ITALY: AMBASSADORS' AFGHANISTAN LETTER HITS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ROME 000241 SIPDIS NOFORN SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/05/2017 TAGS: PREL MOPS MARR NATO AF IT SUBJECT: ITALY: AMBASSADORS' AFGHANISTAN LETTER HITS POLITICAL NERVE REF: ROME 166 Classified By: POL MINCOUNS DAVID D. PEARCE FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D) Summary -------------- ¶1. (C/NF) An op-ed from ambassadors of the U.S., UK, Canada, Netherlands, Australia, and Romania calling for Allies -- and particularly Italy -- to stand firm in Afghanistan spurred widespread media and political response. The daily "La Repubblica" printed the op-ed on its front page on February 3 opposite a message from Prime Minister Romano Prodi that defended the Italian government,s foreign policy aims and accomplishments. Government leaders publicly and privately expressed irritation with the ambassadors, initiative, although no one disputed the op-ed,s arguments regarding the importance of NATO,s Afghanistan mission. Radical left leaders denounced the op-ed as "unprecedented interference," while the center-right opposition pointed to it as a sign that the current government is wobbly in the eyes of important allies. End Summary. Op-ed: "Let,s Stay United in Afghanistan" -------------- ¶2. (C/NF) The idea to write a joint op-ed encouraging Italy to sustain its engagement in Afghanistan came up during informal discussions between Ambassador Spogli and ambassadors from Canada and the UK. Aiming to influence public opinion during the government,s loud quarrel with itself over Italy,s Afghanistan mission, the ambassadors agreed to include signatories from the Netherlands, Australia, and Romania. Embassy Rome circulated a draft on January 26, incorporated other embassies, modifications, and submitted the op-ed for February 3 publication in Italy,s leading daily, "La Repubblica." ¶3. (U) The joint op-ed, which the newspaper headlined "Italy, Let,s Stay United in Afghanistan," recognized the substantial Italian contribution to Afghanistan's security and civil reconstruction, noted the multilateral consensus behind international efforts in that country, pointed out the serious security and reconstruction challenges before us, and called on Italy to stand firm in its commitment. Sharp Public Reactions -------------- ¶4. (U) The op-ed hit a political nerve. Although no Italian leaders took issue with its arguments regarding the importance of NATO,s Afghanistan mission, government leaders expressed irritation over the fact of the ambassadors, initiative. Defense Minister Arturo Parisi and Foreign Minister Massimo D,Alema complained to the press that it was "irregular" for ambassadors to appeal directly to the Italian public on such an issue; radical left leaders denounced the op-ed as "unprecedented interference" in Italy,s sovereign affairs. Meanwhile, center-right opposition leaders, who have been calling for the government to resign because of persistent internal disagreements over foreign policy, seized on the op-ed,s appearance as a sign that important allies view the current Italian government as unreliable on a major Alliance issue. ¶5. (U) Prime Minster Prodi went on the defensive as well, but more blandly. "La Repubblica," a paper closely tied to the center-left leadership, published the ambassadors, joint op-ed opposite a lengthy message from Prodi defending the Italian government,s foreign policy aims and accomplishments. Prodi,s message, headlined "Peace is Hard Work: These Are My Accomplishments," described Italy,s foreign policy aim of promoting peace through multilateral channels. ¶6. (U) In the three days since the op-ed,s appearance, papers have continued giving front page consideration to the meaning of the ambassadors, gesture. On February 6, further complaints by Parisi and D,Alema, alongside State Department spokesperson Terry Davidson,s February 5 praise for the initiative, generated headlines speaking of U.S.-Italian tension over Afghanistan. A &Corriere della Sera8 ROME 00000241 002 OF 002 commentator assessed the op-ed as &an atypical diplomatic step through which the allies, albeit with prudent language, notified us that they are aware that foreign policy is the weakest element of Prodi,s government... The problem the Prodi government must face is how to avoid paying such a high price at the international level without removing the basic ambiguity that enabled the formation of current center-left coalition.8 And Phone Calls -------------- ¶7. (C/NF) Government leaders also expressed their pique privately. Foreign Minister Massimo D,Alema,s chief of staff, Ferdinando Nelli Feroci, telephoned Ambassador Spogli on February 5 to say that D,Alema shared Parisi,s negative response to the ambassadors' initiative. Deputy Prime Minister Enrico Letta also called the ambassador February 3 and obliquely probed as to whether the center-right opposition had had a hand in the matter. The ambassador explained to Letta that the op-ed was entirely an initiative of the six ambassadors. He told both Letta and Feroci that it had three aims: to cite the critical importance of the international mission in Afghanistan; to point out Italy,s key role there; and to urge Italy to continue its efforts. Radical left objections to the international mission in Afghanistan, Ambassador Spogli said, did not change the validity of the op-ed,s arguments and the Italian public,s need to hear them. Comment -------------- ¶8. (C/NF) Center-left leaders are preparing to wrestle with radical coalition partners over sustaining Italy's commitment in Afghanistan. This op-ed reminds them, and the Italian public, that those Allies who bearing the heaviest burdens in Afghanistan expect Italy to stick to its guns. We find it noteworthy that none of the criticism centered on the actual content of the message, but rather on procedure. Undoubtedly, it was a political inconvenience. Far left members of Prodi's governing coalition, who have been highly critical of Italy's Afghanistan commitment, felt publicly pressured. And since they were already smarting from the PM's decision to allow expansion of US Army facilities in Vicenza, this further soured their mood, thus doing nothing to make the prime minister's touchy coalition management task any easier. But with NATO facing a Taliban spring offensive in just a few months, and the far left jawing to reduce Italy's Afghanistan contribution, this was a message that opinion leaders and politicians needed to hear, however inconvenient. End Comment. SPOGLI