choice, given
his ministerial portfolio and his public role touting Costa
Rica,s CN successes. Third, the traffickers needed to send
a message to the GOCR, their presumably compromised network
in Costa Rica, and their customers and suppliers in the
region that they remained in business, despite the recent
setbacks. A successful attack against Berrocal would have
had a serious (and negative) impact on GOCR CN efforts, in
our view. Now that this plot has been broken up and made
public (and Berrocal,s personal security appropriately
improved),we expect the traffickers to turn their attention
back to business as usual, at least for now.

COMMENT
=========

7. (S) The Good News: Judging by the GOCR,s cartel
"enemies," Costa Rica,s CN efforts are making a difference.
Indeed, from our point of view, the GOCR continues to offer a
lot of counter-drug bang for just a few bucks. Furthermore,
in his press comments, Berrocal clearly described the threat
to Costa Rica from international trafficking, in sharp
contrast to some of his comments after taking office last
year suggesting that local crime, and not the "US-fueled"
flow of drugs, was a more serious issue in Costa Rica. The
increased seizures demonstrate not only better law
enforcement efforts but increased cooperation between
intelligence units and the police. The Bad News: We can,t
remember such a bold cabinet-level assassination plot by
narcos in the past in Costa Rica. The drug game may be
changing here, and not for the better. We hope this
near-miss will be a wake-up call to the GOCR to re-energize
efforts to build a better-trained, better-equipped and more
effective domestic security apparatus, within the framework
of coordinated national domestic security strategy.
HENIFIN