SAADA: WAR IS OVER, BUT CAN ROYG NOW WIN THE PEACE?

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SANAA 001133 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/18/2017 TAGS: PREL PGOV MOPS MARR QA YM SUBJECT: SAADA: WAR IS OVER, BUT CAN ROYG NOW WIN THE PEACE? SANAA 00001133 001.2 OF 002 Classified By: DCM NABEEL KHOURY, FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Post contacts have confirmed media reporting of a peace deal brokered by the Government of Qatar to bring an end to almost five months of intensive fighting in the northern governorate of Saada. The deal reportedly provides safe haven for the al-Houthi rebel leadership in Doha in exchange for their staying quiet and for their backers accepting the republican regime. The Government, for its part, reportedly will release a number of al-Houthi supporters from prison, has agreed not to prosecute certain rebel leaders, and will rebuild war-damaged areas. A high-level, bipartisan parliamentary committee has been sent to Saada to oversee the implementation of the ceasfire agreement. The Republic of Yemen Government's (ROYG) primary challenge now will be to prevent acts of revenge by military, sectarian and tribal elements, while convincing the people of Saada that its promises of economic development are genuine. END SUMMARY ¶2. (U) Beginning on June 14, local and international media outlets reported that a peace deal between the ROYG and the al-Houthi insurgents, who had engaged in fierce clashes since the end of January, had been reached through Qatari mediation. Press reporting during the month of May speculated that the Qataris were involved in peace talks and that this was the reason behind visits to Sanaa by the Qatari Emir and his Prime Minister, as well as trips to Doha by presidential advisor Dr. Abdulkarim al-Iryani. ¶3. (C) Neither government has publicly confirmed Qatar's role as mediator, but post contacts have described in detail Qatar's involvement in reaching a settlement. Dr. Iryani told the Ambassador on June 14 that he had recently returned from Doha, where the al-Houthi leadership, represented by renegade Parliament Member Yahya al-Houthi, had agreed to a ceasefire and to hand in their medium and heavy weapons. The ROYG, he said, agreed to allow rebel leader Abdulmalik al-Houthi, his family, and other associates to travel to Qatar. Iryani intimated that the ROYG had also agreed not to prosecute al-Houthi fighters if they abide by the terms of the agreement, but that President Saleh, who must accommodate military leaders whose troops have suffered heavy casualties, had been reluctant to agree to this point. ¶4. (C) Ruling party member and tribal sheikh, Mohammed Abu Luhoum, told poloffs on June 18 that President Saleh relied on his strong personal relationship with the Qatari Emir to help conclude the deal with Qatar's help, noting that Dr. Iryani and the Qatari Prime Minister were key in working out the details with the rebels. Abu Luhoum also confirmed that Qatar had pledged a certain amount of development assistance for Saada to help sweeten the deal for both sides -- aid that will come on top of its pledges at the November 2006 donors' conference in London. He added that a high-level, 10-member parliamentary delegation including members of both the opposition and the ruling party and headed by Shoura Council Vice Chairman Muhsen al-'Ulufi, had left for Saada to oversee the implementation of the ceasefire agreement. ¶5. (C) Abu Luhoum assessed that that al-Houthis had "achieved a victory of sorts," because the ROYG had been unable to defeat them militarily, and they had gained a number of supporters during the conflict. He said he gave the military and Ministry of Interior "a D-minus or worse" for their performance in Saada, and said that this is a shining example as to why the longer term solution for Saada must be a comprehensive economic development package, along with political decentralization. ¶6. (C) Military leaders like Northwestern Area Commander Ali Muhsen al-Ahmar, he said, "must be put on the side now," and prevented from exacting revenge on the population, as happened during the first two Houthi uprisings. Salafists must also not be allowed to take over mosques and further enflame the population. "Three years ago, our biggest mistake was doing nothing on the ideological side," he said. SANAA 00001133 002.2 OF 002 This time, a message of peace and development must become the focus in Saada, and he urged poloffs to make that point with the ROYG leadership. Otherwise, he concluded, "within a year we will see the consequences of Saada," noting that other governorates were already showing signs of major discontent over the ROYG's economic policies, particularly in Dala' and al-Jawf provinces. ¶7. (C) COMMENT: This peace deal, if it is respected by both sides (and reports are still mixed on that),presents an opportunity for the ROYG to change its approach to Saada. For more than a decade, the governorate has been the fiefdom of military leaders who capitalize on its proximity to Saudi Arabia and its productive farmland to become rich through smuggling and selling weapons. The ROYG, and particularly Ali Muhsen, has relied on Salafi preachers to counter Zaydi leaders in balancing one type of religious extremism with another. ¶8. (C) COMMENT CONTINUED: Long term solutions for Saada necessarily include social, political and economic development, filtered through a decentralization plan that has so far remained a paper exercise. In conjunction with other donors, we will continue to press this message with Saleh and others as the ROYG begins to put together its plan for "winning the peace" in Saada if the guns have indeed fallen silent. KRAJESKI