IO PDAS WARLICK'S ROME MEETINGS ON UNSC ISSUES

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 ROME 000209 SIPDIS NOFORN SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/29/2017 TAGS: PREL UNSC PHUM XF ZL XW IT SUBJECT: IO PDAS WARLICK'S ROME MEETINGS ON UNSC ISSUES REF: STATE 11796 ROME 00000209 001.2 OF 005 Classified By: Political Minister Counselor David D. Pearce for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). Summary - - - - - ¶1. (C/NF) In January 29 consultations in Rome, visiting IO PDAS James Warlick discussed a broad range of upcoming UNSC issues including the Balkans, Middle East, and the Horn of Africa with Italy, a new non-permanent member. On Kosovo, Warlick and the Italians agreed on the way forward, and the GOI thought Russia would ultimately abstain on a Kosovo resolution. Warlick warned of the need to resist Russian pressure for delays and possible tradeoffs at the expense of Georgia's interests. On the Middle East, Warlick thanked the Italians for their leadership in Lebanon but warned against a UN committee's planned conference in Rome, noting it could turn into an Israel-bashing exercise that would harm, not help, efforts to promote peace. He urged the Italians to fully implement Iran sanctions, noting financial pressure could be key to getting Tehran back to the negotiating table. The Italians said that Iran sanctions would be painful for Italy, but they would be implemented. Meanwhile, it was also important to consider how to address Iran over the longer term. On Somalia, the Italians agreed that support for the TFG, peacekeeping and reconstruction were necessary and said they would work to avoid conditioning EU assistance to the TFG. Warlick also discussed Rome's upcoming committee responsibilities at the UNSC, and the Italians said they would work for results as head of the DPRK and Sudan sanctions committees. They noted that, like the U.S., they were disappointed by the Human Rights Council, but Italy would become a candidate for the HRC and continue to press for positive change. End summary. Kosovo: Avoiding Russian Tit for Tat - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶2. (C) Warlick told Director General for Europe Laura Mirachian that the United States expected to consult on UN Special Representative Maarti Ahtisaari's recommendations and take up a UNSC resolution in March, working with the Quint. Warlick warned that the Russians would try to conflate the Kosovo resolution with a pending resolution on UNOMIG in Georgia. The U.S. preferred, therefore, that a Kosovo resolution come first. He urged that the Quint remain unified and firm in avoiding trading Georgia's interests for Kosovo's. A new Kosovo resolution would lift the current 1244 resolution, endorse Ahtisaari's recommendations, and pave the way for a Kosovar declaration of independence with a strong international presence. Warlick expected that U.S. and EU recognition would come shortly after that. Belgrade should be convinced that Serb concerns about minorities, religious sites and decentralization were being met. In the end, if the Quint stood together in the UNSC, Qatar, China and others would follow suit. Russia would likely go along reluctantly. If they accept the Ahtisaari plan, it would be much easier to get them to go along with a resolution. However, if the Russians sensed any weakness or split within the Quint, they would be much tougher on Kosovo and Georgia. Additionally, the US believed that the process should go forward whether or not a government was formed in Belgrade. No decision about moving forward unilaterally if the UNSC failed had been made by the US, though. ¶3. (C) Mirachian stated that D'Alema had already outlined Italy's view of the process. The announcement of the Ahtisaari plan would be followed by a UNSCR (although the exact phrasing of independence had not been agreed),followed by a declaration from the Kosovar authorities. NATO had already agreed on PfP for Serbia and the EU should push for restarting SAA - with a conditional clause in the event of noncompliance with ICTY. Mirachian agreed that Russia would take a tough negotiating position but thought that in the end it would probably agree to abstain if the scope of the resolution were limited. She believed that Russia would ROME 00000209 002.2 OF 005 accept the delinking of Kosovo from Serbia but that it saw independence as a separate issue to be addressed in the future. Russia would not approve any resolution opposed by Belgrade, so Italy and the rest of the Quint should work to get Serbia on board. She believed that Russia would eventually agree to move the international administration from the UN to the EU. In the end, a resolution that had the support of the U.S., EU and Russia would provide the most stability. The EU was united in its belief that Kosovo would not be a tradeoff for Georgia and that the path for the Balkans was through EU integration. (Mirachian confirmed Italy's desire to join the Friends of Georgia group in NY.) She worried, however, that enlargement fatigue and absorption capacity could be an obstacle. The EU needed to make a decision on recognition but believed that an SAA agreement, on which there was already consensus, could serve as a de facto recognition or pave the way for recognition. She added, however, that neither the EU nor Italy had decided concretely on how to proceed on recognition. In the meantime, the Kosovar authorities needed to be very careful on any public declarations immediately after the UNSCR. ¶4. (C) On administration, Mirachian said that the UN with its 4,000 personnel had been ineffective and worried that an EUSR office with 1,000-1,500 would not be as effective as necessary. Additionally, 500 million Euros, the yearly cost of the administration estimated by the GOI could prove a heavy burden on the EU. Nevertheless, the GOI was committed to ensuring that a Kosovar administration was being pushed on standards and would work to making the judicial pillar successful to avoid any possible spillover effects of political or criminal instability - something the GOI believes is already happening. Mirachian added that the new administration should be extended to ensure U.S. participation. Cautioning Against UN Committee's Planned Mideast Conference - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶5. (C) Warlick thanked Middle East Department officials for Italy's its leadership on Lebanon. Incoming Gen. Graziano would need to play a political role in addition to his military duties. Vice Director General for the Middle East and Mediterranean Luca Del Balzo noted that there was a window of opportunity on Lebanon and the Middle East Peace Process, but worried about the internal situation in Lebanon. Warlick and Del Balzo agreed the Paris Conference was successful both financially and in showing the international community's support for the Siniora government. Forward movement on the tribunal in the UNSC was important and Italy was working with the Arab League on the issue. Warlick told Del Balzo and BMENA Coordinator Sergio Scarantino that the U.S. was prepared to work for progress on the Middle East through the Quartet and at the UN. While the U.S. and Israel were often isolated amid the posturing at UNGA, any actions in the UNSC need to be focused on pragmatic results. Unfortunately, the Qataris so far had been using the UNSC forum mainly to score political points. The U.S. would look to Italy to help prevent Qatar from playing an unhelpful role. ¶6. (C) Per reftel, Warlick then urged that the GOI reconsider its support for a conference planned in Rome March 22-23 by the UN Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People (CEIRPP). He said that, while we appreciated Italy's good intentions, this meeting would be particularly unhelpful at a time when there are promising efforts to renew discussions on the Middle East, including the February 2 Quartet meeting in Washington and a later planned trilateral meeting with Secretary Rice, PM Olmert and PA President Abbas. The U.S. had long opposed the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People (CEIRPP) and tried to eliminate its funding. Long experience with this committee suggested the conference would become a forum for one-sided criticism of Israel and hinder, not help, efforts to improve the international environment and move the parties towards negotiations. Once the conference was launched it would be out of GOI hands. But Italy would be identified with it, and this was significant, ROME 00000209 003.2 OF 005 given Italy's high profile as a UNSC member. ¶7. (C) Scarantino replied that, in that case, the U.S. should help Italy get good Israeli representation at the meeting. He was well aware of our views, based on reports from the Italian Embassy in Washington. But there was a continuing need for dialogue between Israelis and Palestinians and the idea for the Rome CEIRPP conference had begun with a request from Palestinian Permanent Observer Mansur -- whom Scarantino considered more moderate than his predecessor. The GOI understood the risks, and wished to avoid anti-Israel polemics, but it thought this could be done. Scarantino cited the Bethlehem 2000 conference, also organized by the CEIRPP and GOI, as a precedent. He felt the Bethlehem conference had been successful, with a consensus approach and a constructive final document. So Italy was not as convinced as the United States that the Rome meeting would be a failure. The March 22-23 meeting would take place after the Quartet meeting and perhaps could be a celebration if the Quartet session went well. If not, well, Abu Mazen and Olmert would likely want to move forward in any case. And it was important to help Abu Mazen show some political gains. Scarantino repeated that the GOI sought language on a meeting text that was free of recriminations and was not polemical, but rather contained parameters for peace, including roadmap language. ¶8. (C) Pol M/C then reinforced Warlick's message by telling Scarantino that we wished to be very clear: The Washington view was that nothing good could come of an event in Rome sponsored by the CEIRPP. This was not the way to help Abu Mazen. The record suggested that the meeting would likely be focused on Israel-bashing and propaganda point-scoring. We understood well that the Middle East was a top priority issue for the GOI; indeed, it was for the USG as well. And we appreciated Italy's leadership and help, especially in Lebanon. But this event would do nothing to advance the cause of peace, quite the contrary. The conference would thus be seen with displeasure in Washington. Scarantino said we had been abundantly clear on USG views, but Italy had a different view. Iraq and Iran: Need to Maintain Cooperation - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶9. (C) Warlick expressed appreciation for Italy's continued engagement in Iraq and highlighted the importance of a robust UN presence and engagement. He asked Italy to consider contributing to the middle ring security Distinct Entity Trust to allow a greater UN presence on the ground. Del Balzo agreed the role of the UN was essential but said (after checking with Italian Iraq envoy De Martino) that Italy had no resources for this; nevertheless, he would pass on the USG request. On Iran and Resolution 1737, Warlick asked for Italy's thoughts on the way to proceed after the UNSCR-mandated 60 days expire. Del Balzo noted that a UNSCR could be very costly to Italy, but that it must be implemented. The international community should wait for the 60 days and then see where to go, he said. Italy would consider another resolution, perhaps with additional sanctions, Del Balzo added, but it was important to look at what we wanted to do in the longer term. Warlick said we were willing to talk, but only after Iran stops enrichment comes into compliance with the NPT and UNSCR. We would keep coming back to Iran in the sanctions committee and beyond. PolMinCouns noted that financial pressure was key and Italy could play an important role. Warlick and Del Balzo agreed that UNSC consensus was important; a coalition of the willing would not have the same impact, but it could not be excluded. Somalia: Give the TFG Space for Progress - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶10. (C) Warlick told Deputy Director General for Political Affairs Giacomo Sanfelice that the international community has to make some decisions on Somalia. The U.S. sees three phases. The first is the resolution on the IGASOM force. ROME 00000209 004.2 OF 005 The U.S. is working to ensure two battalions from Uganda can deploy. The U.S. knows that this is an essential immediate step, but it is not sufficient to provide longer-term stability for the Transitional Federal Government. The U.S. will assist with logistical support. The second phase is the deployment of an African Union force at the TFG's request. This should be done quickly. The UK is drafting a resolution, which could be ready within the week, on an AU deployment and will include an exemption to the arms embargo. The U.S. will propose language to deploy a joint UN/AU technical assessment mission to provide recommendations on peacekeeping and reconstruction options. Based on the precedent of the IGASOM resolution, the U.S. does not expect opposition to the resolution. The third phase is the deployment of a UN peacekeeping force in Somalia. The U.S. hopes to see the TFG gain ground and reach out to moderate ICU members and civil society. The U.S. plans to contribute financially to the AU force and was glad the EU could contribute 15 million Euros but was concerned that EU assistance was conditioned on TFG actions. Warlick asked the Italians to work within the EU to remove conditionality. ¶11. (C) San Felice stated that Italy was prepared to contribute resources. D'Alema had called on the EU to provide rapid assistance and had even volunteered to host a donors' conference (an offer subsequently repeated by PM Prodi at the Addis Ababa AU meeting). Italy was concerned that Somalia could become a terrorist haven and the humanitarian situation could deteriorate. Nevertheless, Italy would like to see the deployment of international forces accompanied by an enhancement of the international dialogue process. The TFG has to show willingness to engage with all elements of society. Italy will be looking for positive signals at the AU Summit in Addis Ababa. North Korea and Sudan: Making Sanctions Work - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶12. (C) Warlick said that Italy's chairmanship of the DPRK and Sudan sanctions committees was important. The DPRK panel had been chaired by Slovakia, which had come in for criticism by Russia. In reality, Russia and China wanted to stall activity. The US had demarched Russia on its unhelpful tactics to prevent Slovakia from continuing as chair. So Italy should be prepared, show resolve, and send a message on sanctions. The DPRK resolution committee was already having an impact on Six Party Talks. San Felice said they were in touch with the Slovaks and recognize the difficulties. Nevertheless, Italy is committed to achieving results. The fact that the committee decisions are based on consensus could be a problem, however. On Sudan, Warlick said the US wants to deploy elements of the UN heavy package to test President Bashir's sincerity. In Chad, the U.S. is prepared to support a peacekeeping mission. President Bush asked Ban Ki-Moon to take a personal role in Sudan. San Felice pledged support on Sudan. Other Remaining UN Issues: Ethiopia, HRC, Reform - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶13. (C) On Ethiopia-Eritrea, San Felice said the UNMEE mandate renewal needs to determine the size of the force. Italy wants the force to remain at its current size. Warlick said the US was prepared to argue for a ceiling that would allow forces to be drawn down with the ability to return if necessary without additional UNSC action. The U.S. wanted to see the force go from 2,300 to 1.700. ¶14. (C) Warlick stated that the Secretary has not decided whether the U.S. would run for the Human Rights Council. The U.S. was discouraged by the performance of the HRC because it hadn't shown that it could address country-specific issues. Three out of four special sessions have been on Israel. The US hasn't completely given up on the HRC and if it doesn't run, it would likely stay engaged as an observer. The U.S. would like to see a special session on Burma. The U.S. is frustrated that the most egregious human rights violators ROME 00000209 005.2 OF 005 cannot be held accountable by the UN. San Felice said Italy was also discouraged by the HRC's work, but Italy would continue to try to make it work and would advance its candidacy. On reform issues more generally, he agreed that there was a need to break the G77 and NAM paradigm, but Italy was encouraged by the Peacebuilding Commission and countries needed to continue to push on reform. Comment -------------- ¶15. (C) The Italians clearly appreciated this consultation and the opportunity to hear U.S. views across the board on the many issues they will be grappling with as a new non-permanent UNSC member. Several key senior MFA officials indicated interest in follow-up meetings in Washington, a prospect Warlick welcomed. This is a government that has a thin governing majority, and a small, but influential far left component in its ruling coalition. Moreover, the foreign minister is inclined to deus-ex-machina political interventions on selected issues. To manage this, it is extremely useful to have periodic senior-level exchanges like this one, not only to convey U.S. views and drill deeply with Italian subject experts, but also to ensure effective coordination on Kosovo, Russia, Iran, the Middle East, Africa, Afghanistan, North Korea, and UN reform as Italy settles into its UNSC seat for the next two years. ¶16. (C) PDAS Warlick has cleared this cable. SPOGLI