Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07ROME2093
2007-09-28 15:14:00
CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN
Embassy Rome
Cable title:  

ITALY: DOMESTIC STALEMATE KEEPS PRODI IN THE GAME,

Tags:  PGOV PREL IT 
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DE RUEHRO #2093/01 2711514
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 281514Z SEP 07
FM AMEMBASSY ROME
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9145
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHFL/AMCONSUL FLORENCE 2672
RUEHMIL/AMCONSUL MILAN 8997
RUEHNP/AMCONSUL NAPLES 2807
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ROME 002093 

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/20/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL IT
SUBJECT: ITALY: DOMESTIC STALEMATE KEEPS PRODI IN THE GAME,
BUT ON THE DEFENSIVE

REF: A. ROME DAILY REPORT (9/19/2007)

B. ROME DAILY REPORT (9/18/2007)

C. ROME DAILY REPORT (9/24/2007)

D. ROME 2046

ROME 00002093 001.2 OF 003


Classified By: Ambassador Ronald P. Spogli for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

SUMMARY
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ROME 002093 SIPDIS NOFORN SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/20/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL IT SUBJECT: ITALY: DOMESTIC STALEMATE KEEPS PRODI IN THE GAME, BUT ON THE DEFENSIVE REF: A. ROME DAILY REPORT (9/19/2007) ¶B. ROME DAILY REPORT (9/18/2007) ¶C. ROME DAILY REPORT (9/24/2007) ¶D. ROME 2046 ROME 00002093 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: Ambassador Ronald P. Spogli for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C/NF) A political stalemate keeps the fragile Prodi government afloat and could do so for a prolonged period, even as it prevents PM Prodi from tackling Italy's much needed institutional/economic reforms. The tense domestic politics and PM Prodi and FM D'Alema's different tactics on some items mean Italy's foreign policy could become increasingly inconsistent. Moreover, Prodi's razor thin majority in the Senate means one stumble (for example, during the budget debate running through December, or over casualties or kidnapping of Italian forces deployed abroad) could end his government. Recent defections from the still-unformed Democratic Party (PD) indicate some preparations for life after Prodi are already underway. Our strategy of the most intensive engagement possible with Prodi, D'Alema, and others remains critical in keeping Italy a solid strategic partner. In this regard, frequent contact from Washington is essential. END SUMMARY. PRODI SUFFERED IN HOT SUMMER, NO RELIEF IN SIGHT -------------- --- ¶2. (C/NF) After a politically difficult summer, late August polls showed a record 68 percent of Italians were dissatisfied with the Prodi government, and Prodi's coalition partners were openly discussing cabinet shuffles. Minister of Justice Clemente Mastella suggested that Senate President Franco Marini should replace Prodi and lead an institutional government, and a grass-roots movement against the political class has emerged, with leftist comedian Beppe Grillo rallying thousands to his "throw the bums out" movement (REF A). September brought no relief, and several Prodi allies have threatened a break with the coalition over various pet issues. The governing majority even failed September 27 to win a minor vote in the Chamber of Deputies where the coalition majority is generally considered secure. HELD UP BY A STALEMATE -------------- ¶3. (C/NF) Marini, a relatively conservative center-left former Christian Democrat, told the Ambassador
September 19 that political stalemate is keeping Prodi afloat as no party leader except Silvio Berlusconi is ready to see the Prodi government fall. Marini said Berlusconi would easily win parliamentary elections if held today. According to Marini and others: --The far left knows the Prodi government is the best arrangement they can hope for since any new government would give more weight to centrists and less to the left. --The Democrats of the Left (DS) and Daisy parties are planning the October 14 launch of the new Democratic Party (PD). Presumptive leader Walter Veltroni has made it clear he does not want to see his national coming out coincide with the collapse of the current center-left majority. --Minister of Infrastructure Antonio Di Pietro, leader of the Italy of Values (IdV) Party, is well-placed as a minister and has no incentive to abandon the government. DiPietro, however, is unpredictable and recently threatened to vote for an opposition motion to remove the embattled Vice Minister of Economy. --MoJ and UDEUR leader Mastella, with three seats in the Senate, is working toward an alliance in the center of the political spectrum with Pierferdinando Casini's UDC party--a deal he has not yet locked in. Mastella is one of Prodi's weakest links and could be among the first to try to dump Prodi. Mastella said September 21 he would never again enter a government with the far left and has repeatedly threatened to bring Prodi down. --Berlusconi allies Casini and the National Alliance's (AN) Gianfranco Fini do not want to govern again under the shadow of Berlusconi as PM. They would prefer to wait for a post-Berlusconi scenario. ROME 00002093 002.2 OF 003 --Forza Italia (FI) and the Northern League (LN),however, would be happy to see Prodi fall now. BUT WAITING FOR AN (ENGINEERED) ACCIDENT TO HAPPEN -------------- -------------- ¶4. (C/NF) Marini said the upcoming debates over the budget, which must be passed by December 31, and pension reform would be rife with disagreements that could cause the government to fall. According to Marini, the Prodi government's unpopularity is hurting center-left political parties, making it increasingly likely that one or more of the parties will break from the coalition. He said he was beginning to believe the government could fall before the end of the year, but that Prodi would most likely be replaced by a technical government in 2008. Marini predicted parliamentary elections would be held in 2009. ¶5. (C/NF) In a September 18 press conference, former PM Lamberto Dini announced he would not join the PD (REF B). He will remain part of the center-left coalition but said he would not give carte blanche to measures catering to the far left. Marini termed Dini's decision not to join the PD "malicious," and Berlusconi confidant Gianni Letta told the Ambassador September 26 that Dini's defection changes the political dynamic. Including Dini, there are now five openly "dissident" senators from the conservative wing of the center left. This group is a concern for Prodi, since, unlike Mastella or DiPietro, none of the dissidents have a ministerial position to lose, and Dini (like Marini) harbors aspirations of becoming PM in a technical government. According to Letta, Dini is upset that the government is looking to reverse pension reforms implemented while he was PM and to increase taxes on financial instruments. Many commentators speculate that other politicians might use the October 14 PD constituent congress to jump the Prodi ship, or even sink it. (Note: FI Senator Giampiero Cantoni told Poloff September 19 that he had been actively lobbying Dini to leave the PD. Letta confirmed to the Ambassador September 26 that "they are working that angle very hard." End note.) DOMESTIC POLITICS CONSTRAIN FOREIGN POLICY -------------- ¶6. (C/NF) Most observers say the Prodi government's foreign policy is dictated by the need to survive in a hostile domestic political environment, and criticize the outsized influence the radical left exercises on the rhetoric, if not the action, of Italian foreign policy. Until the September 22 hostage-taking of two SISMI officers in Afghanistan (REF C),the radical left had taken every opportunity to call for the immediate withdrawal of Italian troops there and forced Prodi to offer his resignation in February over foreign policy. Ironically, a Communist Renewal Party (RC) official told Poloff September 25 that their response to the recent incident was muted because the government is so fragile that they did not want to give coup plotters in the moderate wing of the majority an excuse to bring down the government. ¶7. (C/NF) Marini gave a more nuanced assessment of the influence domestic politics has on foreign policy after the Ambassador expressed concern that NSA equivalent Sannino had recently visited Tehran. Marini explained that some issues, especially those involving Italian troop deployments abroad, are conditioned by domestic politics, but that Prodi's rush to dialogue with Iran is a personal preference. Marini noted, however, that Italy would suffer disproportionately if stronger economic sanctions were imposed on Iran. COMMENT -------------- ¶8. (C/NF) Already subject to personal disputes and public inconsistencies on the foreign policy approach between PM Prodi and FM D'Alema, particularly on engagement with Iran, Syria and Hamas (REF D),Italy's ability to support USG goals on the international stage can be hampered by the Prodi government's inherent fragility and the disproportionate influence of the radical left. This is especially true when Italian soldiers are involved, though the radical left's muted response to most recent Afghanistan incident suggests the tense domestic politics can, at times, limit even the radicals. The domestic political stalemate has virtually all Italians stumped as to the next steps--how/when Prodi falls, if followed by a technical government or immediate elections, etc. It also prevents the government from tackling Italy's much needed institutional/economic reforms. The conditions exist for this political stalemate to continue indefinitely ROME 00002093 003.2 OF 003 with Prodi floating in the political doldrums, but Dini and others may be looking for the opportunity to sink Prodi's leaky ship. In the meantime, Italian foreign policy could be unpredictable, as Italian naval gazing enters a period of unprecedented intensity. END COMMENT. SPOGLI

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