LARIJANI VISIT TO ITALY: LOOKING FOR A DEAL?

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ROME 000386

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/26/2021
TAGS: PREL IR IT
SUBJECT: LARIJANI VISIT TO ITALY: LOOKING FOR A DEAL?


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Classified By: POLITICAL MINISTER-COUNSELOR DAVID D. PEARCE, REASONS 1.
4 (b),(d)

Summary
--------------


1. (S/NF) Iranian nuclear negotiator Larijani came to Rome
February 21 for meetings with PM Prodi and senior Italian
officials. He reportedly told them Iran wants a deal that
will not be humiliating and that recognizes its rights under
the NPT. It would stop enrichment in place, the Security
Council would return the matter to the IAEA framework, and
the issue would be settled within three months. On Lebanon,
Larijani also reportedly outlined his view of the way
forward: compromise on government formula, early elections
for President of the Republic, then establishment of the
special Hariri tribunal. End summary.


Iranians Want a Way Out on Nuclear Issue
--------------


2. (S/NF) Marco Carnelos, Middle East adviser to PM Prodi,
February 22 provided Pol M/C with a readout of Iranian
negotiator Larijani's visit to Rome the day before. He said
Prodi met with Larijani at 4 p.m., then went straight to the
cabinet and from there to a meeting with President
Napolitano, where he tendered his government's resignation.
So meeting with the Iranians was virtually his last official
act. As he left the meeting, the PM reportedly quipped, "now
I have to go take care of the real nuclear issues!" Carnelos
and senior diplomatic adviser Stefano Sannino continued
lengthy follow-on discussions with Larijani and his
delegation.


3. (S/NF) Carnelos said his general impression was:

-- They are looking for a way out of the nuclear impasse, but
in a way that will save face. This is difficult because the
issue has become zero-sum; the resolution allows no
enrichment, no nuclear industry.
-- They are looking for some form of recognition of their
rights under the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). Enrichment
is being negotiated, so they don't see why they should stop
if it is being negotiated.
-- Iranian negotiators are on a short leash from Tehran.


4. (S/NF) Carnelos said the Iranians indicated they were
prepared to stop enrichment in place -- at 300 vs 3,000 gas
centrifuges, provided the action was taken out of the
Security Council and returned to the IAEA. The Italian side
made plain that the resolution was clear about stopping all
enrichment; keeping 300 would not be possible. Larijani
reportedly asked what the concern was. That they would
master the technology? Too late, they already had. IAEA SYG
Baradei knows this. So what were they supposed to do? Get
amnesia? They could stay at 5 percent enrichment, and go no
further. That could be monitored by the IAEA. The Larijani
package was: stop enrichment in place, stop at the Security
Council, return to the IAEA framework, and the matter could
be settled within three months.


Al-Qaida is the Real Enemy; Need to Work Together
-------------- --------------


5. (S/NF) But, the diplomatic adviser said, Iran made clear
it seeks not only recognition of its rights under the NPT,
but of its regional status. Carnelos said the Italians told
Larijani there was a problem of trust. President
Ahmadinejad's declarations had created fears that Iran would
develop a bomb that could be used against Israel.


6. (S/NF) Larijani said Iran did not need the bomb. It was
strong enough, and had enough other instruments and tools at
its disposal. Its religion prohibited such an action (as
using the bomb against Israel). Plus, "we Shia" are more
rational than the Sunnis. Iran is a democracy; just compare
it to the other states of the Gulf. The Iranians can be
divided precisely because they are a democracy. Ahmadinejad
can say what he wants (Carnelos said Larijani was quite
dismissive on this point),but the Supreme Leader is the one
who makes the decisions. There is one sure way to end all
divisions in the Iranian leadership and unify the Iranian
people -- "put us in a corner over the nuclear issue".


7. (S/NF) If we were "so stupid" as to use the bomb against
Israel, Larijani reportedly added, we would also kill

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millions of Palestinians and Lebanese. Furthermore, if Iran
got the bomb, Pakistan would then give it to other Sunni
states. At that point, he said, there would be a huge risk
that al-Qaida would get it. And al-Qaida would use it "first
against us, then against you." They are our common enemy.


8. (S/NF) Carnelos said Larijani's message was that they
were looking for a deal, but it was important to understand
the Iranians were proud people and don't want to be
humiliated. They have shown that they can produce results --
as when they helped the U.S. in 2001 on Afghanistan. And the
recognition they got for this was the Axis of Evil label.
Afghanistan is now a mess. The Taleban are preparing a
spring offensive. They are our common enemy and we should
fight them together.


Lebanon: Govt Accord, Early Presidential Vote, Tribunal
-------------- --------------


9. (S/NF) On Lebanon, Carnelos said, Larijani made no effort
to hide Iran's leverage with Hizballah. On the contrary. He
left the impression that it could do whatever it wanted with
them. Lebanon faced an institutional crisis, but Larijani
believed a compromise over the government could be found.
The Iranian official launched into a recitation of
complicated formulas that Carnelos didn't follow entirely,
but which made plain that Larijani was familiar with the
Lebanese government crisis in excruciating detail.


10. (S/NF) The biggest problem, according to Larijani, is
the special tribunal (on the assassination of former PM Rafiq
Hariri). Carnelos said the Iranian negotiator felt content
was less at issue than timing, i.e. when the tribunal would
be established. The Iranian roadmap appeared to be:
government compromise, early elections for President of the
Republic, and then establishment of the tribunal. The
Italian diplomatic adviser commented at this point that he
found it quite striking that Larijani made no mention at all
of Syria. But he did appear to have high confidence in the
possibilities for a deal in Lebanon, and that Iran had
Hizballah under control.


11. (S/NF) Carnelos asked Larijani about the release of the
Israeli prisoners held by Hizballah. Larijani said this,
too, would come in the context of the roadmap he had laid out
above, with Shebaa Farms passing to UN control. Pol M/C
asked if there had been mention of a prisoner swap, and
Carnelos said no. He noted that PM Prodi had promised
Israeli PM Olmert to always raise the issue of the Israeli
prisoners when he spoke with the Iranians, and he always did.


12. (S/NF) The Italian official said Larijani's body
language was very confident. He was the perfect poker
player, no emotion and very professional. Pol M/C asked
Carnelos why he thought Larijani would take the time and make
the effort to lay all this out for Italy. Carnelos responded
that the Iranians seem to have special confidence in Prodi,
evidently because they remember that he was the first
European prime minister to visit to Iran in 1998, when the
regime was still out in the diplomatic cold.


Comment
--------------


13. (S/NF) We caught up with Carnelos right after the
government had resigned. His colleague, Sannino, had been
slated to attend a meeting in Germany of national security
advisers with NSA Hadley later in the week, but canceled
because of the government crisis. The follow-on talks of
Carnelos and Sannino, after the Prodi meeting, took place at
the Iranian Embassy and lasted three hours. Carnelos found
it hugely amusing that the Iranians were displaying such
confidence in Prodi on the very day that his own Parliament
wasn't.
SPOGLI