Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07SANAA226
2007-02-07 11:22:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Sanaa
Cable title:  

ZAYDI SHI'IS, THE AL HOUTHIS, AND SUNNIS: WHAT IT

Tags:  MOPS PINR PREL YM 
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INFO RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI PRIORITY 0007
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0065
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHBVAKS/COMUSNAVCENT PRIORITY
RHMFISS/COMUSCENTAF SHAW AFB SC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SANAA 000226 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/06/2017
TAGS: MOPS PINR PREL YM
SUBJECT: ZAYDI SHI'IS, THE AL HOUTHIS, AND SUNNIS: WHAT IT
MEANS FOR THE SAADA CONFLICT

SANAA 00000226 001.2 OF 002


Classified By: DCM NABEEL KHOURY, FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SANAA 000226 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/06/2017 TAGS: MOPS PINR PREL YM SUBJECT: ZAYDI SHI'IS, THE AL HOUTHIS, AND SUNNIS: WHAT IT MEANS FOR THE SAADA CONFLICT SANAA 00000226 001.2 OF 002 Classified By: DCM NABEEL KHOURY, FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: The third outbreak of major clashes between al-Houthi insurgents and the Yemeni regime has once again brought international attention to Yemen's Zaydi (Shia) population. Misunderstanding about Yemeni Zaydi practices and beliefs have led some in the regional and international communities to view the Saada conflict as Sunni versus Shia. The line between Sunni and Shia in Yemen, however, is highly blurred; the two groups often pray in the same mosques and worship much in the same manner, while identity is derived chiefly from tribal rather than religious affiliation. Confusion exists among Yemenis themselves on what it actually means to be Zaydi, and the relationship Zaydi teachings have with the political theology of Badr al-Din al-Houthi. The conflict between the ROYG and the al-Houthis is political and tribal, rather than religious in nature, yet the fighting in Saada has stirred up questions about the Sunni-Shia divide in Yemen, and whether or not it exists at all. END SUMMARY -------------- Yemen's Zaydi Shia -------------- ¶2. (U) Approximately 75 percent of Yemenis are Sunni Muslims of the Shafi'i school. The remaining 25 percent are Shia of the Zaydi sect. Among Shia, Zaydis are considered the closest to Sunni theology. Zaydis believe neither in the infallibility of the Imams, nor in their divine guidance. ¶3. (U) Zaydis come from the "fiver" school of Shi'ism, based on the belief that there were only five legitimate Imams following the death of the Prophet Mohammed. The overwhelming number of Yemeni Zaydis reside in the northern governorates, which are also heavily tribal. The regime's ruling elite, including President Saleh, Speaker of Parliament Abdullah al-Ahmar, and General Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar, are of Zaydi origin. ¶4. (U) Until the Yemen Revolution defeated the Imamate in 1962, Zaydi Imams ruled most of northern Yemen through a Shia dynasty that was founded in 897. Members of the ruling family, referred to as Sayeds, claimed to be Hashemites -- direct descendants of the Prophet Mohammed. As Islamic regimes came and went, a key political belief arose that is still current among Zaydis today: Zaydis have the right and �
A;the duty to overthrow their ruler when he has become corrupt. -------------- -- Shia and Sunni in Yemen: What's the Difference? -------------- -- ¶5. (C) Yemen's Zaydis and Shafi'is often pray in the same mosques and practice many of the same customs. Yemen's Zaydis do not celebrate Ashura, one of the holiest of Shia occasions, with the traditional solemn procession and self-flagellation witnessed in other countries. In years past, Sanaa celebrated Ashura with a fireworks display, but public observance of the holiday has been more muted in recent years. On matters of Islamic law, Zaydis are closer to Sunni Shafi'i beliefs than to other Shia interpretations. ¶6. (SBU) Unlike other nations with significant Shia minorities, Yemen has no history of a distinct Shia community with its own religious, social, or political agenda. Zaydi Sheikh al-Ahmar heads the Islamic-based reform party Islah, and powerful Commander of the Northwestern Region, General Ali Mohsen, is known for his Salafi beliefs and connections. Both are Zaydi, yet hold leadership positions in Sunni political and religious movements. -------------- --- Shabab al-Moumin: What Sort of Shia are They? -------------- --- ¶7. (SBU) The "Shabab" follow the teachings of slain rebel leader Hussein Badr al-Din al-Houthi, who is from a prominent Zaydi and Hashemite family. Al-Houthi's teachings can be described as "homemade" twelver Shi'ism, the mainstream set found in Iran and throughout the Middle East. Al-Houthi SANAA 00000226 002.2 OF 002 studied at the Badr Religious Center, founded with Saleh's tacit endorsement, by Yemeni theologian al-Hatwari in 1997. Al-Hatwari taught the twelver version of Shi'ism, elements of which al-Houthi took back to followers in Saada - with an emphasis on lineage. Al-Houthi preached that only descendants of a Hashemite family from the Sayed class (such as himself) could be a legitimate ruler of Yemen. When this belief was made public, it naturally drew the attention of the regime. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶8. (C) COMMENT: The al-Houthi rebels' ultimate political goal is unclear. Statements and writings of both Hussein Badr al-Din al-Houthi, killed at the end of the first phase of the conflict in 2005, as well as those of his father Hussein, suggest that they favor the revival of the Imamate theocracy with an anti-American vision. Their rhetoric is highly antagonistic against ISRAEL and the United States. The ROYG claims that al-Houthi followers envision a regime modeled after the Islamic Republic of Iran. This is still unclear, however, as the al-Houthi's statements and military operations have focused mainly on control of Saada in alliance with key tribes. ¶9. (C) COMMENT CONTINUED: According to reliable contact, fighting broke out on January 27, for example, due to a classic tribal dispute with the ROYG: the placement of military checkpoints in key tribal areas. This further illustrates that the al-Houthis are acting with the well-worn mold of Yemen's tribes, who have for centuries challenged the way the country's central authority governs them. END COMMENT KRAJESKI

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