BURMESE EFFORTS TO GAIN U.S. UNDERSTANDING

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 RANGOON 000986

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR P,EAP/MLS, AND IO
PACOM FOR FPA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/03/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL BM
SUBJECT: BURMESE EFFORTS TO GAIN U.S. UNDERSTANDING

Classified By: CDA Shari Villarosa for Reasons 1.4 (b) & (d)


1. (C) Summary: Charge received word from the Foreign
Ministry of a possible attack on the U.S. Embassy, which she
dismissed as ludicrous, and advice that Embassy officers stay
away from demonstrations, which she rejected on the grounds
that we needed accurate information about what was going on.
Charge and the Deputy Foreign Minister spent most of their
meeting debating what constitutes progress towards a
political transition. The steps they described fall far
short of what we would like to see, but, despite their
regular diatribes against us, they want to keep talking with
us, which gives us the opportunity to push for more. End
Summary


2. (C) The Foreign Ministry invited the Charge to travel to
Nay Pyi Taw on October 5 for a briefing by Deputy Foreign
Minister Maung Myint on the current situation. We also
learned that the Chinese and Russian Ambassadors had been
invited for briefings by the same official on October 4.
Charge met with the Chinese Ambassador to get his readout of
his briefing, which was considerably different from Charge's
meeting (see para 9.

Say What?
--------------


3. (C) Expecting to hear the regime's view of the Gambari
visit, Charge was taken aback when Maung Myint began by
reporting that the GOB had uncovered a plot by Generation 88
Student and NLD to steal weapons and uniforms in order to
stage an attack on the U.S. Embassy and make it look like a
Burmese Army attack. After asking him to repeat this to make
sure she heard correctly, she dismissed the report as lacking
credibility noting that she has met often with activists from
both organizations, as the regie knows. He claimed to have
sound sources, whic were "very confirmed." Maung Myint
then clariied that they would not really attack us, but
wold pretend to do so to make the Burmese Army look bd and
harm US-Burmese relations. I noted that w already had
strained relations, and suggested tat the best way to avoid
further strains would b to have more frequent discussions.
Maung Myint eplied that the GOB was always open to
discussion, and promised to make sure that the Charge's
fuure requests for meetings get approved.


4. (C)Then claiming that the GOB also is concerned about
our security, Maung Myint asked Charge to keep Ebassy staff
away from demonstrations. Charge hadearlier run into
Europeans finishing up their Track II talks, who said their
Burmese interlocutors had produced pictures of Emboffs at the
demonstrations to back up their claims of US interference.
Charge told Maung Myint that our observations of
demonstrations were very important to ensure we had accurate
information, noting that those first hand reports had been
helpful for press interviews. He explained that Burmese
military and police forces could not protect Emboffs from
"destructive elements," so they should restrict their
movements. Charge replied that the local authorities knew
that Emboffs were only observing, and added that we had
advised American citizens to stay away from large gatherings
warning of the potential of violence from Burmese authorities.

Than Shwe Budges
--------------


5. (C) Maung Myint, having made the two points he had been
ordered to make, then shifted discussion to highlight Senior
General Than Shwe's conditional offer to meet personally with
Aung San Suu Kyi. Separately the Track II participants told
Charge that the Burmese had asked them if this would be
interpreted as weakness. Charge told Maung Myint that useful
discussions might result if the parties could avoid too many
conditions. She asked if a senior liaison would be appointed
to keep discussions going between ASSK and Than Shwe. Maung
Myint asked if she wanted to be the liaison, to which Charge
replied that a senior military officer who could talk
directly to both would be better. Charge also said that it

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would helpful if the restrictions on access to ASSK could be
eased so that she could consult more broadly with other
interested Burmese. Maung Myint said that he would pass both
suggestions to the senior generals.


6. (C) Maung Myint then noted that Gambari would be briefing
the UN Security Council on October 5 and expressed the
opinion that Than Shwe's offer was "very transparent." He
then provided data on prisoners released (692 yesterday and
2000 today) and still detained (1034) and claimed that the
authorities had used "minimum force" to break up the
demonstrations. Charge commented that if Than Shwe's offer
to talk had been announced on September 25, before any force
had been used, it might have stopped the demonstrations
peacefully. She asked if Min Ko Naing and Ko Ko Gyi would be
released soon, and Maung Myint replied that some must undergo
more interrogation. Charge asked if that involved torture,
and Maung Myint turned to her with a big smile and said "we
don't torture" then touched her on her arm and again repeated
that. Charge repressed her shudders.

Political Transition Coming Very Soon, Be Patient
-------------- --------------


7. (C) Maung Myint launched into the standard defense of the
roadmap, how that had to continue, could not be derailed, and
appealed for understanding. Charge suggested that the
process could be opened up at any stage, and urged the GOB to
release the people it had arrested and start talking with
them about a way forward. Maung Myint complained that NLD
had been invited to participate in the National Convention,
so they had no right to demand a tripartite process of the
military, NLD and the ethnic minorities. He added that the
National Convention had negotiated with the minorities, and
now it was finished and could not be reopened. Charge asked
why Hkun Htun Oo, a Shan ethnic leader who was participating
in the National Convention had been given a long prison
sentence. She again urged the regime to reach out to those
now in prison and just talk with them. She said they loved
their country as much as the military, to which Maung Myint
agreed.


8. (C) Maung Myint assured Charge that the regime was on
track for a political transition "very soon" and urged
patience. He said the current situation was "very delicate
and confused." He said pressure from the EU and Indonesia
had not been helpful and made their Foreign Minister look bad
in front of the international community. Charge replied that
the international community was outraged by the violence used
against peaceful demonstrators. She noted that the ASEAN
statement was the harshest criticism she had ever seen, and
added even China was sounding more critical. She warned that
international pressure would likely increase unless some real
progress was made, not by releasing people who should never
have been arrested in the first place, but by embarking on a
political transition that had broad popular acceptance.


9. (C) Maung Myint said that the Europeans had offered
assistance with the planned referendum on a new constitution.
Charge stated that the U.S. could also assist, pointing out
that we had assisted with complicated political transitions
all over the world, and could provide advice on elections,
setting up political parties, and other transitional issues.
He welcomed the offer, but did not give the impression there
would be any immediate follow-up. Instead, he asked who had
replaced Eric John as Deputy Assistant Secretary. He noted
that Burma had sent three ministers to meet him. Charge
provided him the name of Scot Marciel, but cautioned that
further talks would be very difficult for us without further
progress from where the situation was in June, and not
measured from the recent setbacks.

What the Chinese Heard
--------------


10. (C) The Chinese Ambassador told Charge that Maung Myint
had given him an update on what he described as the four
requests of Gambari:

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release prisoners-some released already, more to come;

stop the violence-Than Shwe listened to Gambari; Maung Myint
described their actions as restrained;

lift the curfew-which has been shortened. The Ambassador
laughed when Charge commented from 9-5 to 10-4. Maung Myint
said it would be lifted "according to the situation."

permit ICRC to visit detainees-the GOB would make "relevant
arrangements."

Charge expressed surprise that Gambari had not discussed the
need for a more inclusive political dialogue. The Ambassador
replied that the Gambari's two meetings with ASSK should be
seen as "most important" and that the mutual understanding
between the UN and the GOB was good. He then said that China
did not want to see unrest and wanted stability. He said
they had asked the authorities to stop the bloodshed and
improve livelihoods, and complained about a Washington Post
article blaming China for the situation in Burma. The
Ambassador agreed with Charge that the generals need to show
more openness and flexibility by talking with a broader range
of Burmese, and added that he found it very difficult to
understand them.


11. (C) Comment: It comes as no surprise that the regime has
a different message for the U.S., than the Chinese and
Russians. Our opinion must matter than most, since they have
not invited any other Ambassadors for briefings, which also
means they want to continue talking with us. They clearly
recognize that the Gambari briefing will be important, and
have offered specific briefings to the three Embassies to
make their case. The Chinese and U.S. agree on the need to
bring more parties into the political dialogue, and the
Burmese are hoping that their conditional offer will show
their openness. Although not enough, it does give us
something to push for more.
VILLAROSA