TEXTILE AND APPAREL PRODUCTION IN BURMA

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 RANGOON 000871 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS STATE FOR EAP/MLS, EEB/TPP/ABT - GCLEMENTS COMMERCE FOR ITA/OTEXA - MDANDREA USTR FOR CMILLER PACOM FOR FPA TREASURY FOR OASIA:SCHUN E.O. 12958:N/A TAGS: ECON ETRD KTEX BM SUBJECT: TEXTILE AND APPAREL PRODUCTION IN BURMA REF: STATE 114799 RANGOON 00000871 001.2 OF 003 ¶1. Summary. Burma's garment and textile sector faces many difficulties, including poor investment climate and crumbling infrastructure. It has the added disadvantage of being subject to U.S. sanctions. In the past five years, employment levels and company profits in the Burmese garment and textile sector have decreased steadily, and the textile sector accounted for less than five percent of total trade earnings in 2006. Since most garment exports are produced using imported goods, the real economic impact of the decline has been increased unemployment. U.S. sanctions alone cannot be blamed for the decline of the sector. Although the Burmese Government reports no legal imports of Chinese textile products, they are often sold in higher-end stores. The GOB has done little to bolster the textile and apparel sector, and is unable and unwilling to stop the illegal import of Chinese products. End Summary. ¶2. GOB economic data is closely guarded and generally unreliable. The regime considers data on industrial production and textile and apparel production to be confidential and therefore does not publish it. We met with private textile producers and local statistical associations to obtain the following information: --Total industrial production for FY05/06: $262 billion --Total garment exports in 2006: $288.9 million --Garment exports Jan-July 2007: $161.4 million --Textile/apparel share of total imports in FY05/06: 12 percent --Textile/apparel share of total exports in FY05/06: 9 percent --Textile/apparel share of total imports in FY06/07: 9 percent --Textile/apparel share of total exports in FY06/07: 5 percent --Textile/apparel share of total imports in FY07 (through July): 13 percent --Textile/apparel share of total exports in FY07 (through July): 4 percent --Total Exports in textile/apparel to the U.S. in 2006: $0 --Total Manufacturing employment: 1.2 million, as projected from GOB 1990 Labor Force Survey --Total Textile and apparel employment: 125,900 in private sector. Employment figures for state-owned garment industry are not available. (Note: Burma's fiscal year runs from April 1 - March 31.) ; ¶3. Q: Are host country producers receiving lower prices due to heightened international competition? Have manufacturers received more, less, or the same number of orders as in years past? Have foreign investors, particularly Asian investors, closed factories or otherwise pulled out of local production? A: Garment producers in Burma primarily perform cut, manufacture, and pack (CMP) operations. They use textile inputs mainly imported from China and export finished products to Europe, Japan, Korea, Singapore, Malaysia, and Hong Kong. Private garment factory owners tell us that they face decreasing prices for their production. Labor costs in Burma are lower than most competitors in the region, they explained, but their logistic costs are higher. Burma's crumbling infrastructure, cumbersome import/export processes, and unpredictable government interference make operations riskier and more expensive, do garment producers are forced to take lower prices per piece. As of September 2007, there were approximately 200 garment factories in Burma, and less than 20 of them were foreign owned. Japanese and Korean companies remain the largest foreign investors in the textile and apparel market. Burma's business laws do not favor foreign-owned companies, which must pay taxes and all bills in RANGOON 00000871 002.2 OF 003 foreign currency, converted at the official rate of 6 kyat to $1. These companies face significant profit loss, as the archaic exchange rate (the market rate is now over 1350 kyat to the $1) acts as a tax on foreign companies. In 2006-2007, one local garment factory closed its operations due to profit losses. ¶4. Q: Have U.S. and EU restrictions on certain exports of textiles and apparel from China, effective through 2007/2008, affected export prospects for host country manufacturers? From January-July 2006, Burmese factories received 50 percent more orders than the prior year because of U.S. and EU-imposed safeguards on Chinese products. After August 2006, the number of orders reduced to normal levels, as most buyers returned to Chinese suppliers. ¶5. Q: Has the host government implemented, or is it considering implementing, safeguards or other measures to reduce growth of imports of Chinese textile and apparel products into the host country? Although the Burmese Government does not record any imports of Chinese textile or garment products, Chinese apparel is readily available in larger cities and in upscale stores. Some of these Chinese products are imported via Thailand; the rest is illegally smuggled into Burma over the border. The GOB does not consider Chinese textile or apparel products to be a threat to local industries, and thus is not considering implementing safeguards on Chinese products. ¶6. Q: Does the host government have any policies or programs in place to deal with any dislocated workers in the sector resulting from increased competition? A: Under Burmese law, a laborer can request a subsidy from the government's unemployment benefit program. In practice, the government does not provide money to unemployed workers. ¶7. Q: Has increased global competition affected local labor conditions by causing employers to reduce wages, seek flexibility from government required minimum wages, or adversely affected union organizing? A: Burmese wages are among the lowest in the region, so global competition has little to no impact on Burma's already isolated economy. In April 2006, factory workers demanded and received a significant wage increase after the GOB increased civil service salaries. Currently, garment workers at the bottom of the scale earn 30,000 kyat/month (approximately $23 at market exchange rates). While Burmese law permits workers to form unions with the prior consent of the government, the government, in practice, does not allow unions. Global competition does not affect union organizing in Burma; rather the GOB blocks the formation of unions as a method of political control. ¶8. Q: Has the host government or private industry taken action to increase the country's competitiveness, such as improving infrastructure, reducing bureaucratic requirements, developing the textiles (fabric production) industry, moving to higher value-added goods, or identifying niche markets? Does post think that the host government or private industry's strategy will be successful? A: Burma's infrastructure is baldy dilapidated, with little evidence RANGOON 00000871 003.2 OF 003 of GOB plans to improve. The GOB offered modest tax benefits to factory owners and promised to supply a few industrial zones with more reliable electricity. Officials plan to establish special economic zones (SEZs) by 2015 in the border areas with Thailand and China. These SEZs will function as free trade zones, and the GOB plans to offer tax incentives for foreign companies who invest. However, the law has been awaiting final approval for several years. As another incentive, the government-controlled Federated Chamber of Commerce offers training courses with private-sector sponsorship to upgrade workers' skills. In 2007, the GOB streamlined the process for import/export licenses. Previously, it took up to 21 days to receive a license; now some companies receive their licenses in less than 7 days. The streamlined process is not universally applied; several smaller garment factories complained that it still takes up to 21 days to receive a license. Additionally, companies must apply for the licenses in Nai Pyi Taw, Burma's new capital, which is located more than 200 miles from Rangoon. Companies must apply in person for a license, and cannot apply in advance of either the import or export shipment. Because most local garment factories perform CMP operations, neither the government nor companies have made any effort to find niche markets or produce high value-added products. Textiles produced in Burma are of lower quality and thus are not exported; there is no plan to improve textile production. ¶9. Q: Overall, if not already addressed, does post think that the host country can be competitive in textiles and apparel exports given heightened global competition? A: Burma's business climate remains unattractive to both domestic and foreign investors. Productivity is low, infrastructure continues to deteriorate, and corruption and political intervention are rife. Until the government establishes more predictable, efficient, and transparent economic and business policies, Burma's share of global textiles and apparel will continue to shrink. VILLAROSA