LATVIA REMAINS CAUTIOUS ON PLANS FOR A/CFE

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 RIGA 000629 SIPDIS NOFORN SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/21/2027 TAGS: PARM KCFE MARR PREL PINR RS LG SUBJECT: LATVIA REMAINS CAUTIOUS ON PLANS FOR A/CFE REF: A) STATE 116194 B) RIGA 533 C) USOSCE 321 Classified By: Charge d'Affaires a.i. Stuart M. Seldowitz. Reason: 1.4 (c and d) ¶1. (S/NF) Summary: Latvia continues to be wary of any plan to move forward on ratification of A/CFE that might leave them behind. They welcomed hearing more detail on our action for action plan and will have more thoughts in upcoming US/Baltic consultations on CFE. The Latvians are looking to get something in return for their flexibility -- feeling that Russia is being rewarded for its eight year stall on its Istanbul commitments. They continue to focus on NATO contingency planning as essential, and have now officially begun to suggest that additional FMF assistance might be needed. When we pushed back on the idea of NATO contingency planning, the political director responded, "We know the Russians will enter these negotiations having made their contingency plans, we need ours as well." We believe that the Latvians have some flexibility in the exact shape of the assistance in thinking through future scenarios, but believe they are serious in wanting something in exchange for what they perceive as flexibility on their part. Beyond planning and monetary assistance, they may also seek additional intelligence support. Additionally, there are several items that appear to us to be redlines for the Latvians as this moves forward. Namely, no multilateral discussion with Russia of Baltic accession to A/CFE without the Balts in the room; no wavering on the necessity for Russia to fulfill the Istanbul Commitments prior to entry into force of A/CFE; no request for the Balts to make commitments now on future territorial ceilings; and no requests for the Balts to do something extraordinary to show their commitment to join the adapted treaty absent Russian movement to fulfill Istanbul. End summary. ¶2. (C) Pol/econ chief delivered reftel points to Latvian MFA political director Ilgvars Klava on August 20, who was joined by two officials from the MFA's arms control section. Klava took detailed notes and regularly interrupted with questions and clarifications. At the end, Klava said that the points and non-paper would be sent immediately to FM Pabriks and widely circulated around the GOL. ¶3. (C) Klava said that he appreciated the briefing, especially in advance of the briefing in Washington later in the day. He said Latvia was ready to talk, but that they would need additional assurances from Allies, including the U.S., regarding Russia before proceeding. Recent events, including the missile incident in Georgia, left Latvia feeling uneasy about Russian intentions. He reiterated a request made earlier (ref B) for NATO contingency planning for Latvia. When pol/econ chief asked about possible bilateral assistance in developing national defense plans instead, Klava replied that this would also be welcome, but Latvia was standing firm on contingency planning. He said that Latvia could not go into the process without understanding the "basic math" in play, especially if there is a willingness to reopen the treaty at a later date that could lead to changes in the flank regime. Latvia had been working with general assumptions about what its territorial ceilings would be, but that could all be moot now. Klava added something we have heard rumored previously, but this was the first formal mention we've heard -- once it understands the various permutations of possible arrangements and has the contingency planning, Latvia might seek increased FMF assistance to implement those plans. When pol/econ chief again asked if NATO contingency planning was really that important Klava responded, "We know the Russians will enter these negotiations having made their contingency plans, we need ours as well." ¶4. (C) Klava was very focused on the proposed calendar, which he noted was "very tight." He was glad that US/Baltic consultations on CFE would take place in August and said that the GOL would use our paper to develop more concrete points for discussion at that meeting. The proposed September discussion of Baltic accession to A/CFE also generated many questions from Klava. How would this synch with the next planned US-Russia experts' discussion with Russia? Did the US have in mind to use the already scheduled Sep. 26 NRC Ambassadorial to discuss or another meeting? (If so, Klava noted the conflict with UNGA leaders' week, which meant instructions would need to be drafted earlier.) How detailed would the September discussions be? He wanted to be sure that there would be pre-coordination of Allied positions and he had a clear expectation that Latvia would be in the room when the issue was discussed with Russia. Klava saw no problem with Latvia participating in such discussions, but how forward leaning they would be would depend on what they could get from the Allies. He was very cautious about the proposed December statement reaffirming their intention to RIGA 00000629 002 OF 002 join A/CFE, saying that Latvian willingness to be forthcoming would depend on Russian action on the Istanbul Commitments. ¶5. (C) Klava concluded by saying that if Baltic willingness to be forthcoming on A/CFE in the face of Russian intransigence is "of interest to the Allies, they will need to help (the Baltic states)." He stressed that the Latvians would also be talking about their concerns with European Allies like the French and Germans. ¶6. (S/NF) We also shared the substance of the message with the offices of the President and Prime Minster and got similar reactions. We could not get to the MOD August 20, but DATT discussed the issue of CFE with outgoing and incoming MOD Undersecretaries Janis Kalsbergs and Janis Sarts in a lunch the week before. They too pressed on the contingency planning, although they were far more open to bilateral US assistance to develop a national plan as opposed to NATO planning, and increased FMF to implement the plan. They also requested US assistance in enhancing their sigint capability to better monitor Russian military activity near the border. ¶7. (C) Comment: The Latvians are sticking to their positions on this issue. As we noted following their demarche in Vienna (ref C),Brussels and Washington taking a fairly hardline position, they really feel that Allies are trying to use the Balts to get more flexibility from Russia. From the Latvian perspective, Russia has mostly dragged its feet for 8 years on the Istanbul Commitments while Latvia repeatedly reaffirmed its willingness to accede to A/CFE once in force. Our willingness to reopen the adapted treaty once in force, seemingly without precondition, makes them worry that thinking they did on how the A/CFE regime would apply here (especially on territorial limits) is outdated and makes them a) desirous of the planning assistance and b) wary of what other concessions we might be willing to offer. Based on the discussions with MOD, there may be some flexibility on the idea of US bilateral assistance to develop national defense plans in lieu of NATO contingency planning, but we expect the Latvians to be very dug in on several points -- no multilateral discussion with Russia of Baltic accession to A/CFE without the Balts in the room; no wavering on the necessity for Russia to fulfill the Istanbul Commitments prior to entry into force of A/CFE; no request for the Balts to make commitments now on future territorial ceilings; and no requests for the Balts to do something extraordinary to show their commitment to join the adapted treaty absent Russian movement to fulfill Istanbul. SELDOWITZ