ITALY: PM PRODI DISAPPOINTED BY U.S. COOLNESS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ROME 000702 SIPDIS NOFORN SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/04/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL MAR MOPS SRYI UNSC SUBJECT: ITALY: PM PRODI DISAPPOINTED BY U.S. COOLNESS REF: ROME 0701 ROME 00000702 001.2 OF 002 Classified By: Ambassador Ronald P. Spogli for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C/NF) The Ambassador met for one hour April 4 with PM Prodi. Though paying lip service to our strong bilateral relationship, Prodi expressed disappointment that the U.S. government had not recognized the amount of political capital and effort he had spent on Afghan mission refinancing and approval of the U.S. Army's Dal Molin base expansion in Vincenza. Prodi hinted that a White House invitation would be a welcome reward. On specific issues, Prodi said he would consult with EU leaders on the best approach to resettling Guantanamo detainees; gave full support to Ahtissari's Kosovo plan; and affirmed that MoD Parisi would soon sign the final authorizations required to begin construction at Dal Molin. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C/NF) The Ambassador met PM Prodi for one hour April 4. The Ambassador sought the meeting to take the temperature of bilateral relations after the friction surrounding Italy's participation in ISAF and the expansion of the U.S. Army base at Dal Molin in Vincenza. ¶3. (C/NF) Prodi's mood was one of disappointment. He explained that he felt he had spent political capital in a very difficult political environment, but that the U.S. had not given him credit for his efforts to approve the U.S. Army base expansion at Dal Molin in Vincenza and to obtain passage in the Senate of the funding proposal for Italy's military missions abroad. Prodi hinted that an invitation to the White House would be welcome recognition of his efforts. ¶4. (C/NF) Prodi predicted Italian economic growth might reach 2.5 percent in 2007. Prodi noted this would increase Italian resources and might allow the government to take on some new projects. ¶5. (C/NF) Prodi told the Ambassador the international community needed to remain focused on the Middle East over the next few months. He said "we have too many open questions and need to close the issues in Afghanistan, Iran and Dafur by the end of 2008 ¶6. (C/NF) Vincenza Base Expansion: Prodi affirmed that MoD Parisi would soon sign the final authorizations for construction to begin (REF A). Nevertheless, Prodi asked rhetorically why the U.S. could not have been more flexible, perhaps choosing to locate the base in southern Italy instead of Vincenza. The Ambassador firmly replied that had the Italian government made such suggestions five years ago, the U.S. might have been open to considering them. But now, we are where we are. The Ambassador confirmed the U.S had and would continue to address the concerns of the local community. Prodi concluded that the decision to approve the project has been made but that the political issue remains alive for him. ¶7. (C/NF) Guantanamo Detainee Resettlement: Prodi was aware of the Ambassador's earlier discussion on this issue with MoI Amato (Septel). Prodi said he would like to be helpful and that he would explore with other EU leaders whether a common approach could be found. ¶8. (C/NF) Kosovo: Prodi said he strongly supports the Ahtissari plan, and that if there were any differences with Ahtissari, they were at the MA, not the Prime Ministry. ¶9. (C/NF) Comment. Both Prodi and FM D'Alema have shown themselves willing and sometimes eager to use foreign policy statements (and sometimes policy decisions) for domestic politic gain, thus creating unhelpful and unnecessary friction with us. Prodi clearly recognizes that his relationship with Washington is not all it could be and would like a White House invitation to put bilateral relations on firmer ground. We take seriously Prodi's conviction that he worked hard to support U.S. interests despite significant political risks--to leave no doubt, he sent his diplomatic advisor to pre-brief the Ambassador on this point. Prodi's ROME 00000702 002.2 OF 002 desire to improve his relationship with Washington provides us with an opportunity to press him against waffling on key issues like Iran sanctions and Kosovo. End Comment. SPOGLI