D'ALEMA/KOSOVO: CAN'T LET RUSSIA IMPOSE WILL ON

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ROME 001588

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/23/2017
TAGS: PREL IT
SUBJECT: D'ALEMA/KOSOVO: CAN'T LET RUSSIA IMPOSE WILL ON
EUROPE


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Classified By: Ambassador Ronald P. Spogli, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

Summary
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1. (C) The Ambassador probed FM D'Alema on Kosovo in a
meeting on July 23, shortly after the minister returned from
the GAERC. Ambassador noted that the situation was
dangerous, and could blow up in Europe's face if there were
no independence. FM D'Alema said recognition of Kosovo
independence would be necessary in the end, and the EU can't
let Russia impose its will on Europe. If the Russians were
allowed to block Kosovo independence, it could end the whole
process of European integration, and destabilize the area in
a serious way -- all on Italy's borders. The FM said he
intended to invite EU colleagues currently opposed to
recognition (he named Greece, Bulgaria, Macedonia) "to
reflect seriously" on the consequences of a Russian blocking
move. But D'Alema also felt time was needed for additional
negotiations and that it would be tactically important not to
announce now that we intend to recognize Kosovo independence
at the end of the process. Otherwise, the Kosovars would
have no incentive whatever to negotiate seriously. On other
issues, the Ambassador reinforced our message on the need to
maintain financial pressure on Iran, and asked the FM to
demarche Syria on the issue of foreign fighters to Iraq. He
also took issue with the FM's recent public call for greater
Palestinian "national unity", noting that the Palestinians
actually faced a choice between Abbas and Hamas, so calling
for Palestinian national unity, at this moment, was not
particularly helpful, because it actually served to undermine
Abbas and take the pressure off Hamas. End Summary.


Kosovo: EU Divided
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2. (C) Ambassador, accompanied by POL M/C, met July 23 with
FM D'Alema, shortly after the minister's return from the
GAERC in Brussels. D'Alema was accompanied by his office
director Fernando Nelli-Feroci, and another aide. The
Ambassador probed first on Kosovo. He noted that the
situation was dangerous there, and could blow up if there
were no independence. Europe would then reap the result. We
can't let Russia dictate on this, we need to act together.


3. (C) D'Alema said there was general agreement among EU
ministers on the way forward on Kosovo, i.e. a US-EU-RU
troika to lead the parties in negotiations. HR Solana would
be considering who to name as the EU representative. But the
Italian FM sketched considerable EU disarray on Kosovo
recognition. He said some countries endorsed the US
approach, some say they will not agree to recognize Kosovo
independence under any circumstances, and some say there is a
need to negotiate now, but in the end there must be
recognition, because the EU can't let Russia impose its will
on Europe. Italy is in latter camp.


4. (C) The FM said he was persuaded that recognition was
inevitable, but some time was needed for negotiations and
it's tactically important not to say now (even if we believe
it) that we will recognize Kosovo independence at the end of
the process. This aspect of our discussions should remain
"private among us". Otherwise, the Kosovars will have no
incentive whatever to negotiate seriously. Chief of staff
Nelli-Feroci noted that there would be a Contact Group
experts meeting in Vienna soon to define terms of reference
for the Troika effort. It would be important to have
constructive ambiguity, on the recognition issue.


Russians Can't Be Allowed to Block
--------------


5. (C) D'Alema said if the Russians were allowed to block
Kosovo independence, it could end the whole process of
European integration, and destabilize the area in a serious
way. And all this would occur on Italy's borders. The FM
said he intended to invite his EU colleagues currently
opposed to recognition (he named Greece, Bulgaria, Macedonia)
"to reflect seriously" on the consequences of a Russian
blocking move.


6. (C) While talks go on, he noted, Kosovo will remain
independent in fact, and the EU presence will continue. The
EU is the arbiter, for better or worse. Serbia wants EU
integration, and the Serbs can't have it without a Kosovo
accord. And "Kosovo independence" ultimately depends on the

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EU, to the tune of 3 billion euros a year. So the EU has
some leverage with the parties, and there should be an
energetic effort to achieve agreement.


7. (C) Meanwhile, the juridical issue is a significant
matter in the EU, e.g. Germany can't deploy troops/money, due
to its constitutional restriction, unless a UNSCR is in
place. While the EU countries could base deployment of
troops/money on bilateral agreements with Kosovo, that would
require recognition, and the EU as a whole isn't there yet.
D'Alema said the EU was currently studying the possibility of
a coalition of the willing in the event that EU internal
agreement continues to prove elusive. Such an operation
would be explicitly recognized as an EU effort, but only
those members who wished to participate would do so.


Iran: Keep Up the Pressure
--------------


8. (C) Turning to Iran, the Ambassador stressed need to
maintain international pressure, especially financial
pressure, on Iran to bring them to the table and more
productive talks on the nuclear issue. This was not a time
for business as usual. D'Alema said Italy was doing its
part, keeping up the financial pressure, acting against Bank
Sepah. And the Iranians were angry with them about that.
But no regime, he said -- witness Saddam Hussein -- has
fallen due to sanctions. Political factors are what do it in
the end. There was no better way to put this regime in
difficulty than to put them at the negotiating table. The
US was talking to them on Iraq, but not on the nuclear
matter. They are thus allowed out of their isolation, but
not put in any political difficulty.


9. (C) POL M/C noted the Iranians had two angles of
approach, if they were interested in making headway. The
first was Iraq talks at the envoy level. The other was to
suspend enrichment; in which case, the Secretary had offered
talks at the highest level. So they have two different
prospects. They are subtle people. If they want to engage,
it will not be difficult for them to do so.


10. (C) Returning to the nuclear issue, D'Alema he said he
understood the Iranians were on the verge of a capacity jump,
from 3,000 to 8,000 centrifuges. Our priority should be to
stop that. There was a process under way of clarifiying
outstanding issues between Iran and IAEA. He felt action in
New York should be kept in abeyance as long as the IAEA's
Baradei certifies that this process is ongoing.


Syria: Help Us With the Foreign Fighters Message
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11. (C) The Ambassador told D'Alema it would be helpful if
Italy were to address directly with Syria our common message
on the need to take action the flow of foreign fighters
through Syria to Iraq. D'Alema nodded, and his chief of
staff made a note. POL M/C noted that Damascus Airport was a
particular problem. The FM then launched on a long
discourse on Bashar, the nature of the Syrian regime, and how
different the son was from his father. He expressed some
wonder -- and took as a sign of Bashar's weakness -- that VP
Shara had requested to see D'Alema after the minister's
meeting with Bashar. Under the father, he said, that would
never have happened -- Hafiz al-Asad was the last meeting,
and no one would presume to come after. Visit a tourist
site, go to the museum, maybe, but that was always the last
official meeting.


Hamas: The Issue Is Not National Unity
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12. (C) The Ambassador noted that D'Alema had spoken in
favor of Palestinian national unity, and reconciliation
between Fatah and Hamas. But the issue now, he said, was not
national unity. It was that this is a time of choice for
Palestinians, a choice between Hamas and Abbas. D'Alema said
he had spoken in terms consistent with the letter of the ten
EU foreign ministers; he had not called on the international
community to engage with Hamas, but for greater Palestinian
national unity, i.e. for Palestinians to engage with each
other and for Hamas not to be driven in an even more radical
direction. The Ambassador noted that the practical effect of
calling for national unity now was to undermine Abu Mazin and
reduce pressure on Hamas. The point was not recognizing that

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Hamas won an election or acknowledging that they have a
following in Palestinian society. It's recognizing that
Hamas can't pretend to function as part of a legitimate
political system and then proceed to undermine that system by
resorting to violence and terror. And it's up to all of us
to help clarify for the Palestinians the choice before them.



Comment
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13. (C) D'Alema saw us right after his return from the GAERC
FMs meeting, and just before he was to appear before
Parliament to testify on Italy's ME policy. He spent far and
away the longest time talking about Kosovo. He appears to be
with us on recognition, and recognizes the inevitability of
it. But he is concerned to use the coming months not only to
make an energetic effort with the parties, bolstered by
serious EU blandishments to Serbia on integration, but also
to work within the EU for a more coherent position. And on
the latter, he recognizes that he has his work cut out for
him. End comment.


SPOGLI