Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07ROME1015
2007-05-14 14:30:00
CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN
Embassy Rome
Cable title:
LEBANON: ITALY CAUTIOUS ON HARIRI SPECIAL TRIBUNAL
how-toVZCZCXRO4501 OO RUEHFL RUEHNP DE RUEHRO #1015 1341430 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 141430Z MAY 07 FM AMEMBASSY ROME TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8003 INFO RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEHLB/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY 0283 RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY 0655 RUEHFL/AMCONSUL FLORENCE PRIORITY 2373 RUEHMIL/AMCONSUL MILAN PRIORITY 8634 RUEHNP/AMCONSUL NAPLES PRIORITY 2531
C O N F I D E N T I A L ROME 001015
SIPDIS
NOFORN
SIPDIS
FOR IO/UNP ANNELIESE REINMEYER
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/14/2017
TAGS: PREL PTER UNSC LE IT
SUBJECT: LEBANON: ITALY CAUTIOUS ON HARIRI SPECIAL TRIBUNAL
CHAPTER VII UNSCR
REF: A. STATE 63229
B. ROME 1011
Classified By: Political Military Counselor Jonathan R. Cohen for reaso
ns 1.4 (b) and (d).
C O N F I D E N T I A L ROME 001015
SIPDIS
NOFORN
SIPDIS
FOR IO/UNP ANNELIESE REINMEYER
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/14/2017
TAGS: PREL PTER UNSC LE IT
SUBJECT: LEBANON: ITALY CAUTIOUS ON HARIRI SPECIAL TRIBUNAL
CHAPTER VII UNSCR
REF: A. STATE 63229
B. ROME 1011
Classified By: Political Military Counselor Jonathan R. Cohen for reaso
ns 1.4 (b) and (d).
1. (C) Poloffs delivered Ref A demarche May 10 separately to
MFA Near East Deputy Office Director Danielle Bosio, UN
Office Director Leonardo Bencini, and the Prime Minister's
Middle East Advisor Marco Carnelos, encouraging GOI support
for a UNSCR to establish the Special Tribunal for Lebanon.
Bosio and Bencini expressed support for establishing the
Tribunal, but stressed that a Chapter VII UNSCR should be a
last resort. Both noted that Italy had several serious
reservations about Security Council action. Bencini said
that, while Italy had not made a final decision (and likely
would not do so until absolutely necessary),if there was a
general consensus Italy would join. Prime Minister Prodi
raised the issue of the Tribunal with Ambassador May 10,
expressing concerns about the fragile political situation in
Lebanon and arguing the UNSC should wait until after October
elections to act (Ref B).
2. (C) Bosia and Bencini both raised the following list of
Italian concerns.
--UN Legal Counselor Michel's report did not rule out the
possibility of a negotiated solution, and Italy thought the
possibility for an internally negotiated solution, though
unlikely, should be exhausted before resorting to Security
Council action.
--Lebanese PM Siniora had not expressed to Italy a desire to
see the UNSC adopt a Chapter VII resolution.
--Italy doubted the Tribunal could function effectively
without the consent of all parties concerned.
--Italy's understanding was that Russia was not supportive of
a Chapter VII resolution. If Russia vetoed the UNSCR, the
GOI believed it would be the end of the Tribunal, and would
also have very negative consequences for Security Council
work. Bosio and Bencini both stressed the importance of
making certain Russia was on board before tabling a
resolution.
--Italy was also concerned about the potential destabilizing
internal effects in Lebanon, and the security threat this
could pose to Italian UNIFIL troops if Hizballah and other
groups were antagonized.
Spogli
SIPDIS
NOFORN
SIPDIS
FOR IO/UNP ANNELIESE REINMEYER
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/14/2017
TAGS: PREL PTER UNSC LE IT
SUBJECT: LEBANON: ITALY CAUTIOUS ON HARIRI SPECIAL TRIBUNAL
CHAPTER VII UNSCR
REF: A. STATE 63229
B. ROME 1011
Classified By: Political Military Counselor Jonathan R. Cohen for reaso
ns 1.4 (b) and (d).
1. (C) Poloffs delivered Ref A demarche May 10 separately to
MFA Near East Deputy Office Director Danielle Bosio, UN
Office Director Leonardo Bencini, and the Prime Minister's
Middle East Advisor Marco Carnelos, encouraging GOI support
for a UNSCR to establish the Special Tribunal for Lebanon.
Bosio and Bencini expressed support for establishing the
Tribunal, but stressed that a Chapter VII UNSCR should be a
last resort. Both noted that Italy had several serious
reservations about Security Council action. Bencini said
that, while Italy had not made a final decision (and likely
would not do so until absolutely necessary),if there was a
general consensus Italy would join. Prime Minister Prodi
raised the issue of the Tribunal with Ambassador May 10,
expressing concerns about the fragile political situation in
Lebanon and arguing the UNSC should wait until after October
elections to act (Ref B).
2. (C) Bosia and Bencini both raised the following list of
Italian concerns.
--UN Legal Counselor Michel's report did not rule out the
possibility of a negotiated solution, and Italy thought the
possibility for an internally negotiated solution, though
unlikely, should be exhausted before resorting to Security
Council action.
--Lebanese PM Siniora had not expressed to Italy a desire to
see the UNSC adopt a Chapter VII resolution.
--Italy doubted the Tribunal could function effectively
without the consent of all parties concerned.
--Italy's understanding was that Russia was not supportive of
a Chapter VII resolution. If Russia vetoed the UNSCR, the
GOI believed it would be the end of the Tribunal, and would
also have very negative consequences for Security Council
work. Bosio and Bencini both stressed the importance of
making certain Russia was on board before tabling a
resolution.
--Italy was also concerned about the potential destabilizing
internal effects in Lebanon, and the security threat this
could pose to Italian UNIFIL troops if Hizballah and other
groups were antagonized.
Spogli