SAADA: CASUALTIES MOUNT, SALEH PREPARES FOR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SANAA 000221 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/06/2017 TAGS: PREL MOPS PINR YM SUBJECT: SAADA: CASUALTIES MOUNT, SALEH PREPARES FOR OFFENSIVE REF: A. SANAA 211 ¶B. SANAA 177 ¶C. SANAA 139 ¶D. SANAA 116 ¶E. SANAA 85 SANAA 00000221 001.2 OF 002 Classified By: DCM NABEEL KHOURY, FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Casualties continue to mount since the third round of fighting in Saada erupted on January 27. Government sources report that at least 42 soldiers have been killed and another 81 wounded, while casualties among the al-Houthi rebels are unknown. Military officials have confirmed press reports that another battalion has been sent to Saada. Post contacts report that the Government has mishandled tribal mediation efforts and has alienated key tribal leaders who are now indirectly supporting the insurgents. President Saleh, chairing a rare televised meeting of the National Defense Council, made it clear that the Government will launch a military offensive if the al-Houthis do not turn in their heavy weapons and accept his political concessions. Given the al-Houthis' sense of betrayal by the Saleh regime, this does not seem likely to happen. END SUMMARY ¶2. (C) Local and international media outlets reported on February 5 that National Security Bureau Director Ali al-Anisi briefed the Shoura Council (the legislature's appointed consultative chamber) and political party leaders, including the opposition, on current events in Saada. Anisi's report included casualty figures of 42 dead and 81 wounded on the Government side. The report did not mention casualty estimates among the rebels. Most clashes have reportedly been instigated by the al-Houthis via ambush attacks on Government convoys or assaults on military outposts. ¶3. (C) On January 4, President Saleh chaired a meeting of the National Defense Council, at which al-Anisi also presented his Saada report. Saleh used the occasion, which was broadcast on state television and radio, to reiterate his January 29 ultimatum (ref C) to the al-Houthis to turn in their heavy and medium weapons or "face the consequences." (NOTE: The last three times Saleh publicly chaired National Defense Council meetings were in 2006 in preparation for nationwide elections, and in 2005 during the last al-Houthi uprising. END NOTE) Military officials have confirmed to Embassy DAO members that another battalion from the first �00A;armored division has been sent to reinforce troops already in Saada. ¶4. (C) Post contacts report that the al-Houthis are unlikely to submit to Saleh's ultimatum. Most observers believe that the group receives funding and support from Iran, and that powerful tribal sheikhs in Saada are now providing tacit support to the al-Houthis. The sheikhs reportedly did not receive a cut of the Government's 2006 supplemental budget request, and are also upset that the Government has not taken tribal efforts to mediate the conflict with the al-Houthis more seriously. While post contacts do not believe that tribal leaders are contributing fighters at this point, they are at least not working with the Government to report on or round up insurgents. (NOTE: During the 2005 uprising, the Government clashed directly with the Sahara tribe due to its support for the al-Houthis. END NOTE) ¶5. (C) In addition to the support the insurgents may be receiving from Iran and certain tribal leaders, contacts report that the al-Houthis will not back down due to a sense of revenge for what they see as a major betrayal by the Saleh regime. According to several local contacts who have followed the Saada uprising since the first major clashes in 2004, Saleh garnered the favor of the al-Houthis in the 1980s by sending them to pursue religious studies in Houza (NFI) Iran. (NOTE: The al-Houthis identify themselves as members of the Zaydi sect, which theologically follows the Shia Mu'atzili school. Zaydis are sometimes also referred to as "Fivers" because they believe that Zayd bin Ali was the rightful fifth imam, not his brother Mohamed al-Baqr.) SANAA 00000221 002.2 OF 002 ¶6. (C) According to these contacts, Saleh then relied on his Zaydi allies to counter-balance his Sunni Islamist rivals, some of whom eventually formed the Islah party. Saleh replaced mosque preachers sympathetic to his political rivals with al-Houthis, particularly in areas of growing Wahabi influence. As time wore on and the al-Houthis did not see the kind of political autonomy and economic development they had expected from their alliance with Saleh, tensions mounted and intermittent clashes with the Government broke out into full-scale conflict in 2004. Fighting erupted again in 2005, followed by a period of small-scale al-Houthi ambushes. ¶7. (C) Many observers believed that a political solution was slowly emerging when Saleh pardoned many al-Houthis in late 2005 and freed more than 300 prisoners in late 2006. Government mediators also made clear to the al-Houthis in 2006, according to Foreign Minister Abu Bakr al-Qirbi, that they were free to form a political party and even to have as their platform their desire to return Yemen to an Imamate. ¶8. (C) The fact that the al-Houthis apparently rebuffed these political concessions seems also to be feeding a sense of betrayal on Saleh's part, according to post's contacts. Tribal leaders report that the Government has not taken tribal mediation efforts seriously and has not attempted to resolve this issue "the traditional way," i.e. through pay-outs to important tribal members in exchange for information and assistance in countering the al-Houthis. Post contacts take this lack of engagement on the tribal side, along with Saleh's very public posturing, as signs that a third military offensive against the al-Houthis is inevitable. ¶9. (C) COMMENT: While the al-Houthis' motto is well known -- God is Great, Death to America, Death to Israel -- their precise political goals are not. The Government believes the al-Houthis wish to re-instate the Imamate with an anti-western flavor. Non-government contacts generally reject this assertion, and claim that the al-Houthis are out for revenge against Saleh and political autonomy within Saada. Whatever their raison d'etre, the al-Houthis appear determined to fight on, and the Government seems poised to crush them this time, if at all possible. ¶10. (C) COMMENT CONT'D: President Saleh is generally a master of using political and military tools to his full advantage -- a major reason he has been able to hold on to power for 28 years. With the al-Houthis, however, Saleh appears at a loss to find the right combination of military pressure and political inducements to end the fighting. KRAJESKI