CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE JOINT WORKING GROUP MEETS

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 RIYADH 000475 SIPDIS SIPDIS DOE PASS TO GPERSON CIA PASS TO TCOYNE E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/06/2017 TAGS: EPET PTER PGOV SA SUBJECT: CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE JOINT WORKING GROUP MEETS MARCH 4-5, ADOPTS ACTION PLAN FOR PHYSICAL SECURITY UPGRADES REF: A. RIYADH 355 ¶B. RIYADH 259 Classified By: Economic Counselor Robert Silverman for reasons 1.5 (b) and (d). -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (S) On March 4-5, the US-Saudi Joint Working Group on Critical Infrastructure Protection met in the MOI Officers Club in Riyadh, co-chaired by the Ministry of Interior's Director of Modernization Saud al-Semari, and Embassy Economic Counselor. The two government delegations met March 4, followed on March 5 with technical workshops conducted by the US delegation for Saudi company industrial security engineers and managers. On March 4, DOE Senior Advisor de Alvarez presented findings from his late February site assessment visits to critical infrastructure sites, and presented an action plan (para 6). He noted that while Saudi Aramco has made significant progress in improving security procedures and had initiated a rapid reaction force, more permanent capital investments in security upgrades await passage of new industrial security regulations. These new regulations are in process, an effort in which de Alvarez is assisting the MOI. NAVCENT Captain Cox briefed the JWG on rising Iranian belligerence in daily interactions with coalition naval forces in the Arabian Gulf. Ministry of Interior senior advisor to Prince Muhammad bin Nayef, MG Saad al-Jabri, said Prince Muhammad bin Nayef wanted to meet with the JWG group on the plan for adopting physical security upgrades, scheduled for March 12. Jabri asked the JWG to broaden its focus in two areas: measures aimed at protecting Saudi infrastructure from a military threat from Iran; US cooperation in training the new Facility Security Force (FSF),and mounting up its new training academy. The JWG plans to have have a detailed series of recommendations on March 12, following site visits currently underway in the Eastern Province. End Summary. -------------- -------------- Concern with Iranian Rhetoric and Maritime Security -------------- -------------- ¶2. (S) The MOI is increasingly concerned with Iranian capabilities and intentions, according to MOI MG Saad al-Jabri, and he asked that the JWG be a venue to bring in USG expertise about the Iranian threat and potential counter measures to protect Saudi infrastructure. In response to this request, NAVCENT Captain George Cox, Director of the Friendly Forces Coordination Center, attended the JWG with other NAVCENT officers and gave a detailed and well received brief on Iranian naval capabilities and activities in the Gulf. The Saudi side took careful notes. Jabri stressed that Iran has publicly threatened it has the capability to reach Saudi petroleum facilities, and its rhetoric indicates it is willing to do so. Cox noted that Iranian Revolutionary Guards are making increasingly deliberate probes of NAVCENT's operational line, ("opline") in the North Arabian Gulf, testing U.S. reactions and capabilities. Captain Cox emphasized that NAVCENT remains committed to "de-pressurizing" the environment in the Arabian Gulf. However, he stated, our maritime success will depend on engaging Iran with a coalition, including nations from the region. Both NAVCENT and MOI representatives agreed the threat from small boats was the most difficult to counter. They agreed to discuss further the option of integrating Ras Tanura into a Point Defense System (PDS). ¶3. (S) MOI ensured the attendance of two MOD officers throughout the JWG, including Colonel Fuad al-Nasser of the Royal Saudi Navy. -------------- Site Assessments: Some Improvements, but Key Vulnerabilities Remain -------------- RIYADH 00000475 002 OF 004 ¶4. (S) The Department of Energy senior advisor briefed on his February site visits to the key facilities last visited by US experts in May 2006 as well as to the additional critical energy infrastructure sites in Jubail and Yanbu' (which house large refineries and petrochemical plants). He indicated he was generally pleased with progress on the ground, but also highlighted key remaining vulnerabilities. Improvements: --There is better and more streamlined command and control systems. Security procedures have improved. --Saudi Aramco guards have been armed and trained in bearing weapons. --Saudi Aramco has implemented a quick reaction force, and provided them with anti-terrorism training. --Saudi Aramco has implemented temporary pipe barriers. Aramco and other companies have accentuated natural obstacles, such as trenches. Inadequacies: --Saudi Aramco lacks a senior executive level security manager with a direct reporting relationship to the Aramco CEO. Currently there are several management layers between the General Manager for Security (Samir Raslan) and the CEO, which delays decision-making and implementation of security programs. --No sites had a formal threat definition, i.e., a defined level to which the company was committed to protect its facility before calling on outside help. --Company security guards lacked anti-terrorism training. --Current industrial security regulations, last formulated in the 1970s, are inadequate to protect against current threats. In Saudi Arabia's regulatory-base system, the companies are waiting for new regulations to make capital investments in security infrastructure. While these new regulations are being drafted, only temporary improvements have been put in place. --The Jubail City water cooling plant remains highly vulnerable and outside the security perimeter. All industries in Jubail rely on this one plant to cool sea water, the water used by all industries there. -------------- FSF Recruitment and Training are High Priorities -------------- ¶5. (S) MG al-Jabri emphasized the FSF is a "major subject for this group, and a major concern for the two governments." He told us the following: -- FSF is recruiting new members. It hired 10,000 new recruits over the past year, and would hire a further 7,000 in the next three years, working towards the goal of a 35,000 member force. -- All FSF soldiers will shortly receive basic military training at an MOI emergency evacuation center in Mecca, temporarily converted into a training center. FSF are currently using various Army and National Guard training facilities elsewhere. Pakistani military trainers will start basic military training for FSF recruits at the converted Mecca center in April. Jabri stated that the Saudis "need a lot of input" to design a training program for the FSF. MOI is continuing to work with Saudi Aramco to identify a site for a permanent facility in the Eastern Province. He added that the British have offered to help with the FSF, and might join an associated research and design center. He emphasized RIYADH 00000475 003 OF 004 the academy should have a maritime training component. -- DS/ATA Agent Soler noted the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC) could offer a venue for training the FSF, or alternately, FLETC trainers could travel to KSA to offer training. Both parties agreed to further examine training programs in cooperation with U.S. law enforcement, particularly those based on a train-the-trainer model. -- The FSF Commander, MOI MG Saad al-Majed, attended the entire two-day JWG, asked numerous questions and participated actively. -------------- Schedule Moving Forward; MbN to Meet with JWG -------------- ¶6. (S) The schedule for the JWG TDY team for the remaining time in the Kingdom stands as follows: --March 6-10: Two joint teams, one land-based and one maritime-based, to visit critical infrastructure sites (e.g., Ras Tanura, Qateef Junction, and Abqaiq) to discuss specific security upgrades with local managers. (Note: These site visits will be the first for the JWG to include a specific maritime component staffed by maritime subject-matter experts, including from NAVCENT. End note.) Teams to meet at CG Dhahran to draft recommendations for presentation to the JWG Executive Committee (the two co-chairs plus DOE senior advisor, DS/ATA, S/CT and the Higher Commission on Industrial Security director). --March 11-12: Teams brief the JWG Exec Committee on site-specific recommendations. JWG finalizes the recommendations. --March 12 or 13: JWG Executive Committee presents the recommendations to Assistant Minister of Interior Prince Muhammad bin Nayef (Note: MG al-Jabri requested that the team brief MbN). --Late March: The MOI's High Commission on Industrial Security adopts the approved recommendations, begins to implement those recommendations relating to it, and conveys the other recommendations to the relevant companies. Moving forward, the JWG has proposed the following for the next few months: --March: Identification of specific Saudi utilities (power and desalination plants) to include in the JWG as critical infrastructure protection; --April: Joint MOI, MinPet and Saudi Aramco visit to Sandia Labs, US offshore petroleum facilities, and USG security training sites; --May: Sandia Labs official Gardner to conduct a "Design Basis Threat" workshop for the Higher Commission on Industrial Security and for Saudi industry, in Riyadh. (Note: This is a technique used by Sandia Labs to identify weaknesses in and improvements needed for security of critical infrastructure sites, such as U.S. nuclear labs or power stations. End note.) --June: The third JWG meeting takes place in Washington. ¶7. (S) The senior Saudi participants in the March 4-5 JWG were: Dr. Saud al-Semari, MOI Director of Modernization and JWG co-chair. MG Saad al-Jabri, senior advisor to Assistant Minister of Interior Prince Muhammad bin Nayef MG Saad al-Majed, FSF Commander MG Khaled al-Humaidan, MOI Director of International Liaison MG Misfer al-Ghamdi, MOI Assistant DG for Operations, Border Guard RIYADH 00000475 004 OF 004 Dr. Khaled al-Ageel, MOI Director of the Higher Commission for Industrial Security Colonel Fuad al-Nasser, Saudi Royal Navy Colonel Said al-Qahtani, MOI Mubahith Major Abdul Hamid al-Badr, MOI Coast Guard Captain Thamer al-Ageel, MOI Mubahith Samir Raslan, General Manager of Industrial Security, Aramco Nasser al-Lajam, Project Engineer for Industrial Security, Aramco Waleed al-Fayyad, General Manager of Industrial Security, SABIC Ghazi Hariri, Manager of Industrial Security, Saudi Electricity Company. OBERWETTER