ITALY: SUDAN SANCTIONS COULD HARDEN KHARTOUM, NEED

C O N F I D E N T I A L ROME 000627 SIPDIS SIPDIS NOFORN FOR IO/PSC GRACE KANG, FOR AF/SPG E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/27/2017 TAGS: PREL CD CT UNSC KPKO IT SUBJECT: ITALY: SUDAN SANCTIONS COULD HARDEN KHARTOUM, NEED POLITICAL STRATEGY REF: STATE 33367 Classified By: Acting Political Minister-Counselor Jonathan R. Cohen fo r reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary. While Italy considered Sudanese President Bashir's March 6 letter to SYG Ban unsatisfactory, the GOI thought it was too early to call it a rejection of the agreement on the Darfur UN Heavy Support Package (HSP). Italy did not believe that sanctions were the best solution as they would likely harden Khartoum's position. However, Italy might be willing to consider sanctions if they were presented as part of a broader political strategy. It was important to give UN Special Envoy for Sudan Eliasson and the political track a chance to work in response to Bashir's letter before turning to sanctions. Italy saw the Tripartite Commission as a key forum for discussion and problem-solving on the UN/AU hybrid force. End Summary. ¶2. (C) Poloff delivered reftel points March 26 to Fabrizio Pignatelli and Domenico Polona, MFA Horn of Africa Office Director and Deputy, respectively; and separately to Leonardo Bencini, UN Office Director. Poloff highlighted U.S. concerns regarding Sudanese President Bashir's March 6 letter to SYG Ban, and asked Italy to publicly speak out against Bashir's efforts to impose conditions on UN support for Darfur. Pignatelli responded that Italy thought it was too early to consider the letter a rejection of the HSP. He noted that UNSCR 1706 had not been accepted by the Sudanese Government, and that the November 16 Addis Ababa Agreement was very general. Given that the agreement did not go into detail on the deployment (and that the AU had agreed on the need for UN/AU/GNU dialogue during UNGA),Khartoum could expect to have input as the process moved forward. Poloff stressed that the HSP was a package, and could not be subject to line-item veto, as the letter seemed to propose. ¶3. (C) The Tripartite Commission provided a framework for discussing and resolving problems relating to the Darfur hybrid force, Pignatelli said. He also noted that UN and AU response to the letter has thus far been cautious. Italy saw Bashir's emphasis on the importance of the political track as a positive element that could help guide the way forward. When Eliasson went to Asmara, he cautioned that too much pressure in this phase was not the solution, according to Pignatelli. Italy thought sanctions might not be the best solution. ¶4. (C) If sanctions targeted the GNU directly, Pignatelli worried it would bring an end to all collaboration from Khartoum. Pignatelli also raised several other concerns about sanctions, including the potential effect on the Darfur conference in Juba, how proposed elements like the monitoring of offensive flights would be implemented, and what unilateral sanctions the U.S. was considering. Pignatelli also wondered what the role of the Libya-Chad-Eritrea-Sudan initiative would be within the political track. Italy believed these questions should be addressed before considering sanctions. ¶5. (C) Pignatelli argued that it was important to support Eliasson and AU Special Envoy for Darfur Salim, as well as to monitor Sudanese First Vice President Kiir's initiative, thus giving the political track an opportunity to work. Sanctions, he said, could serve to harden the most uncooperative elements of the GNU and place Bashir in a difficult position. While Italy took a very pragmatic approach to Darfur and might be able to accept a hardening of the sanctions regime, the GOI needed to see how this fit into a broader political strategy. ¶6. (C) Ethiopian Foreign Minister Mesfin will visit Rome on March 29 for discussions, including on Sudan, Somalia, the Ethiopia-Eritrea border dispute, and Italy-Ethiopia bilateral issues, according to Pignatelli. SPOGLI