SAG MFA ANNAPOLIS OBSERVER REPORTS CONFERENCE A

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RIYADH 002404 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/04/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR SA SUBJECT: SAG MFA ANNAPOLIS OBSERVER REPORTS CONFERENCE A SUCCESS ON MANY FRONTS Classified By: Political Counselor David Rundell for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Ministry of Foreign Affairs Western Department Director Dr. Riyadh Krimley, who attended the November Annapolis conference with Foreign Minister Prince Saud al-Faisal, told PolOffs during a December 1 meeting that the conference was a success in working towards peace on several issues: Israel-Palestinian conflict, the Golan Heights dispute, the Lebanese elections, and Iranian regional influence, particularly regarding Syria. Although the SAG was offended by the Syrian and Iranian public statements about the conference, Krimley stated that it was the actual participation of Syria that told the real story. Other Saudi and Arab interlocutors also commended Annapolis and were positive about the prospect for peace-- the first in a long time-- in the region. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C) Ministry of Foreign Affairs Western Department Director Dr. Riyadh Krimley, who attended the November Annapolis conference with Foreign Minister Prince Saud al-Faisal, told PolOffs during a December 1 meeting that the conference was a success on many fronts. According to Krimley, prior to Annapolis the SAG's primary goal was to gain an Arab consensus to attend the conference-- an obvious success-- with the next goal being to ensure that the talks continue. He then stated that the outcome indicated good faith negotiations will take place in the coming weeks, however, the SAG contends that Israel "must give Abbas political capital in order to maintain goodwill with his people." Without this capital-- such as a decrease in checkpoints and a stoppage of Israeli settlement activity in the West Bank-- he said that Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas will "lose face" with his people, causing him to potentially lose his presidency or at least to be able to uphold any negotiated positions. ¶3. (C) After stating the SAG's position, Krimley shared his unofficial views-- namely that the conference was also a success on the Iranian and Syrian fronts. He explained why, in his opinion, it was critical that Syria participated in the peace process: (1) Syria is the main actor that can negatively affect the peace process in the long run; (2) if Golan Heights becomes a priority for Syria, then other issues-- specifically Lebanon and Iran-- are kept on the proverbial back-burner; and (3) if Syria successfully negotiates with Israel and the West for the Golan Heights, it would be in exchange for their alliance with Iran. Krimley continued that Syria is looking for dialogue with the United States, and the Golan Heights issue is a mutually beneficial starting point for breaking Iranian ties. He also noted that the Lebanese political parties looked to Annapolis to save their election process. In his opinion, the positive steps taken following the conference-- the announcement that the Lebanese Army Chief is now the "agreed upon" candidate-- was a direct result of seeing the positive steps towards Syrian dialogue with the West. ¶4. (C) Krimley concluded, stating that the SAG was "offended" by the "rude" Iranian-Syrian statement predicting the failure of the conference and condemning the Arab participants. However, he said that what the Syrians and Iranians publicly remark is most often actually opposite from what happens in private. He added that King Abdullah is very frank in his discussions with foreign heads of state. According to Krimley, King Abdullah has been blunt before with Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, and will be so again the next time that they communicate. ¶5. (C) Krimley's sentiment was shared by both official and unofficial interlocutors alike. An official from the Institute of Diplomatic Studies told PolOff during a December 1 conversation that the role of Syria in Annapolis was one of the most significant benefits to come out of the conference and is the one that will pave the way for the most change in the region-- particularly as it concerns Iran and regional security issues. Likewise, a professor from the Islamic Affairs Department at King Saud University commented to PolOff on December 1 that the Annapolis conference was widely seen as a success, and that the negative publicity that Saudi Arabia received for their unwillingness to shake hands with Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert was unwarranted because they were at the forefront for Arab participation-- the key for a successful conference. ¶6. (C) Additionally, several unofficial Saudi and Lebanese interlocutors told PolOff during conversations following Annapolis that they strongly supported the conference and were hopeful that the broad participation would pave the way for positive long-term negotiations. The Lebanese interlocutors also spoke of their confidence in the RIYADH 00002404 002 OF 002 conference-- because of Syrian participation-- that it will ensure peaceful domestic elections in the coming weeks. ¶7. (U) The local press echoed these positive sentiments. Media reporting described the conference as a last chance, effort and a real opportunity for both parties. The press underscored regional hopes of achieving real progress before the end of 2008, reported on the FM Saud Al-Faisal,s refusal to shake hands with members of the Israeli delegation, and noted the key Saudi role. Moderate Al-Jazirah daily suggested in a November 28 editorial, "Israel has lost many opportunities of peace. If Israel does not make use of the peace opportunity offered by the Arab countries, it will never have security and peace by force." Conservative Okaz editorialized on November 28, "That the Arabs agreed to participate in Annapolis shows that they are committed to peace as a strategic option." Under the headline "The Meaning of the Saudi Participation," conservative Al-Madina daily wrote on November 28 that FM Prince Saud Al-Faisal,s refusal to shake hands with Israeli delegation members was "to show that the conference was not for normalization." ¶8. (U) The media prominently featured the Saudi role in the conference, best summarized in an Al-Watan editorial on November 28, "The Kingdom's attendance at Annapolis was to enhance its leading strong role for moderate Arab powers...The Kingdom will not lead Arabs to put pressure on the Palestinians if they reject a proposal or concessions...its position would be to support the Palestinian position." ¶9. (C) COMMENT: The official and unofficial outlook in Saudi Arabia on the prospect of peace in the entire region seemed to improve as a result of the Annapolis conference and renewed activity in the Peace Process. END COMMENT. GFOELLER