ITALY AND CUBA: NSC-DIRECTED REVIEW FOR LIBERTAD

C O N F I D E N T I A L ROME 001270

SIPDIS

SIPDIS
NOFORN

FOR WHA/CCA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/07/2017
TAGS: PREL ETRD ETTC CU IT
SUBJECT: ITALY AND CUBA: NSC-DIRECTED REVIEW FOR LIBERTAD
TITLE III SUSPENSION

REF: A. STATE 65523


B. ROME 1029

C. HAVANA 298

D. DERETIC-YOUNG E-MAIL

Classified By: Political Minister Counselor David D. Pearce for reasons
1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) There has been little change in Italy's relationship
with Cuba in the past six months. The most significant event
in bilateral relations this period was a visit by Cuban
Foreign Minister Felipe Perez Roque to Rome on March 15. In
his meeting with Italian Foreign Minister Massimo D'Alema,
the GOI ensured the main topic of conversation was the human
rights situation in Cuba (refs b and c). The Italian Embassy
in Havana continued to meet with opposition leaders as part
of Italy's two-track approach to engage both Cuban government
officials and the opposition. Italy did not participate in
exchange programs with Cuba. There was no significant change
in the level of Italian investment, joint ventures, or
tourism in Cuba.


2. (C) A small group of Italian parliamentarians continued to
put pressure on the Italian government to engage more with
the democratic opposition, especially by providing internet
access at the Italian Embassy. Labor rights activists urged
Italian companies in Cuba to implement socially responsible
practices, including by organizing a day-long meeting on the
subject May 15, co-sponsored by the small center-left ruling
coalition party Partito Radicale and the International Group
for Corporate Social Responsibility in Cuba (GIRSCC).
Telecom Italia's contribution to GOC repression was also
criticized (ref D). MFA Under Secretary for Human Rights
Gianni Vernetti said the GOI was looking for concrete ways to
increase support to the Cuban opposition (perhaps by using
NGOs similar to the National Endowment for Democracy).
However, he stressed the difficulty of funding opposition
parties because of the possible negative effects on the
opposition from GOC retaliation.


3. (C) Italy favors lifting EU suspended sanctions and
increased contact with GOC officials. By engaging with the
GOC, Italian officials argue, the international community can
find and exploit differences of opinion and divisions within
the Cuban Communist Party. However, Italy also believed
strongly in engaging with opposition figures and noted the
GOI would only send a high level representative to Havana if
the GOC allowed the official to meet with members of the
opposition. Italian officials did not see repression
increasing in Cuba (ref B).


4. (C) Comment: Embassy Rome recommends the continuation of
Italy's waiver under Title III as important to helping Italy
maintain positions critical of the GOC. End Comment.
Spogli