GOL DECIDES TO TRY AGAIN ON LATVIA-RUSSIA BORDER

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 RIGA 000053 SIPDIS SIPDIS NOFORN E.O. 12958: DECL: (10 YEARS AFTER SIGNING OF LATVIAN/RUSSIAN BORDER TRE ATY) TAGS: PREL PBTS PGOV RS LG SUBJECT: GOL DECIDES TO TRY AGAIN ON LATVIA-RUSSIA BORDER TREATY Classified By: Ambassador Catherine Todd Bailey. Reasons: 1.4 (b & d) ¶1. (C/NF) Summary: Latvian Prime Minster Kalvitis has decided to renew discussion of the Latvia-Russia border treaty, with an aim to sign the document in the first half of ¶2007. He believes the political calendars in Russia and Latvia provide a unique window of opportunity. In order to avoid the problems of May 2005, when a unilateral Latvian declaration on the treaty was rejected by Russia and scuttled a planned signing, Kalvitis is seeking a simple parliamentary authorization to sign the document. However, legal arguments his government made two years ago are providing fodder for some political opposition. Nevertheless, there is greater unity among key government figures than in 2005 and it appears the PM has the votes in parliament to get the authorization to sign. There is still no guarantee, however, that Moscow will go along with this carefully laid out plan. The debate over the treaty reveals how fragile the Latvian national psyche remains on issues of the Soviet occupation and in many ways provides the best argument for signing the treaty and beginning to look forward rather than back in Latvian-Russian relations. End summary. History -------------- ¶2. (U) Latvia's eastern border with Russia was originally delineated in the Latvian-Soviet treaty of peace and friendship in 1920. It was moved slightly westward after WWII when the USSR redrew the boundaries of the Latvian SSR. Six counties around the town of Abrene, historically populated by Russians and amounting to less than two percent of Latvia's territory, were moved from Latvia to Russia. In 1997, the two countries reached agreement on the text of a treaty to demarcate the border, with Abrene remaining in Russia, but the agreement was never signed. Plans to sign the treaty when President Vike-Freiberga visited Moscow in May 2005 were scrapped when Russia rejected a declaration passed by the Latvian parliament that referred back to the 1920 peace agreement and the Soviet occupation of Latvia and asserted the continuity of the Latvian state since 1918. Russia felt that the declaration left open the possibility of Latvia making a future claim on Abrene and/or seeking monetary reparations for the loss of territory and other elements of the Soviet occupation. Latvia noted that it had made clear in joining the EU and NATO that it had no outstanding territorial claims, but the treaty was left to the side. In the meantime, the two countries concluded agreements on establishment of an intergovernmental commission and on economic cooperation. Current plans -------------- ¶3. (C) Following his reelection in October, PM Kalvitis began working to revive the border treaty. Building a more stable relationship with Russia has been a key goal for Kalvitis now that Latvia is securely in the EU and NATO and he sees the border treaty as an important step. Determined to avoid the problems of 2005, the PM's office developed a short resolution for parliament to pass authorizing the government to sign the treaty. The text refers to the August 1991 document restoring Latvia's 1922 constitution. As this document was the one used by Boris Yeltsin to recognize Latvian independence that same month, the Latvians believe Moscow cannot object. The text also makes reference to the internationally recognized continuity of the Latvian state, a term Kalvitis believes Putin told him he could accept when they met in St. Petersburg in June 2006. ¶4. (C) The draft resolution was endorsed by the foreign affairs committee of parliament January 18 by a vote of six to one with two abstentions. FM Pabriks briefed Ambassadors of NATO and EU countries that same day and Ambassador Bailey attended. Pabriks explained that the next step is for the parliament to consider the draft in its January 25 session when, for procedural reasons, it will refer it back to the foreign affairs committee for a second endorsement. There will then be a full parliamentary debate on the issue February 1, when the PM, FM, and possibly even President Vike-Freiberga, will address the parliament. Final passage is planned for February 8 and the Latvians would hope to sign the text later that month in Moscow. (Comment: This is only the latest timeline and it is possible that the dates may slip, although the sequence of events should remain the same. End comment.) ¶5. (C/NF) The PM's office has been working to keep international partners abreast of the process. We and the German Embassy were given advance copies of the text in the RIGA 00000053 002 OF 003 hopes that we would be willing to endorse it publicly. We declined given the internal nature of the issue. They have also showed the draft to the Russian MFA, which did not reject it, but took a wait and see attitude, wanting to see what would actually emerge from parliament. Challenges -------------- ¶6. (U) While the government has a plan, significant political objections have been raised. Many of the same parties of the current coalition were in power in 2005 when the unilateral declaration was adopted. At the time, the government, for domestic political reasons lined up legal scholars who claimed the declaration was necessary to conform to the constitution. Now, however, they are stuck with this legal interpretation from 2005. There are two interrelated and legally technical issues raised by opponents of the treaty. First, the 1922 constitution defines the territory of Latvia as comprising four regions and with borders defined in international agreements. Amending this section of the constitution requires a referendum. The argument is that the Latvia-Russian border was set by the 1920 treaty and any change in that border requires a referendum. The government counters that the section empowers the government to modify borders by international agreement as needed. The second issue is whether accepting the new border both legitimizes the occupation and denies the continuity of the Latvian state. In this argument, the 1920 treaty is still in force since Latvia has never withdrawn from it or abrogated it. Since Russia feels it lapsed when Latvia "willingly" joined the USSR, they will not tolerate mention of it. Therefore, critics argue, failure to refer to the 1920 treaty in addressing the current agreement amounts to validating the Soviet occupation. Also, the continuity of the state is a key element in Latvia's politically sensitive citizenship and property restitution laws. Politically, some ethnic Latvian parties opposed to the border treaty are also questioning the government's seeming rush to get this done right away. Despite these political challenges, key officials such as the President, PM, and FM appear better coordinated in their strategies and public comments than was the case in 2005. Why now? -------------- ¶7. (C/NF) According to Peteris Ustubs, the PM's foreign policy advisor, and Aivis Ronis, former Ambassador to Washington and NATO, who is supporting the PM's plan, the PM is motivated to move forward by several factors. First, Kalvitis feels that he has a unique and small window of opportunity in the political calendar get this done. At home, he is politically strong, coming off the October elections in which he was the first Latvian PM ever returned to office. On the Russian side, after the middle of this year, Duma and then Presidential elections will stymie any ability to move forward, possibly until at least 2010, by which time Latvia will again be facing elections. Second, the lack of the border treaty provides one more arrow in the quiver of Russian critics of Latvia, who keep alive the idea that Latvia will use NATO membership as a shield to reclaim Abrene by force. Finally, the PM feels that resolving this issue allows him to move forward on what he feels are the more pressing bilateral issues, such as reducing barriers to Latvian-Russian trade. For example, the lack of the border treaty has been cited as a reason for the slow processing of trucks from Latvia into Russia, often causing trucks to idle at a checkpoint, often for days at a time. In public comments, the PM has stressed this last point as a key reason to move ahead quickly. Prospects -------------- ¶8. (C/NF) The question now is whether PM Kalvitis can succeed in this effort. On a television program to discuss the issue, about 60% of the roughly 8,000 people who called to register their views were opposed to the PM's plan to sign the treaty "clean." And while the country's senior leadership is relatively united, he does not have the full support of his governing coalition, with nationalist Fatherland and Freedom opposed to signing the treaty without the 2005 declaration and a sizable minority of the Greens and Farmer's party feeling the same. So, he will have to rely on support from the ethnic Russian parties. Our best guess is that he can probably get about 60 votes to support signing. However, as soon as the resolution is passed, it is expected that opposition center-right party New Era will file a challenge with the Constitutional Court, arguing that the legislation contradicts the Constitution absent a referendum. RIGA 00000053 003 OF 003 And there is still no assurance from Moscow that they will sign, and our contacts here all agree that Russia will not sign if there is a pending challenge in the Constitutional Court. ¶9. (C/NF) Comment: The PM is taking a risk here, no question, but Kalvitis has good domestic political instincts, so he did not rush into this without thinking it through. From our standpoint, what has been most interesting about this issue is the high level of insecurity it reveals among the Latvian public on its own history. There is a genuine fear among a large segment of the population that signing this treaty would serve to legitimize the Soviet occupation and annexation, sixty-seven years after it occurred and sixteen years after Latvia regained independence. In many ways, that is the best argument for signing this treaty. Leaving the issue out there only serves to provide a focal point for the past, whereas signing it helps to turn the page and allow Latvia to develop a more forward-looking relationship with Russia. BAILEY