MARCH 12 JOINT WORKING GROUP MEETING WITH PRINCE

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 RIYADH 000523 SIPDIS SIPDIS DOE PASS TO A/S HARBERT, MWILLIAMSON, KKOLEVAR AND GPERSON CIA PASS TO TCOYNE E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/14/2017 TAGS: EPET PTER PGOV SA SUBJECT: MARCH 12 JOINT WORKING GROUP MEETING WITH PRINCE MOHAMMED BIN NAYIF REF: A. RIYADH 475 ¶B. ROSS-FEIERSTEIN E-MAIL 14 MARCH 2007 Classified By: AMBASSADOR JAMES C. OBERWETTER FOR REASONS 1.4 B, D, AND E. ¶1. (U) Action Request: This is an action request. Please see paragraph nine. -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶2. (S) After two weeks of meetings and site visits, USG experts from the Joint Working Group (JWG) on critical infrastructure protection (CIP) capped off their visit with a highly successful meeting on March 12 with AssistantMinister of Interior Prince Mohammed bin Nayif. Prince Mohammed underscored the Saudi government,s view of the seriousness of the threat to petroleum infrastructure. He listened attentively as Department of Energy's Senior Advisor to the Ministry of Interior (MOI) de Alvarez outlined a series of recommendations on security improvements. The meeting, scheduled for a half hour, extended to two hours with Prince Mohammed's follow-up questions. He said he seeks to implement technological solutions to Saudi Aramco's security challenges in order to minimize both human error and internal sabotage. He noted the MOI needed to be prepared to meet threats to the petroleum infrastructure from either terrorists or nation states. Prince Mohammed communicated a sense of urgency and emphasized his interest in measures that could be implemented immediately. He clarified that the MOI needed assistance on the Iran threat, in contingency planning for the continued operation of strategic petroleum facilities in the event of hostilities. Economic Counselor noted military measures should remain in military channels, though contingency planinng for keeping petroleum facilities operating could be a JWG issue. Prince Mohammed liked the JWG briefing, and asked his staff to translate it into Arabic so he could brief it to the King. End summary. -------------- Meeting Participants -------------- ¶3. (C) On the Saudi side, meeting participants included: --Assistant Minister of Interior Prince Muhammad bin Nayif, --Dr. Saud al-Semari, MOI Director of Modernization and JWG Co-Chair, --MG Dr. Saad al-Jabri, Chief of Staff to Assistant Minister of Interior Prince Muhammad bin Nayif, --MG Saad al-Majed, FSF Commander, --MG Misfer al-Ghamdi, MOI Assistant DG for Operations, Border Guard, and --Dr. Khaled al-Ageel, MOI Director of the Higher Commission for Industrial Security. De Alvarez presented the JWG's technical recommendations to Prince Mohammed (ref B). -------------- MOI: Trust in Technology, Not People, Fearful of Internal Sabotage -------------- ¶4. (S) Prince Mohammed described his philosophy for improving security at critical infrastructure sites: "We want to minimize reliance on the human factor, and we want to institute systems for detection, deterrence, and interdiction of terrorism." He lamented the fact that people who work inside RIYADH 00000523 002 OF 003 can be a threat and noted that the tendency to turn suicide bomber seemed to spread from person to person, "like a virus." In light of Saudi's internal threat, he concluded, "we want to depend more on machines." -------------- -- Implementing the "Design Basis Threat" Framework for Strategic Saudi Energy Facilities -------------- -- ¶5. (S) De Alvarez and Gardner explained the Design Basis Threat process, utilized by the USG to evaluate threats to strategic sites, such as U.S. nuclear plants. DOE recommended that large petroleum installations in Saudi Arabia, such as Abqaiq, be designated as globally strategic facilities and subject to the Design Basis Threat analysis and planning process. They suggested that a nation should spend the most resources to protect those facilities and components that are most critical, rather than attempting to protect all facilities equally, which roughly describes the current Saudi model. The Design Basis Threat process produces plans to protect strategic national sites to the highest level of security and guides decisions on the human, material, and technological resources required to provide this security. In addition, the Design Basis Threat process produces a national policy document that outlines the threat level to which strategic sites will be protected. -------------- -------------- Exiting the Stovepipe: Developing Joint Operations between Government Security Forces and Industry -------------- -------------- ¶6. (S) Dr. Saud al-Semari, Director of Modernization for the MOI (and JWG Co-Chair),noted the JWG recommended that all relevant security organizations - the High Commission on Industrial Security, the Facilities Security Force (FSF),the Border and Coast Guards, and Saudi Aramco Industrial Security, be involved and exposed to the DBT framework. Prince Mohammed remarked that he was "happy to hear the forces would be working as a team." The USG JWG members emphasized the need to break through the traditional Saudi stovepipes to promote joint training and control centers. This is particularly true in the maritime area, as Saudi Aramco, the Coast Guard, and Royal Saudi Naval Forces all have different sectors of responsibility, but would nonetheless have to coordinate closely to implement effective anti-terrorism measures. The team noted that, unfortunately, they had not yet had an opportunity to observe any joint maritime efforts, but they looked forward to the opportunity to do so during the upcoming maritime team visit. -------------- Focus on Quick Results -------------- ¶7. (S) Zooming in on the need for quick results, Prince Mohammed asked which recommendations could be implemented immediately. DS Soler noted the immediate need to implement anti-ram barriers at key facilities, and the immediate purchase of Itemizer equipment to detect those entering sites with explosive materials. DS provided specifications and drawings of tested anti-ram barriers to the MOI. On the maritime side, Captain Grant recommended the maritime team return in the near future to assess the Ras Tanura Single Point Mooring (SPM) junction. He also counseled immediately implementing authentication procedures for liquid petroleum gas (LPG, a highly volatile fuel) vessels, which pass very near critical Ras Tanura RIYADH 00000523 003 OF 003 facilities, such as Sea Island and the SPM junction. -------------- Focusing on the Iran Threat: Recovery in Event of Attack -------------- ¶8. (S) Prince Mohammed asked bluntly, "What can the internal forces do to minimize damage (to petroleum installations) when at war with Iran?" He emphasized the need for contingency planning, and stated he was not sure whether to shut down at-risk facilities, evacuate civilians from sites such as Jubail City, or take other measures in the event of hostilities. Economic Counselor thanked Prince Mohammed for the clarification. He noted that military measures would have to be considered within direct military to military channels, but contingency planinng for petroleum facilities was an issue the JWG could consider. De Alvarez noted that after the U.S. experience in coping with energy supply disruption from 9/11 and Hurricanes Rita and Katrina, we found "you don't shut down the facilities you need to respond or recover." De Alvarez also described the U.S. experience in carrying out post-9/11 joint tabletop exercises with federal, state, local, and industry officials to plan for possible disruptions to the energy supply. He noted that private companies could be contracted to run such contingency planning exercises. Prince Mohammed indicated that the JWG's mission was very important, "as Iran and the terrorists won't hesitate to use whatever they can," and estimated the threat to Saudi oil facilities originated "60% from terrorism, and 40% from national threats," i.e., Iran. Wrapping up, Prince Mohammed thanked the delegation, stating, "Thank you for taking this seriously. My leadership supports your work. Our countries have trusted us, and we need results. We want to feel we did the maximum we could every day." -------------- Comment and Action Request -------------- ¶9. (S) The MOI enthusiastically received the JWG meetings and follow-on site visits. Dr. al-Jabri requested at the immediate conclusion of the meeting with Prince Mohammed to move the next meeting of the JWG forward to late April or early May in the U.S., rather than waiting until early June. The MOI site visits are tentatively planned to conclude in San Diego on or about April 28. The request to move up the next session reflects MOI concerns with tense relations with Iran. We request Washington's guidance on the preferred timing for the JWG's next session. OBERWETTER