ITALY ON THE UNSC: A EUROPEAN VOICE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ROME 000175 SIPDIS NOFORN SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/25/2017 TAGS: PREL UNSC IT SUBJECT: ITALY ON THE UNSC: A EUROPEAN VOICE REF: A. 06 ROME 3279 ¶B. 06 ROME 3131 ¶C. 06 ROME 3132 ¶D. ROME 116 Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Anna M. Borg for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary. Italy enters the UN Security Council under Romano Prodi's center-left government, looking to show its commitment to multilateralism, enhance EU coordination on UNSC issues, and focus on areas within the GOI sphere of influence and where it has troop commitments. The Middle East, Iran, Lebanon, Afghanistan, and Kosovo will be top priorities for Italy, although the GOI will play an active role on the range of UNSC agenda items. Italy welcomes the additional attention to human rights issues in the Council. Although the U.S. and Italy generally agree on the direction the international community needs to take on the major issues the UN will face, the Italians prefer greater dialogue and multilateralism. Additionally, we must be cognizant of the fact that Foreign Minister Massimo D'Alema may at times take key decisions away from his advisors - and even from his ministry - and make decisions himself (Ref A). Following is an overview of GOI positions on U.S. priorities in the UNSC. End Summary. Iran -------------- ¶2. (C) MFA DG for Political and Multilateral Affairs (Political Director) Giulio Terzi told EUR/WE Director Allegrone January 24 that Italy would follow the EU common position on Iran and argue for "effective implementation" of UNSCR 1737. While Italy has said it supports Iran sanctions and has provided valuable information on Bank Sepah, as Tehran's second-largest trade partner in Europe Italy is concerned about wider sanctions setting in motion a process of escalation whose outcome is not predictable. Italy has encouraged U.S. engagement with Iran. Having felt excluded in the past by the EU3 from discussions on Iran policy, the GOI plans to use its UNSC seat to push for a new format, and is grateful that we have begun to include them in consultations (Ref B). Lebanon -------------- ¶3. (C) Italy has played a leading role in international efforts to stabilize Lebanon. In July, at the request of the U.S., Italy hosted an international conference attended by Foreign Ministers from 20 nations and international organizations to discuss the international community's role in resolving the current crisis in Lebanon. Immediately after the conference, Italy pledged to contribute 3,000 soldiers to an enhanced UNIFIL. With just over 2,400 troops on the ground, Italy is the single largest troop contributor and will take over command of the forces on the ground February 17. They currently command the UNIFIL planning cell in New York as well. Kosovo -------------- ¶4. (C) As a member of the Contact Group of nations working on the future status of Kosovo, Italy maintains close contact with the U.S. on this issue. In the past, cooperation with Italy has been excellent and Italy places a premium on Contact Group unity. As the closest CG nation to the Balkans, however, Italy is concerned about absorbing the effects of any possible instability. Hence, Italy appears more cautious than the rest of the Quint inside the CG. We expect that Italy's actions on the Security Council will be guided by its participation in the CG. Our efforts in lobbying the GOI should be made through CG structures. Iraq -------------- ¶5. (C) Although Italy no longer maintains a military presence in Iraq, it continues to maintain a civilian Reconstruction Support Unit (USR) in Dhi Qar. Additionally, Italy participates in the NATO Training Mission. Despite the fact that this government based part of its election campaign on opposition to Italy's military participation in the war in Iraq, the GOI shares our goal of promoting a secure, stable and sovereign Iraq. Italy can be expected to support any resolutions to continue the MNF-I presence in Iraq until the Government of Iraq decides in conjunction with the ROME 00000175 002 OF 003 international community that its presence is no longer warranted. Afghanistan -------------- ¶6. (C) The far-left faction of the GOI center-left coalition government is opposed to continued Italian military presence in Afghanistan. Funding for the mission is currently front and center for Italian politicians as they debate their budget. FM D'Alema has now attempted twice, unsuccessfully, to float the idea of an international conference on increasing civil reconstruction assistance to Afghanistan. The FM views an Italy-initiated conference as important to underlining the political and reconstruction aspects of the Afghan mission and securing far-left acquiescence. Italy plans to host an Afghan donors conference on the justice sector in February. And the FM announced recently that Italy will also ask to serve as rapporteur in UNSC discussions on Afghanistan scheduled for March and October. He hopes to use this occasion to reintroduce the idea of an international conference, which he is billing as part of a new element in the current international strategy. Middle East: Seeking a Broader Role -------------- ¶7. (C) The GOI under PM Prodi has sought to play a role in many international crises and hopes its leadership in Lebanon will help give it a seat at the table on other important global issues like Iran, Afghanistan, and the Middle East Peace Process (Ref C). In a recent visit to Lebanon, Prodi reiterated his government's belief that the key to long-term stability in the region is finding an equitable solution to the Israel-Palestinian conflict, a solution that is guaranteed by the international community (i.e. UN),and the Italians would like to help make that happen. Italy will use its seat on the UNSC to advance its case. Although the GOI seeks to be an honest broker in the MEPP, and the center-left government has sought to maintain the improved ties with Israel initiated by the center-right, the Israeli perception (and ours) is that FM D'Alema's first instincts still tend to reflect the traditional pro-Arab orientation of the Italian left. Somalia -------------- ¶8. (C) As the former colonial power and a member of the International Contact Group, Italy feels it has an important role to play on Somalia. Italy has looked on U.S. policy in Somalia up until now as short-term and welcomes our recent increased attention and leadership. The GOI would like to see Ethiopian troops depart Somalia as quickly as possible, and has stressed the need for an inclusive government. Despite claims to a strong interest in Somalia, the issue has attracted high-level GOI attention only sporadically. Within the UNSC, Italy will support an international peacekeeping force, although it will also call for dialogue with moderate Islamic leaders and engagement with civil society by the Transitional Federal Government (Ref D). Italy has offered Rome as the venue for an eventual donors conference for Somalia. An "EU Seat" on the UNSC -------------- ¶9. (C) Italy has referred to its UNSC membership as an "EU seat", seeking closer coordination among the EU members of the Council and EU consensus on issues before the UNSC. Italy is a strong proponent of European integration and views its UNSC membership as an opportunity to encourage greater EU cohesion on foreign policy. Although the GOI holds steadfastly to its EU strategy in theory, and will look for consensus in Brussels whenever possible, in practice Italy will make its own decisions when there is no clear European position. The GOI knows a real EU seat is a long long way off. ¶10. (C) A more likely and more troublesome scenario is that Italy will work to mollify Russia in the UNSC. Italy under former PM Berlusconi saw itself as a bridge between Russia and the transatlantic community. Heavy dependence on Russian energy, a strong far-left element in the governing coalition, traditional Italian sympathy toward Russia, and a desire by Prodi and D'Alema to move the international community toward a multipolar world mean that this government is more likely to incorporate Russia's views into its decisionmaking process than before. ROME 00000175 003 OF 003 Resources -------------- ¶11. (C) While Italy's UN Mission is not large, the MFA has added four new positions to cover the extra workload during its UNSC rotation. Even with the additional staff, Amb. Marcello Spatafora resisted P5 requests to have Italy chair the Counter Terrorism Committee due to lack of personnel. With a position equivalent in rank to MFA Political Director Terzi, and a higher personal rank, Spatafora has the ability to push back on decisions from Rome. The UN Office in the MFA is understaffed, but is very competent, with several diplomats who have prior experience in New York, some during Italy's last UNSC rotation. Their lack of personnel, however, means some issues slip through the cracks and responses to demarches can be slow and difficult to obtain. SPOGLI