Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07RIYADH2531
2007-12-20 12:39:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Riyadh
Cable title:  

ISMAILI SHI'A ACTIVISTS THREATEN TO "UNLEASH HELL"

Tags:  KIRF PGOV PHUM SA 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHRH #2531/01 3541239
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 201239Z DEC 07
FM AMEMBASSY RIYADH
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7301
INFO RUEHJI/AMCONSUL JEDDAH PRIORITY 9315
C O N F I D E N T I A L RIYADH 002531 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT. PLEASE PASS TO IRF FOR AGOMBIS, DRL/NESCA FOR
JLIEBERMAN, AND NEA/ARP FOR RJACHIM/SRAMESH.

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/20/2017
TAGS: KIRF PGOV PHUM SA
SUBJECT: ISMAILI SHI'A ACTIVISTS THREATEN TO "UNLEASH HELL"
IF HADI AL-MUTIF IS NOT RELEASED

REF: A. 2006 RIYADH 8808

B. 2005 RIYADH 7281

C. 2005 RIYADH 7757

D. 2007 RIYADH 2501

Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Michael Gfoeller for
reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L RIYADH 002531

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT. PLEASE PASS TO IRF FOR AGOMBIS, DRL/NESCA FOR
JLIEBERMAN, AND NEA/ARP FOR RJACHIM/SRAMESH.

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/20/2017
TAGS: KIRF PGOV PHUM SA
SUBJECT: ISMAILI SHI'A ACTIVISTS THREATEN TO "UNLEASH HELL"
IF HADI AL-MUTIF IS NOT RELEASED

REF: A. 2006 RIYADH 8808

B. 2005 RIYADH 7281

C. 2005 RIYADH 7757

D. 2007 RIYADH 2501

Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Michael Gfoeller for
reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: PolOff met with five Ismaili Shi'a activists
recently to discuss the latest efforts to free Hadi al-Mutif,
an Ismaili Shi'a who has been in prison for the past 15 years
for uttering a profanity against the Prophet. (reftel A)
Shi'a and human rights activists maintain that al-Mutif's
harsh punishment is tied to his religious identity. Spurred
by the international media focus on the "Qateef girl," the
activists invited al-Mutif's father to Riyadh in late
November to discuss how to secure his son's release. They
first chose the "tribal route" by asking a prominent Sheikh
from a leading tribe to accompany al-Mutif's father to King
Abdullah's weekly majlis in Riyadh, in order to request the
King's intervention. However, this effort was not
successful, so the activists decided to ask the president of
the Saudi Human Rights Commission to speak directly with King
Abdullah in Riyadh. If this official route does not achieve
results by the first day of the first Islamic month of
Muharram (January 8, 2008),the activists claim that they
"will unleash hell" against the SAG via foreign media. They
continue to insist that al-Mutif's case is representative of
SAG discrimination against Ismailis and the southern Najran
region in general. (reftels B and C) While the recently
announced judicial reforms and the King's pardon of the
"Qateef girl" are promising, it remains to be seen if these
developments will have any effect on al-Mutif's case or if an
international campaign will be launched on his behalf. END
SUMMARY.

--------------
BACKGROUND ON HADI AL-MUTIF
--------------


2. (C) Hadi al-Mutif was 18 years old when he began training
at a military unit in the southern Najran province.
According to Embassy contacts and Human Rights Watch,
al-Mutif apparently uttered "let's pray on the penis of the

Prophet" during a communal prayer session in December 1993.
(reftel A) In response, his superiors turned him over to the
"mabahith" or secret police, who questioned him for a few
weeks and then transferred him to a local jail. His first
trial was in 1994. Then he was sentenced to death in 1996
for "saab al Rasul" or insulting the Prophet. The sentence
was commuted to life imprisonment in 1999. Human Rights
Watch asserts that judges during each phase of his
sentencing, from the Najran General Court to the Mecca
Appeals Court to the Supreme Judicial Council, displayed open
hostility towards al-Mutif's Ismaili identity. After
repeated requests by his family, King Abdullah approved a
special review process, including a six-month psychiatric
evaluation, which concluded that al-Mutif "suffered from
childhood trauma and that he was not responsible for his
actions at the time of the incident." However, a judicial
committee upheld the verdict in 2001 and sent al-Mutif back
to the Najran Mabahith Prison, where he has attempted suicide
at least two times. He is now kept in isolation reportedly
as punishment for a January 2007 al-Hurra interview.


3. (C) Al-Mutif remains in prison because he was sentenced
under "had," which is a punishment mandated under the Qur'an,
and not under "ta'azir," which is a punishment that allows
for more discretion in sentencing. If his case is changed to
"ta'azir," then King Abdullah could pardon him. A Ministry
of Islamic Affairs official told PolOff on December 2 that he
knew of a Sunni man who was executed for a similar offense
and therefore, he believed that al-Mutif's punishment was
"fair." However, he added that he believes that the King
"will pardon him shortly."

-------------- ---
ACTIVISTS FIRST CHOOSE TRIBAL ROUTE TO FREE HADI
-------------- ---


4. (C) PolOff held a series of meetings with five male
Najrani activists in November and December to discuss the
latest efforts to free al-Mutif. These activists range in
age from the mid-twenties to late fifties. They include a
graduate student, a psychologist, a military officer, and two
public relations officials. Three of these activists and
other Najranis based in Riyadh invited Said al-Mutif, the
father of Hadi al-Mutif, to visit Riyadh in late November to
discuss how to secure his son's release. During their

initial meeting on Saturday November 24, the activists
debated an "international route" or requesting help from
foreign missions in Saudi Arabia, international human rights
organizations, and foreign media, but voted against this
option. The group instead chose the "tribal route" by asking
a Sheikh from the Ajman tribe to accompany Said to the King's
weekly majlis on Friday November 30 to plead for the King's
intervention. An activist confided to PolOff on December 1
that Supreme Judicial Court Judge Saleh al-Luhaidan refuses
to revisit the al-Mutif case, so the activists are trying to
encourage the King to either pardon al-Mutif or ask
al-Luhaidan to at least review the case. However, the Sheikh
called Said on Thursday November 29 to say that he "had other
plans," so he could not accompany Said to the King's majlis.
When the group met with Said again on Thursday night, he was
"devastated" and "sobbing." Therefore, the activists decided
to send Said back to Najran the next day.

-------------- --------------
IF OFFICIAL ROUTE FAILS, ACTIVISTS WILL USE THE MEDIA
-------------- --------------


5. (C) An activist told PolOff on December 1 that the group
is now following up with Human Rights Commission President
Sheikh Turki al-Sudairy in Riyadh to request his intervention
with the King. Although Said has met previously with Sheikh
Turki, Crown Prince Sultan and even King Abdullah, the
activists are willing to use the "official route" one last
time. However, if the group does not receive an official
response by the "first day of the first Islamic month of
Muharram" (approximately January 8, 2008),then the group
will attempt to "unleash hell" on the Saudi Government by
taking the "international route." The activists repeatedly
compared al-Mutif's case to the "Qateef Girl" case and said
that "it was almost time" to start using the media to raise
al-Mutif's international profile

--------------
SYSTEMIC DISCRIMINATION AGAINST ISMAILIS?
--------------


6. (C) An activist told PolOff on November 30 that "Hadi's
case is a litmus test for Saudi justice for both Najrani and
other Saudi activists." He referred to the ongoing
perceptions of systemic bias against Ismailis and other
communities living outside of the central Nejd region.
(reftels B and C) The 2005 SAG census defines the Najran
population to be approximately 430,000, of whom 85% are
Ismaili according to the activists. They also claim that
there are almost 700,000 Ismailis throughout the country.
The activists described a pattern of SAG discrimination
against Ismailis, who are reportedly unable to "build their
mosques" with Ismaili imams, as opposed to SAG-sponsored
Sunni imams, whose Ismaili imams are "co-opted by Wahhabi"
imams, and whose religious identity is disparaged in Saudi
textbooks. They also pointed to Najran's limited
infrastructure, including no television station or
newspapers, limited employment opportunities, and basic
educational facilities - with the very recent exception of
the 2007 opening of Najran's first university. In addition,
they alleged that the SAG is relocating and "building new
villas and cantons" for Yemeni Sunni tribes, in order to
change Najran's religious demographics.


7. (C) The activists brought up two specific cases to
demonstrate the inconsistent and unfair application of SAG
justice in al-Mutif's case. First, they cited the case of
Mu'idh al-Salim, a 16-year old Ismaili who uttered the same
profanity as al-Mutif and whose original death sentence and
subsequent commuted sentence of 14 years and 4,000 lashes was
pardoned by King Abdullah on October 30, 2006. Second, they
cited the October 24, 2007 execution of Hadi al-Suleiman, an
Ismaili who helped a convicted drug smuggler escape from a
Najran hospital to Yemen. After the appeals court and
Supreme Judicial Court upheld the ruling, the King ordered
al-Suleiman to be beheaded on the grounds of "al harraba" or
spreading corruption in the land. The activists viewed
al-Suleiman's role as an accessory to the crime to be
disproportionate to his harsh punishment, which they viewed
as another example of SAG intolerance of Ismailis. (COMMENT:
While "had al harraba" is a notoriously flexible punishment
(reftel D),it is more likely that al-Suleiman's harsh
punishment reflects the SAG's strict policy against
narcotics. END COMMENT.)


8. (C) COMMENT: The Ismaili activists' internal debate
mirrors Saudi decision-making writ large, with the activists
trying to take a tribal route to secure al-Mutif's release
before turning to outsiders for assistance. In light of the

recent media focus on the "Qateef Girl" case, it is not
surprising that the Najrani activists are now considering
using the media to further their cause. However, in the
absence of a coordinated media strategy, this "international
route" may have unintended consequences, as evidenced by the
SAG's reported isolation of al-Mutif after his January 2007
al-Hurra interview. In general, Ismaili claims of systemic
discrimination are similar to claims made by Shi'a activists
in the Eastern Province, but are difficult to substantiate
without further outreach to Najranis. The inconsistent
sentencing of Ismailis demonstrates the wide discretion of
Saudi judges under the current judicial system and explains
the rationale for the recently announced judicial reforms.
While these reforms and the King's pardon of the "Qateef
Girl" are promising, it remains to be seen if these
developments will have any effect on al-Mutif's case or if an
international campaign will be launched on his behalf. Post
will continue monitoring the al-Mutif case, the related
efforts of the activists, and the situation in Najran. END
COMMENT.
FRAKER