AFGHANISTAN: ITALIAN HOSTAGE RESCUE REKINDLES ISAF

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ROME 002096 SIPDIS NOFORN SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/29/2017 TAGS: NATO PINS PREL MOPS MARR AF IT UK SUBJECT: AFGHANISTAN: ITALIAN HOSTAGE RESCUE REKINDLES ISAF DEBATE IN PARLIAMENT, GOI COMMITTED TO STAY COURSE REF: A. ROME DAILY REPORT (9/24-26/2007) Classified By: Acting Political Minister-Counselor Jonathan Cohen for r easons 1.4 (B) and (D) ¶1. (C) Summary: The kidnapping and rescue of two Italian military intelligence officers in Western Afghanistan the weekend of September 22-24 has rekindled the political discussion in Italy over involvement in ISAF. But so far Prodi's far left allies in the fragile governing coalition are keeping a low profile and the press are portraying the government's actions in a positive light. The rescue mission's successful outcome should provide a confidence boost to Italian supporters of ISAF. Although investigations into the wounding of the two agents may keep media controversy alive, it is unlikely to have a serious impact on Italy's Afghan policy or on the stability of Prodi's government. End Summary. A BAD START TO UNGA WEEK -------------- ¶2. (C/NF) The kidnapping and rescue exposed the Italian decision-making apparatus to an unusual degree of public scrutiny. Italian officials had hoped to keep the kidnapping from becoming public knowledge but Afghan officials announced the disappearance of the two military intelligence officers on September 22, just as FM D'Alema and PM Prodi were arriving for UNGA discussions in New York. D'Alema, who championed the "civilian" approach to the Mastrogiacomo kidnapping in March, immediately sought help from, among others, Iranian FM Mottaki, even as Prodi and Defense Minister Parisi were deciding in favor of the military option over the phone (Ref A). ¶3. (C) Prodi's coalition partners on the far left initially kept silent, with the exception of PdCI (Communist) leader Diliberto, who called for an immediate withdraw from the "absurd" Afghan mission. The rectitude of Rifondazione Comunista (RC),the Greens, and the left wing of the Democrats of the Left (DS),all vocal critics of ISAF in the past, left Diliberto isolated. Because the kidnapping and rescue took place over a weekend, Italian parliamentarians did not have time or opportunity to turn the rescue decision into political fodder until after the fact. ¶4. (C/NF) The swift precision of the Italian-led rescue mission, and the close coordination between Italian and British commandos, has done much to counter the image of ISAF sometimes put forward in the past by D'Alema and others of a heavy-handed, uncoordinated operation responsible for unacceptable civilian casualties. Parisi told Parliament on September 24 that he had authorized the operation on the condition that all possible care be taken to protect the lives of the three hostages (two Italian and one Afghan) and to reduce the risk of civilian casualties. For this reason the mission did not strike on the evening of September 23 when Predator UAVs identified the kidnappers' vehicles outside a house in a village in Farah province. Instead, commando units intercepted the vehicles the next morning as the kidnappers drove south toward a Taliban-controlled area. In the ensuing firefight most of the kidnappers were killed; British troops subsequently discovered the three hostages concealed in the vehicles. All three had suffered bullet wounds. CALIPARI REVISITED?... -------------- ¶5. (SBU) Early press reports suggested that the hostages had been struck by British bullets, raising the specter of a friendly fire controversy. A Rome military prosecutor has since opened an investigation into the conduct of the rescue operation and Franco Ionta, the prosecuting magistrate who charged U.S National Guardsman Mario Lozano with the 2005 death of SISMI agent Nicola Calipari in Iraq, has opened a civil investigation. An ISAF spokesman said on September 26 that initial witness testimony indicated that the hostages were not, as was previously believed, shot by British troops, but by their Taliban captors who fired at their own vehicles after abandoning them. During Parisi's second appearance ROME 00002096 002 OF 002 before Parliament, Calipari's widow, now a DS Senator, asked him pointedly whether armed intervention had been the "only possible option," while RC Senator Lidia Menapace called for a Parliamentary inquiry into the incident and an "exit strategy" from Afghanistan. ¶6. (C/NF) The debate's duration and its ultimate impact will depend in part on the course of the military and civil investigations. Ionta says that he will conduct his own ballistics investigation. In any case, the far left's instinct to criticize the operation has already been tempered by its fear of bringing down the government at a time when there is no suitable center-left alternative (Septel). ... OR A CONFIDENCE BOOSTER? -------------- ¶7. (C) Prodi and his ministers remain confident that they made the right choice in launching the rescue. In his two appearances before Parliament on the matter, Parisi projected a rare image of resolve and authority. In New York on September 26, D'Alema acknowledged that the incident signals the beginning of a new phase in Italy's Afghan Mission. More importantly, from a military perspective, the operation shattered the myth that Italy's role in Afghanistan could remain a purely defensive, peacekeeping one. One newspaper noted that because Parisi had to waive national caveats, the operation marked the first time in the history of the Republic that Italian troops have been authorized to take offensive action on foreign territory. Embassy contacts in the MFA and MOD are pleased with the result -- not least because of the positive performance of Italian troops in a NATO operation -- and guardedly optimistic about its impact on the future of Italy's ISAF mission. COMMENT -------------- ¶8. (C) The Prodi coalition has lived for months in dread of the day when Italian troops in Afghanistan would be involved in non-defensive combat. Now that it has happened, the relatively positive outcome may bolster the confidence and reslience of the government in future crises in Afghanistan and other troop deployment zones. The possibility of a drawn-out military investigation of the kind that followed the 2003 Nassiriya bombing in Iraq -- or a prolonged media frenzy like the one that followed the shooting of Calipari -- could cast a shadow over Italy's involvement in Afghanistan. However, as long as the current political stalemate holds, few parties inside or outside of the coalition have any incentive to use the controversy to try to unseat the government or to try to force a withdrawal of Italian troops. Prodi, too, has little incentive to make sudden foreign policy adjustments that might upset the fragile balance keeping his cabinet afloat. For now Prodi's government has weathered its latest Afghan challenge with resolve and more than a little good fortune. SPOGLI