BURMA: PRECARIOUS PEACE IN KAREN STATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 RANGOON 000199

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EAP/MLS; PACOM FOR FPA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/25/2017
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PINS PREF PREL BM
SUBJECT: BURMA: PRECARIOUS PEACE IN KAREN STATE

REF: A. CHIANG MAI 35

B. CHIANG MAI 22

C. 06 RANGOON 1828

D. 06 RANGOON 1767

E. 06 RANGOON 1536

F. 06 RANGOON 1065

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Classified By: Poloff Dean Tidwell for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: Confusion continues to surround the reported
cease-fire agreement between the SPDC and a breakaway faction
of the KNU. Unlike earlier cease-fire agreements between the
regime and other armed ethnic groups, the latest deal does
not require the Karen faction to surrender their arms for
peace. The regime continues to allow Karen peacemakers to
travel back and forth across the Thai border to convince
others to join them inside Burma. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) Following January peace talks in Rangoon with Chief of
Military Security Affairs (MSA),Major General Ye Myint, the
former head of the Karen National Liberation Army's (KNLA)
7th Brigade, Major General Htay Maung, led his supporters to
Hto Kaw Koe, a new settlement site provided by the regime in
Karen State. The Burmese media highlighted the Karen group's
February 11 welcome ceremony.

A CEASE-FIRE WITH A TWIST


3. (C) It is still unclear whether Htay Maung and the SPDC
signed a written agreement, or just reached an oral agreement
similar to the one made with the late General Bo Mya in 2004.
The agreement significantly differs from those the regime
reached with seventeen other insurgent groups in the 1990s
because it does not require the Karen group to surrender any
weapons. In its media, the regime calls the latest ceremony
a "victory for peace."


4. (C) Rangoon-based Karen contacts Drs. Simon Tha and
Rebecca Tin (PROTECT) described the behind-the-scenes drama
just before the welcome ceremony. Local Burmese officers
wanted the returning Karen soldiers to set aside their
weapons for the welcome ceremony, but Ye Myint overruled
them, explaining that this was not the usual surrender of
"arms for peace." The Burmese officers then requested that
the Karen unload their weapons before the ceremony, but Ye
Myint again vetoed the idea. The Karen soldiers participated
in the ceremony in full battle gear while carrying their
arms, including RPGs and mortars.

HTAY MAUNG'S SHUTTLE DIPLOMACY


5. (C) According to Dr. Simon, only 178 Karen attended the
welcome ceremony on February 11. Since then, he said, Karen
returnees had increased to 321. Exile media reports claim as
many as 70 more soldiers have left the 7th Brigade since
February 11 to join Htay Maung. Dr. Simon claimed that other
Karen also want to join Htay Maung's group, but under its new
commander, Brigadier General Johnny, the 7th Brigade has
planted landmines and deployed troops to block access routes.
The families of many of the returning Karen fighters live in
Bae Klaw (Mae La) refugee camp in Thailand; the Karen
National Union (KNU) has reportedly forbidden the refugees to
leave the camps to return to Burma.


6. (C) During the peace talks, we were told that Htay Maung
demanded the Burmese Army withdraw from certain areas of
Karen State (ref F). According to Dr. Simon, the Burmese
Army immediately complied. However, when newly appointed 7th
Brigade commander Johnny threatened to cut off Htay Maung's
group from access to the Thai border, Htay Maung requested
that the Burmese Army return to keep a travel corridor open.
In an unusual move, the regime now permits Htay Maung and Ler
Mu, his son-in-law and deputy, to shuttle back and forth

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between Hto Kaw Koe and their base on the Thai border at Maw
Pah Thoo, presumably to try to convince additional Karen
fighters to join their peace group. Dr. Rebecca also said
that when schools in Bae Klaw camp close in March, more
families of the returned soldiers might try to join the group
inside Burma.

HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE


7. (C) According to Dr. Rebecca, Htay Maung sought the right
for NGOs to assist his group to establish itself at Hto Kaw
Koe. During the negotiations in Rangoon, Ye Myint granted
Htay Maung's request to attend services at the local
Seventh-day Adventist Church, where Htay Maung reportedly
asked the Adventist Development and Relief Agency (ADRA) to
assist his group when they moved back to Burma. Teddy Din,
Director of ADRA Myanmar, told us he has already traveled to
Hpa-an to meet Karen State leaders who want ADRA to expand
its activities to their region. ADRA has since delivered
clothing to the new returnees. Dr. Simon's Karen Development
Committee also plans to provide medical assistance to the
returnees. If true, the New Mon State Party and other
cease-fire groups might also demand that the regime allow
INGOs to resume work in their territories. The regime forced
INGOs Medecins Sans Frontieres France and the ICRC to stop
their activities in Mon State in 2006.

THE HAND THAT ROCKED THE CRADLE


8. (C) According to Dr. Simon, Htay Maung and the KNU
leadership never sat down to communicate their differences
face-to-face, but instead aired their grievances against each
other through international media. Htay Maung complained to
Dr. Simon that Bo Mya's second son, Col. Ner Dah, initiated
the recent peace discussions with the regime, but at the last
moment, he and Brigadier General Johnny backed out (refs C &
E). Htay Maung, who is known to be indecisive, then became
unusually courageous and decided to make peace. Dr. Simon
claimed that the KNU leaders and Htay Maung both jostle for
the support of the late Bo Mya's wife (ref A). In the end,
she committed her support to the organization her husband
founded -- the KNU -- and told her sons not to join Htay
Maung's Peace Council. Dr. Simon stated that Ner Dah
abandoned Htay Maung at the last minute, out of a mixture of
respect for his mother and a deep-rooted mistrust of the
Burmese regime.

A CONVOLUTED PATH TO PEACE


9. (C) Dr. Simon also told us that DKBA delegates to Burma's
National Convention were called away on urgent business in
late December (ref D) as part of secret peace negotiations.
Convinced that KNLA commander Nay Kaw, eldest son of Bo Mya,
supported a peace deal, the SPDC ordered the DKBA to withdraw
its troops from General Bo Mya's former redoubt at Maner Plaw
and turn the base over to him. When it appeared that other
troops, still loyal to the KNU, might occupy it, the Burmese
Army rushed its own soldiers to Maner Plaw to hold it. When
Nay Kaw's battalion finally arrived, they handed it over.
Nay Kaw then backed out of Htay Maung's peace deal, but
continued to occupy Maner Plaw. Through this SPDC
miscalculation, forces loyal to the KNU now control Maner
Plaw for the first time since the Burmese Army overran it a
decade ago.


10. (C) COMMENT: These latest events are part of a chain
reaction of political and military changes triggered by Bo
Mya's death. We expect most Karen soldiers and families will
probably wait to see how well the SPDC treats Htay Maung and
his followers before deciding whether to join the peace group
or remain with the KNU. Nevertheless, the Burmese regime's
success at driving another wedge between the KNLA and the KNU
was a major propaganda victory, even if it has not yet

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succeeded in its larger plan to woo back a majority of Karen
soldiers. Should most Karen soldiers later opt to join Htay
Maung and settle in Burma, the KNU central committee would
become not only leaders without a country, but also without
an army. END COMMENT.
VILLAROSA