ITALIANS CAUTIOUS ON UN ENVOY FOR AFGHANISTAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ROME 001497

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/03/2017
TAGS: PREL UNSC IT
SUBJECT: ITALIANS CAUTIOUS ON UN ENVOY FOR AFGHANISTAN

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Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor David D. Pearce, for reason
s 1.4 (b) and (d)

Summary
--------------


1. (C) In bilateral meetings on the fringes of the Rome
Afghan conference, Italy's prime minister and foreign
minister guardedly welcomed the prospect of a new, high-level
UN envoy for Afghanistan. But PM Prodi told USUN Amb
Khalilzad it would be important for such an envoy to have
adequate resources to do the job. FM D'Alema agreed on the
need for greater international cooperation, but said such a
person would need to be an international political figure.
Separately, Afghan President Karzai told Khalilzad that a
high-level envoy could be useful for improving coordination
between and among donors, and with the Afghan government, but
not as a new high commissioner to be imposed on Kabul.
Karzai said sensitive regional issues, like Afghan-Pakistani
relations, should be reserved for the highest level, e.g. the
UNSYG. Khalilzad also discussed with the Italians the need
to revise and strengthen the mandate of the UN Assistance
Mission to Iraq, and suggested they consider possible
candidates for such a position.


2. (C) The Italian PM and FM discussed Iran with Khalilzad
in familiar terms, arguing the need for engagement and saying
that the US, not the European, role was key for Tehran.
Khalilzad said it was important to be consistent in our
collective message on the nuclear issue; otherwise the
Iranians would scent division and hold out in the belief they
can get a better deal. D,Alema repeated his G-8 message:
the current cycle of sanctions and more sanctions on Iran was
not working. Boucher said Iran needs to choose between a
productive relationship with the rest of the world and
nuclear weapons. On Kosovo, the PM said we need to go "in
the direction of" independence but use the coming months to
make the Serbs feel the prospect of EU membership is real.
The FM added that the EU would split over a unilateral
declaration now by Kosovo. That said, D,Alema declared that
Kosovo independence was the only solution, even for Serbia.
He supported the Quint approach, i.e. go for a simple
resolution now that would bless an EU troop presence, but
leave independence and the recognition issue for later.
Outside this process, however, Quint members should agree
among themselves that at the end of the designated
negotiating period there would be independence and
recognition. End Summary.


Cautious on Senior UN Envoy for Afghanistan
--------------


3. (C) USUN Amb Khalilzad met July 2 with PM Prodi and FM
D'Alema during the Rome conference on the rule of law in
Afghanistan. SCA A/S Boucher joined the FM meeting. Prodi
noted that civilian casualties in Afghanistan put him under
political pressure in Italy. Khalilzad said they caused
pressure not only in Italy but in Afghanistan. The Taliban
were to blame, but we may also need to consider something
like a joint cell with the Afghans on military strategy.
D'Alema expressed concern about the intentions of Iran's
Revolutionary Guard and whether their activities could
portend intent to use the Afghan battlefield for other
reasons, e.g. to pressure the USG. Khalilzad commented that
the Iranians were capable of doing several different, and
apparently contradictory, things at the same time. He stated
that it was time to develop a sophisticated approach to
counter Iranian strategy, rather than to debate about its
nature.


4. (C) Khalilzad probed both Italian leaders for their views
on the utility of a high-level UN envoy to renew the "Spirit
of Bonn" and work both the internal and external aspects of
the Afghan issue. The PM questioned whether such an envoy
would be given the requisite resources to do the job. If so,
he would support it. The FM agreed greater regional
cooperation was needed, as well as progress on the political,
and not only military, level. That was why he had been
advocating an international conference. But D'Alema was
cautious about an envoy, saying such a UN envoy would need to
be an international political figure. Boucher noted that the

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Afghan government was at the center of the process and any
envoy would have to be someone who worked to support Karzai.


5. (C) Separately, Khalilzad also raised the UN envoy
proposal in discussions with Afghan President Karzai, who was
also attending the conference. The Afghan president felt an
envoy could be useful, in addition to the current UN envoy.
The new envoy's role should be to improve coordination among
donors, and between donors and the Afghan government. The
JCMB is not working well, in Karzai's view, and better
coordination would be helpful. Such a person would need to
understand the Afghan situation well and be prepared to work
closely with the Afghan government, not be placed in any kind
of position over it, e.g. as a high commissioner. The envoy
would need to be resident in Kabul to be effective. Karzai
felt that discussion of the most sensitive regional issues,
like Afghanistan-Pakistan relations, should take place only
at the highest level, a role that the UN Secretary General
may wish to reserve for himself. (UNSGY Ban Ki-Moon told
Khalilzad he had already been discussing with UNAMA head
Koenig the idea of a possible role for himself; Koenig
reportedly is unenthusiastic about naming a second UN envoy,
hQever.)


... and Iraq
--------------

6 (C) Khalilzad observed that the mandate for the UN
assistance mission to Iraq, UNAMI, also needed to be renewed
and strengthened soon. This was potentially important for
national reconciliation efforts in Iraq, e.g. helping to sort
out the complex issues related to Kirkuk and the north. He
asked the FM if the GOI had any candidates. D'Alema, after
consulting briefly with aides, demurred, saying the GOI had
experienced people, but no official suggestions at the
moment.


Iran: What Tehran Wants, Only the US Can Give
--------------


7. (C) Both the PM and FM discussed Iran in familiar terms,
arguing the need for engagement and saying that the US -- not
the European -- role is key. Khalilzad stressed that it was
important to be consistent in our collective message;
otherwise the Iranians would scent division and hold out in
the belief they can get a better deal. D'Alema repeated his
G-8 message: Italy would not get out of step with the P5
plus one. It would implement resolutions, and had taken
steps against Bank Sepah. But the current cycle of sanctions
and more sanctions is not working. We need to revisit the
strategy. The Iranians have 3,000 centrifuges working now,
and it will be 8,000 by the end of the year.


8. (C) Prodi sounded the same theme, arguing the need to
stop this process now and get Iran into negotiations. We're
locked in the preconditions phase, he said, not getting to
negotiations, but time is working in Iran's favor. He and
D'Alema both felt a negotiations process would split the
Iranians whereas confrontation serves only to unite them.
Khalilzad told the PM that the question was whether Iran
would stop, even if we engaged them. What level of pressure
would be needed to effect adequate controls? And if they
truly wanted to engage, would it really be so hard for them,
with all their cleverness and subtlety, to find a way to
suspend, as we have suggested? We have offered negotiations
-- at the level of the Secretary. But our analysts think it
is unlikely Tehran will give up its pursuit of a weapon. If
not, then we need to consider other options, and those are
different judgments. Boucher told D'Alema that Iran needs to
choose between a productive relationship with the rest of the
world and nuclear weapons.


Lebanon: Rollover UNIFIL Mandate
--------------


9. (C) The Prime Minister noted Lebanese PM Siniora had
visited recently. Siniora preferred to leave the UNIFIL
mandate as it was, and do a technical rollover. Khalilzad
said the USG supported Siniora. The PM said the Lebanese

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leader was concerned about the porous border with Syria and
felt it was critical to get some measure of control.


Kosovo: Take More Time, but Independence Inevitable
-------------- --------------


10. (C) The PM and FM both attached importance to the
US-Russia summit in Kennebunkport and its discussions on
Kosovo. Prodi said we need to go "in the direction of"
independence but use the coming months to make the Serbs feel
the prospect of EU membership is for real. The FM said the
EU would split over a unilateral declaration by Kosovo. EU
countries want a resolution to have a legal basis for action
and to keep NATO troops. Italy was not ready to support a
unilateral declaration just yet but could be in the future.
D'Alema declared that Kosovo independence is the only
solution, even for Serbia. He supported the Quint approach,
i.e. to go for a simple resolution now that would bless an EU
troop presence, but leave the independence and recognition
issue for later. Outside this process, however, Quint
members would agree among themselves that at the end of the
designated negotiating period there would be independence and
recognition.
BORG