INTERAGENCY VISIT TO LAUNCH DEEPER MOI COOPERATION

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 07 RIYADH 002474 SIPDIS SIPDIS NEA FOR DAS GGRAY DEPT OF ENERGY PASS TO A/S KKOLEVAR, A/S KHARBERT, AND MWILLIAMSON S/CT FOR GFEIERSTEIN AND BAVERILL DS/ATA FOR KMALOY TREASURY PASS TO A/S CLOWERY DHS PASS TO TWARRICK AND DGRANT CIA PASS TO TCOYNE E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/11/2017 TAGS: KCIP EPET ENERG PTER ASEC SA SUBJECT: INTERAGENCY VISIT TO LAUNCH DEEPER MOI COOPERATION REF: A. RIYADH 2117 ¶B. RIYADH 1954 Classified By: DCM Michael Gfoeller for reasons 1.4 (b) (c) and (d). ¶1. This cable has been cleared by Deputy Assistant Secretary Gray, Assistant Secretary Kolevar, and S/CT Deputy Coordinator Feierstein. -------------- Summary -------------- ¶2. (S) An interagency team traveled to Riyadh on December 3-5 to signal the USG's strong support for the Ministry of Interior's (MOI) proposal for deeper cooperation, including for its modernization drive. The MOI is requesting USG assistance with the daunting task of modernizing across its spectrum of operations: law enforcement, special security operations, civil defense, and intelligence. Our MOI interlocutors, including Assistant Minister of Interior for Security Affairs HRH Prince Mohammed bin Nayif, warmly welcomed proposed USG inter-agency support (septel) in areas such as training, systems, and technology. Major General Dr. Saad Al Jabri signaled that discussions on new mechanisms for inter-agency cooperation should continue in parallel to on-going cooperation under the Joint Working Group (JWG) for Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP),and proposed amending an existing agreement to quickly facilitate new areas of cooperation. Embassy Riyadh has proposed the 1970s-1990s JECOR technical assistance program as a possible model for cooperation. A JECOR-style program would enable cooperation with a variety of USG agencies with "one-stop shopping," for the MOI, a suggestion which keenly interested our interlocutors. The MOI underscored its interest in a long-term partnership and flexible cooperation mechanism to meet a rapidly-evolving threat. -------------- Meeting Attendance -------------- ¶3. (C) The visiting delegation included: --Department of State NEA Deputy Assistant Secretary (DAS) Gordon Gray, --Department of Energy Assistant Secretary Kevin Kolevar, --Department of Energy DAS William Bryan, --Department of State S/CT Deputy Coordinator Gerald Feierstein, --Department of State Political Military Bureau Deputy Director Brooke Milton-Kurtz --Department of Homeland Security Coast Guard Captain Don Grant, --Department of Defense Colonel Don Olds, --Department of Defense Commander Mark Panicek, and --Department of Defense Desk Officer Jared Thomas. Key participants from the MOI participating in the December 4 and 5 meetings included: --Major General Dr. Saad Al-Jabri, Senior Security Advisor to the Assistant Minister of Interior Prince Mohammed bin Nayif, -- Dr. Saud al Semari, MOI, Director of Modernization and JWG Co-Chair, -- Dr. Kahlid Al -Ageel, MOI, Manager, High Commission on Industrial Security, and --Abdullah Al-Hammad, MOI, Budget Director. Mission participants included: RIYADH 00002474 002 OF 007 --Charg D'Affaires Michael Gfoeller, --Acting Deputy Chief of Mission David Rundell, --Energy Attach Shannon Ross, --Naval Attach Rick Ryan, -- Economic Officer Vanessa Paulos, --Political Military Officer Joel Wiegert. -------------- - "No Question about the Strength of Our Ties"; JWG Set the Stage for Future Cooperation -------------- - ¶4. (C) DAS Gray opened by discussing the USG's commitment to resolving issues in the Middle East, whether in Lebanon, Iraq, or Saudi Arabia. He noted our leadership's commitment to working with the MOI was demonstrated by the size and diversity of the inter-agency team which had traveled from Washington. Dr. Al-Jabri responded, "We have a very strategic relationship. Since we signed the MOU (on Critical Infrastructure Protection, in December of 2006),it is progressing very well. There is no question about the strength of our ties. In every house in Saudi Arabia, they appreciate the relationship. 9/11 was a big shock to our whole society; this kind of relationship was not available to us before. Dr. Al-Jabri, emphasizing the demands now made by his senior leadership for even broader and deeper cooperation, continued, "The Joint Working Group (JWG) has done a good job. It is highly appreciated; it is one of the best things we have done in the last two years." Setting the stage for the rest of the day's discussions, he then noted, "However, now our leadership has become more demanding." -------------- Update on the Joint Working Group and Contingency Planning Activities -------------- ¶5. (S) Dr. Hadleg, Director of the MOI's Radical Ideology Department, opened the activities with a briefing on the MOI's de-radicalization initiative (setpel). To provide a common foundation of understanding for all present, Dr.Al-Semari then provided a briefing on JWG activities since the group's establishment in December 2006. He highlighted JWG rapid security assessments at Abqaiq Oil Facilities, Ras Tanura and Ras al Ju,aymah Terminals, Qateef Junction, Eastern Province Coast Guard Facilities and Operations, and Yanbu Industrial City. He noted Sandia National Laboratories had conducted a two-week workshop to train MOI officials and industry security personnel from key energy, power, water, and petrochemical facilities. The training had focused on the design-basis threat model (DBT) used to protect critical U.S. facilities, such as nuclear installations. Looking forward to future JWG activities, Assistant Secretary Kolevar stated that within 6-8 weeks, the JWG would put another subject matter expert team on the ground to assess training needs for the Facilities Security Force Training Academy. Additionally, the JWG had planned a Vulnerability Assessment for Abqaiq Plant, the world's largest oil processing facility, for the January-February timeframe. ¶6. (S) A/S Kolevar then provided an update on the contingency planning project underway with the MOI. He noted the JWG had received a batch of contingency planning documents from the MOI, and a U.S. team was moving forward with machine and human translations in parallel. The U.S. had established a group of technical experts to review the documents. Should the group come to the KSA in January, they would be prepared to provide the MOI with general feedback on the contingency plans, and a sense of what gaps remain. Following that, the experts would deliver formal feedback on RIYADH 00002474 003 OF 007 the contingency planning documents at the next JWG meeting in February 2008. Highlighting the interest with which these issues are followed, Dr. Al-Jabri requested, "When you meet with the King, can you make sure that the Assistant Secretary can brief him on this?" -------------- MOI Highlights Sensitivity of Negotiations -------------- ¶7. (S) Turning to the issue of broader interagency cooperation with the MOI, Dr. Al-Jabri indicated that although the MOI team represented was small, "the right people" with the right level of negotiating authority were present. Dr. Al-Jabri stated the MOI did not want to risk information leaking out by bringing a large team to such sensitive discussions. Dr. Al-Jabri noted, however, that the Ministry of Finance was aware of the negotiations, and the MOI was fully authorized to carry out the discussions from the financial perspective. He remarked on the key attendance of the MOI's budgeting officer. -------------- Positive Views of US Systems and Technology -------------- ¶8. (S) Dr. Al-Jabri highlighted the MOI's positive views of U.S. technology and systems. "The U.S. has the best people, the best technology, and we want a good result." He noted just recently the MOI had concluded a commercial purchase of helicopters, and now the MOI wanted a "useful mechanism" to support further such sales. To quickly facilitate new areas of cooperation and enable to the MOI to more easily obtain political buy-in for a new agreement (including from the Ministry of Finance) he proposed amending the December 2006 MOU between the MOI and DOS. (Note: The existing MOU, "The Framework for Cooperation to Improve Security at Critical Energy Facilities in the KSA" was signed by Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Joseph and HRH Mohammed bin Nayif. End note.) -------------- Saudi Needs for MOI Modernization: Training, Systems, and Technology -------------- ¶9. (S) Dr. Saud Al-Semari then presented an overview of the MOI's operations, which include law enforcement, security operations, civil defense, and intelligence components. He emphasized that Special Security Operations in particular needed accelerated and well-organized cooperation with the U.S., to include training, systems, and technology. He added that the MOI also needed extensive assistance to build its human resources, on which all else depends. -------------- USG Can Meet Your Needs, but Need to Specify the Tool -------------- ¶10. (S) DAS Gray responded, "The USG can meet these needs. We have an extensive ability to train, including in law enforcement, the State Department, including Diplomatic Security, S/CT, and Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA) programs. We have the best technology, and a good relationship of selling our systems to Saudi Arabia. It would be helpful if you could identify as specifically as possible the right tool for your needs. The willingness is there, we just need to specify the need." Deputy Coordinator Feierstein re-iterated that the DOS's ATA program has been involved in JWG assessments and technical assistance from the start. He RIYADH 00002474 004 OF 007 indicated ATA could also assist the MOI with law enforcement training. He noted, "As far as overall commitment and capacity, we're there, and we'll continue to be players." -------------- MOI White Paper To Clarify USG Role Vis a Vis Modernization Effort -------------- ¶11. (S) Deputy Coordinator Feierstein continued by asking our MOI counterparts to clarify how they saw the USG contributing to the MOI's overall modernization effort. He queried, "One thing we need to know to recommend specific ideas: is the role of the USG limited to critical infrastructure protection, or do you see USG participation beyond that? It would be helpful for us to understand the decisions which have already been made. We recognize that this train has already begun to move from your perspective." Dr. Al-Semari responded by asking for the USG's specific questions in writing. He indicated the MOI would then prepare a white paper to respond to the questions, "for mutual understanding." (Note: The delegation prepared a list of questions and passed these to the MOI on 5 December. End note.) Dr. Al-Jabri concurred this would help to better identify the MOI's needs and requirements. -------------- MOI Interested in Flexible Mechanism to Meet Evolving Threat -------------- ¶12. (S) Dr. Al-Jabri then addressed Deputy Coordinator Feierstein's remarks, emphasizing the MOI sees a need for a flexible long-term partnership which can evolve over time. He stated, "the threat is not fixed, so our needs may be different tomorrow. We are interested in setting up a mechanism for cooperation, we're interested in a long-term partnership, and not just our current needs." -------------- How does an Interagency Agreement Mesh with MOI's Relationship with Bearing Point? -------------- ¶13. (S) Deputy Coordinator Feierstein queried how the proposed cooperation with the USG might fit in with the MOI's on-going contractual arrangements with consulting firm Bearing Point. (Note: Bearing Point has a three-year contract with the MOI to assist with its modernization effort. End note.) Dr. Al-Jabri responded that when the MOI contracted with Bearing Point, it did not have these mechanisms (e.,g. the JWG or proposed inter-agency mechanism),and it faced substantial time pressure. He stated, "We approached everyone, including the private sector, because we had to launch a huge modernization program. We used the tools available to us at the time, which were commercial mechanisms." Dr. Al-Semari clarified, "The role of the consultant is limited, it is not a decision-making role, it is doing the homework and the heavy lifting." Comment: The implication appears to be that the MOI will maintain the advisory services of Bearing Point to do the "heavy lifting," but the MOI leadership would prefer to have a strategic partner such as the USG as well. In this meeting as in the past, the MOI leadership has made clear they are inherently more trusting of a government-to-government relationship than of their "hired guns." End comment. -------------- -------------- US Assistance Welcome in MOI Strategic Planning: Challenge of Modernizing All Faces of the MOI RIYADH 00002474 005 OF 007 -------------- --- ¶14. (S) Dr. Al-Semari turned to the challenge of modernizing the MOI across its several directorates, with more than a quarter million forces in its employ. He stated, "Energy infrastructure is one area, but there is not one single stakeholder. We have to modernize them all. The MOI has many different faces, military, intelligence, civil defense. We can't only modernize one side, we have to modernize all sides." ¶15. (S) Outlining the work Bearing Point has carried out to date, Dr. Al-Semari explained, "We have now done an across-the-board needs assessment. We now have a good level of detail, and are making a strategic plan. Integration is a key word. The consultants (Bearing Point) help with integrating the systems and companies (e.g. contractors)" He indicated that USG assistance with the strategic planning process would be welcome once a cooperation mechanism is in place. He related, "We can work on strategic planning once we have a mechanism. We have a current state we are in, we want a future state, and we need a partner to help us reach that point." -------------- JECOR: "One Stop Shopping" for Interagency Assistance to the MOI -------------- ¶16. (SBU) Acting Deputy Chief of Mission Rundell then gave a presentation on the U.S.-Saudi Joint Economic Cooperation Commission, known as JECOR, a program started in the 1970's to provide a wide range of technical expertise to the Saudi Government. ADCM Rundell noted that over more than a quarter century, JECOR provided the Saudi state with the expertise to build civilian government infrastructure, from building a national treasury, to national parks, to ambulance services. Under this program, the Saudi Ministry of Finance (MOF) paid the U.S. Department of the Treasury to provide a wide range of training, advisory, and procurement services, to the then-fledgling Saudi government. Many USG departments and agencies provided advisors to Saudi Arabia. At one point, JECOR had over 300 advisors in-country. ADCM Rundell explained that we were looking to the JECOR as one possible mode of successful interagency cooperation. JECOR provided a "one-stop shop" for the SAG, which did not have to make separate contacts and agreements with each USG agency. Instead, Treasury made contact with all of the other USG agencies on behalf of the SAG. ¶17. (S) ADCM Rundell cautioned the proposed MOI-interagency cooperation program has a few significant differences from the JECOR program. Unlike JECOR, this program will include civilian and military components. Nonetheless, the MOI may wish to retain the some organizational features of JECOR - funding flowed from one Saudi agency to one Washington agency, with a primary point of contact on each side. Charg D'Affaire's Gfoeller noted the "one-stop shopping" model had proved successful in the past, through various Democratic and Republican administrations. ADCM Rundell emphasized we are not seeking slavish imitation of the JECOR model, but looking for a starting point for a work-able and flexible model to meet current needs. We are actively seeking input on improvements to the model, and are open to suggestions from the MOI. Additionally, there are likely to be modifications necessitated by changes in how the USG operates since the 1970s, such as a greater reliance by the USG on contract staff. -------------- Interagency Cooperation: Broad and Flexible, RIYADH 00002474 006 OF 007 Parallel to but Separate from JWG -------------- ¶18. (S) When asked to clarify the relationship between the Joint Working Group (JWG) for Critical Infrastructure Protection and the proposed mechanism for inter-agency cooperation, Dr. Al-Jabri responded that he believed the JWG was working very well. He also saw no harm if we had an independent mechanism for inter-agency cooperation. Dr. Al-Semari added, "Let's start now as parallel efforts, then judge how we're going." Dr. Al-Jabri then requested a follow-up "brainstorming session" to provide recommendations to Washington for the inter-agency cooperation mechanism. ¶19. (S) The interlocutors agreed the focus should be on a broad and flexible agreement, which did not specify a minute level of detail. Noting that the original JECOR agreement had encompassed military cooperation, although this aspect of the agreement was never utilized, CDA Gfoeller remarked, "We don't know what sort of cooperation we will need in thirty years, and we don't want to limit ourselves." -------------- Explaining FMS Processes to the MOI -------------- ¶20. (S) Deputy Director Milton-Kurtz then initiated a discussion of Foreign Military Sales issues by emphasizing our willingness to engage with the MOI on counterterrorism and border security issues. She provided an overview for the MOI on the U.S. system of Foreign Military Sales (FMS) and legal requirements for Direct Commercial Sales (DCS), including explaining the need for early Congressional notification of possible sales. If the MOI determines that it would like to participate in FMS sales, Deputy Director Milton-Kurtz requested the MOI supply her office with additional information on specific MOI units and their mission, as well as the types of equipment purchases which would be considered. She noted U.S. law provided scope to authorize FMS sales to MOI units with a counterterrorism mission, but the State Department would have to "make the case" to allow FMS sales to the MOI to move forward. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶21. (S) The MOI is facing a profound sense of urgency regarding their modernization project, in conjunction with meeting the challenge that Iran and the internal terrorism threat pose to their energy infrastructure and internal stability. Their senior leadership believes its past partnership with the French government has failed them. MOI interlocutors also repeatedly express their sense that a series of contractors and consultants have also let them down. They are turning to the USG for an unprecedented level of assistance and strategic cooperation. If we succeed, this program could become the equal of our cooperation programs with US Military Training Mission to Saudi Arabia (USMTM) and the Office of the Program Manager for the Modernization of the Saudi Arabian National Guard (OPM-SANG),programs we have run with Saudi counterparts for 60 and 25 years respectively. ¶22. (S) However, the USG will have to demonstrate an adept and rapid inter-agency response to meet these requests, as the MOI believes its window of opportunity to gear up to meet these threats is very limited. This inter-agency visit was extremely positive, and has moved the ball forward significantly. The MOI would clearly prefer to deal with the U.S. to protect the country's economic "crown jewels," its RIYADH 00002474 007 OF 007 oil facilities in the Eastern Province. However, if we are perceived as slow to organize ourselves, the MOI could turn its attention elsewhere. ¶23. (C) JECOR, one possible model for interagency cooperation, made a positive impression on the MOI. Dr. Al-Jabri and his team were comfortable discussing a program of JECOR's scope. They concurred with us that resident and embedded advisors would be needed to achieve the MOI's goals. From the MOI's perspective, the JECOR model has several advantages: it has a strong track record of success across many Saudi ministries. The MOF, JECOR's Saudi home, has a positive view of the program's track record, which will ease the MOI's task of obtaining the MOF's buy-in and allow MOI to more easily mobilize financial resources for the project. Finally, the SAG retains in its employ several officials, both Saudi and American, who worked on JECOR, and whose expertise the MOI could tap to help design the new project. FRAKER