COSTA RICA: NORMALIZED RELATIONS WITH CHINA BRING

C O N F I D E N T I A L SAN JOSE 001173 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR WHA/CEN, EAP/CM, CA AND PRM; SOUTHCOM FOR FPA E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/18/2017 TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR SNAR CVIS XK CS SUBJECT: COSTA RICA: NORMALIZED RELATIONS WITH CHINA BRING ECONOMIC AND IMMIGRATION CONCERNS REF: A. SAN JOSE 01106 (NOTAL) ¶B. SAN JOSE 868 AND PREVIOUS (NOTAL) Classified By: ADCM David E. Henifin per 1.4 (d). ¶1. SUMMARY (U) Costa Rica's June 1 recognition of the PRC and consequent break in diplomatic relations with Taiwan (Ref A) have brought worries about the financing of ongoing assistance projects (previously funded by Taiwan) as well as immigration concerns at a time when illegal Chinese traffic is taxiing immigration authorities. Greater Chinese involvement in Costa Rica may also bring Chinese drug trafficking, a point we have raised already with FM Stagno. While cabinet ministers (and President Arias) point to prospective trade benefits, the Legislative Assembly (Asamblea) is scrambling to replace the lost Taiwanese funding. Immigration authorities expect increased arrivals of Chinese nationals, and are concerned about possible Chinese mafia involvement. The GOCR was clearly not prepared to face the practical consequences of its political decision to embrace China. END SUMMARY NEW FRIENDS, NEW MONEY? ======================= ¶2. (U) Costa Rica's partnership with Taiwan included financial aid such as low-cost, long-term financing, or outright aid, such as capital costs for construction, police equipment, vehicles, and motorcycles. As recently as May 30 (on the eve of the secret negotiations in Beijing which sealed the PRC recognition deal),the GOCR had included in a supplemental budget request to the Asamblea the amount of 7,792 million colones (USD 15,130,000) for construction of the Naranjo-Florencia highway, which was predicated on Taiwanese funding. Minister of Finance Guillermo Zuniga pulled back the budget request on June 8. The Asamblea is now scrambling to secure loans, or to transfer funds from other sources to fill the gap. ¶3. (U) Zuniga has hinted publicly about a possible credit or bond purchase from the Chinese, but cautioned that these are only "options"; no firm details have been concluded. Minister of Foreign Trade Marco Vinicio Ruiz announced that the first Chinese-Costa Rican trade fair might take place in October. President Oscar Arias stressed the trade prospects with China, reminding an audience on June 8 that he had long 
noted the importance of free trade agreements with Singapore and South Korea, as well as China. ¶4. (U) Meanwhile, the PRC has moved quickly to fill the diplomatic gap voided by Taiwan. Ambassador-designate Wang Xiaoyuan arrived from his previous post, Montevideo, on June ¶13. Described by the local media as an excellent Spanish speaker and a Latin American "expert" with experience in Mexico, Brazil, Equatorial Guinea, and Spain, Wang is expected to present a copy of his credentials to FM Bruno Stagno on June 18. His official credentialing ceremony with President Arias will come later. OUR CONCERNS: TRAFFICKING IN DRUGS AND PEOPLE ============================================= = ¶5. (C) On the Costa Rican side, Stagno,s Chief of Staff, Antonio Alarcon, was dispatched to Beijing to oversee the embassy opening there (although we understand he will not remain as ambassador). A confident-sounding Stagno told Ambassador Langdale on June 11 that the Arias administration expected the controversy about the sudden switch in relations to die down in a few weeks. "The decision has been made," he stressed. Stagno asserted that the recognition timing was partly driven by regional dynamics. The GOCR was under the impression that other Central American countries, including Nicaragua, were considering recognizing China. Costa Rica did not want to be in the position of "following Nicaragua" on this issue. This was "not just about trade," According to Stagno. ¶6. (C) While acknowledging Costa Rica,s right to recognize China, the Ambassador noted two concerns. First, given the history of Chinese trafficking in persons to and through Costa Rica, normalized relations would likely increase that flow. The GOCR should be vigilant to likely visa fraud. Second, Chinese drug traffickers are active elsewhere in the region, particularly in the methamphetamine trade. The GOCR should be prepared for this as well. Stagno thanked the Ambassador for these warnings. GOCR CONCERNS: IMMIGRATION ========================== ¶7. (C) Immigration Director Mario Zamora told Pol/C and Poloff on June 11 that he had no advance warning of President Arias,s decision to recognize China. He immediately grasped the potentially negative implications, given Costa Rica,s recent history as a trans-shipment point for illegal immigrants mostly seeking their way to the United States, and as a destination for Chinese workers paid slave wages in Costa Rica (Ref B). They arrive via land, air, or by boats from Panama, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru. Any of the boats are not seaworthy and, while they may not necessarily be headed to Costa Rica (they prefer landingsin Guatemala to continue their trip North) they re found in Costa Rican waters or become disable here. Zamora said there are 72 PRC citizens curently awaiting deportation (many of them were arivals by boat while some were found in safehouses n Costa Rica). According to Zamora, the GOC hasalready acceded to pay for this group of illegalimmigrants to return (by air) to China. ¶8. (C Zamora estimates there are at least 10,000 PRC ationals legally residing in Costa Rica. This numbr could easily double with the amount of undocumnted illegal immigrants or in-transit Chinese. Te increase in illegal Chinese arrivals during th four-month period earlier this year when Colomba relaxed visa requirements for PRC citizens was a troubling case in point. The influx of PRC citizns to Colombia (with repercussions throughout th region) grew more thanten-fold during that brief period, according to Zaora. Showing us some passports, he added that 23of the Chinese nationals currently waiting for dportation from Costa Rica had legal entry stampsinto Colombia dated March 2007. ¶9. (SBU) Currenty, PRC travelers to Costa Rica are Category 4 aplicants, the most restricted requiring a limited(90-day) MFA-approved visa to enter Costa Rica. Zaora maintains this prerequisite will remain in efect, as it is not based on the level of diplomatic relationship. Haiti and Cuba, for example, ar in the same visa category. Zamora anticipates hinese pressure to ease visa requirements (as ha already appeared in the local media) and he seemsready to stand firm. If the Chinese claim they need additional business visas, he said, then CostaRica should see an influx of genuine businessmenand investors from China. Zamora told us he hasrequested a meeting with FM Stagno to discuss the Chinese visa issue and other immigration implications from recognition. FRAUDULENT ID CARDS, CHINESE MAFIA ALSO WORRISOME ============================================= === ¶10. (SBU) The illegal Chinese immigrant issue is exacerbated by quality problems in the alien identification card issued by the GOCR. Zamora said the original contract was awarded to the local representative of a US-based firm, "Lasercard". The end product did not meet the GOCR specifications or the quality standards of the company resulting in rapidly fading photos and vital data in the cards. (Zamora showed us examples.) The faded cards are often passed to illegal immigrants who place their photo and data on the same, while the legal holder gets a legitimate replacement of his faded card. The result is an active illegal market for these identifications, which could easily be used by Chinese obtaining seemingly legal cards to secure their status as immigrants. Zamora added that the government is currently addressing these problems and seeking redress from the company. ¶11. (SBU) The potential involvement of Chinese mafia-type smuggling organizations (such as the Han Garcia Clan of Mexico) also concerns Zamora. Should these groups become more active in Costa Rica, the result could be more violence associated with trafficking. Zamora,s office is working hard to identify such groups and/or attorneys involved in the illegal immigration trade. Zamora is also well aware of the lax passport procedures now in effect in Venezuela, which could be exploited by Chinese or smuggling organizations sending Chinese via airline service from Caracas. Zamora added that in the past, secondary inspection by airport immigration officers has been able to detect counterfeit travel documents, resulting in exclusion and deportation of the travelers. COMMENT ======= ¶12. (C) The GOCR was clearly not prepared to face the practical consequences of its political decision to embrace China. Like Minister of Public Security Fernando Berrocal (Ref A),Zamora was kept in the dark, despite his key portfolio. He is painfully aware of the impending immigration problems associated with China,s recognition and seems determined to hold his ground. However, Zamora may be unable to resist the political pressure to elevate China eventually to a Category 3 country. This would permit Chinese with US or EU visas to enter/transit Costa Rica without MFA review and a Costa Rican visa, and would not be good news from our perspective. WEITZENKORN