Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07ROME702
2007-04-05 14:44:00
CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN
Embassy Rome
Cable title:
ITALY: PM PRODI DISAPPOINTED BY U.S. COOLNESS
how-toVZCZCXRO6173 OO RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR DE RUEHRO #0702/01 0951444 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 051444Z APR 07 FM AMEMBASSY ROME TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7624 INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE RUEHBW/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE 0308 RUEHFL/AMCONSUL FLORENCE 2305 RUEHMIL/AMCONSUL MILAN 8539 RUEHNP/AMCONSUL NAPLES 2455 RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC RUEHPS/USOFFICE PRISTINA 0391
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ROME 000702
SIPDIS
NOFORN
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/04/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL MAR MOPS SRYI UNSC
SUBJECT: ITALY: PM PRODI DISAPPOINTED BY U.S. COOLNESS
REF: ROME 0701
ROME 00000702 001.2 OF 002
Classified By: Ambassador Ronald P. Spogli for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
SUMMARY
-------
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ROME 000702
SIPDIS
NOFORN
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/04/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL MAR MOPS SRYI UNSC
SUBJECT: ITALY: PM PRODI DISAPPOINTED BY U.S. COOLNESS
REF: ROME 0701
ROME 00000702 001.2 OF 002
Classified By: Ambassador Ronald P. Spogli for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
SUMMARY
--------------
1. (C/NF) The Ambassador met for one hour April 4 with PM
Prodi. Though paying lip service to our strong bilateral
relationship, Prodi expressed disappointment that the U.S.
government had not recognized the amount of political capital
and effort he had spent on Afghan mission refinancing and
approval of the U.S. Army's Dal Molin base expansion in
Vincenza. Prodi hinted that a White House invitation would
be a welcome reward. On specific issues, Prodi said he would
consult with EU leaders on the best approach to resettling
Guantanamo detainees; gave full support to Ahtissari's Kosovo
plan; and affirmed that MoD Parisi would soon sign the final
authorizations required to begin construction at Dal Molin.
END SUMMARY.
2. (C/NF) The Ambassador met PM Prodi for one hour April 4.
The Ambassador sought the meeting to take the temperature of
bilateral relations after the friction surrounding Italy's
participation in ISAF and the expansion of the U.S. Army base
at Dal Molin in Vincenza.
3. (C/NF) Prodi's mood was one of disappointment. He
explained that he felt he had spent political capital in a
very difficult political environment, but that the U.S. had
not given him credit for his efforts to approve the U.S. Army
base expansion at Dal Molin in Vincenza and to obtain passage
in the Senate of the funding proposal for Italy's military
missions abroad. Prodi hinted that an invitation to the
White House would be welcome recognition of his efforts.
4. (C/NF) Prodi predicted Italian economic growth might reach
2.5 percent in 2007. Prodi noted this would increase Italian
resources and might allow the government to take on some new
projects.
5. (C/NF) Prodi told the Ambassador the international
community needed to remain focused on the Middle East over
the next few months. He said "we have too many open
questions and need to close the issues in Afghanistan, Iran
and Dafur by the end of 2008
6. (C/NF) Vincenza Base Expansion: Prodi affirmed that MoD
Parisi would soon sign the final authorizations for
construction to begin (REF A). Nevertheless, Prodi asked
rhetorically why the U.S. could not have been more flexible,
perhaps choosing to locate the base in southern Italy instead
of Vincenza. The Ambassador firmly replied that had the
Italian government made such suggestions five years ago, the
U.S. might have been open to considering them. But now, we
are where we are. The Ambassador confirmed the U.S had and
would continue to address the concerns of the local
community. Prodi concluded that the decision to approve the
project has been made but that the political issue remains
alive for him.
7. (C/NF) Guantanamo Detainee Resettlement: Prodi was aware
of the Ambassador's earlier discussion on this issue with MoI
Amato (Septel). Prodi said he would like to be helpful and
that he would explore with other EU leaders whether a common
approach could be found.
8. (C/NF) Kosovo: Prodi said he strongly supports the
Ahtissari plan, and that if there were any differences with
Ahtissari, they were at the MA, not the Prime Ministry.
9. (C/NF) Comment. Both Prodi and FM D'Alema have shown
themselves willing and sometimes eager to use foreign policy
statements (and sometimes policy decisions) for domestic
politic gain, thus creating unhelpful and unnecessary
friction with us. Prodi clearly recognizes that his
relationship with Washington is not all it could be and would
like a White House invitation to put bilateral relations on
firmer ground. We take seriously Prodi's conviction that he
worked hard to support U.S. interests despite significant
political risks--to leave no doubt, he sent his diplomatic
advisor to pre-brief the Ambassador on this point. Prodi's
ROME 00000702 002.2 OF 002
desire to improve his relationship with Washington provides
us with an opportunity to press him against waffling on key
issues like Iran sanctions and Kosovo. End Comment.
SPOGLI
SIPDIS
NOFORN
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/04/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL MAR MOPS SRYI UNSC
SUBJECT: ITALY: PM PRODI DISAPPOINTED BY U.S. COOLNESS
REF: ROME 0701
ROME 00000702 001.2 OF 002
Classified By: Ambassador Ronald P. Spogli for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
SUMMARY
--------------
1. (C/NF) The Ambassador met for one hour April 4 with PM
Prodi. Though paying lip service to our strong bilateral
relationship, Prodi expressed disappointment that the U.S.
government had not recognized the amount of political capital
and effort he had spent on Afghan mission refinancing and
approval of the U.S. Army's Dal Molin base expansion in
Vincenza. Prodi hinted that a White House invitation would
be a welcome reward. On specific issues, Prodi said he would
consult with EU leaders on the best approach to resettling
Guantanamo detainees; gave full support to Ahtissari's Kosovo
plan; and affirmed that MoD Parisi would soon sign the final
authorizations required to begin construction at Dal Molin.
END SUMMARY.
2. (C/NF) The Ambassador met PM Prodi for one hour April 4.
The Ambassador sought the meeting to take the temperature of
bilateral relations after the friction surrounding Italy's
participation in ISAF and the expansion of the U.S. Army base
at Dal Molin in Vincenza.
3. (C/NF) Prodi's mood was one of disappointment. He
explained that he felt he had spent political capital in a
very difficult political environment, but that the U.S. had
not given him credit for his efforts to approve the U.S. Army
base expansion at Dal Molin in Vincenza and to obtain passage
in the Senate of the funding proposal for Italy's military
missions abroad. Prodi hinted that an invitation to the
White House would be welcome recognition of his efforts.
4. (C/NF) Prodi predicted Italian economic growth might reach
2.5 percent in 2007. Prodi noted this would increase Italian
resources and might allow the government to take on some new
projects.
5. (C/NF) Prodi told the Ambassador the international
community needed to remain focused on the Middle East over
the next few months. He said "we have too many open
questions and need to close the issues in Afghanistan, Iran
and Dafur by the end of 2008
6. (C/NF) Vincenza Base Expansion: Prodi affirmed that MoD
Parisi would soon sign the final authorizations for
construction to begin (REF A). Nevertheless, Prodi asked
rhetorically why the U.S. could not have been more flexible,
perhaps choosing to locate the base in southern Italy instead
of Vincenza. The Ambassador firmly replied that had the
Italian government made such suggestions five years ago, the
U.S. might have been open to considering them. But now, we
are where we are. The Ambassador confirmed the U.S had and
would continue to address the concerns of the local
community. Prodi concluded that the decision to approve the
project has been made but that the political issue remains
alive for him.
7. (C/NF) Guantanamo Detainee Resettlement: Prodi was aware
of the Ambassador's earlier discussion on this issue with MoI
Amato (Septel). Prodi said he would like to be helpful and
that he would explore with other EU leaders whether a common
approach could be found.
8. (C/NF) Kosovo: Prodi said he strongly supports the
Ahtissari plan, and that if there were any differences with
Ahtissari, they were at the MA, not the Prime Ministry.
9. (C/NF) Comment. Both Prodi and FM D'Alema have shown
themselves willing and sometimes eager to use foreign policy
statements (and sometimes policy decisions) for domestic
politic gain, thus creating unhelpful and unnecessary
friction with us. Prodi clearly recognizes that his
relationship with Washington is not all it could be and would
like a White House invitation to put bilateral relations on
firmer ground. We take seriously Prodi's conviction that he
worked hard to support U.S. interests despite significant
political risks--to leave no doubt, he sent his diplomatic
advisor to pre-brief the Ambassador on this point. Prodi's
ROME 00000702 002.2 OF 002
desire to improve his relationship with Washington provides
us with an opportunity to press him against waffling on key
issues like Iran sanctions and Kosovo. End Comment.
SPOGLI