Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07RANGOON1111
2007-11-15 11:39:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Rangoon
Cable title:  

PINHEIRO RETURNS TO BURMA

Tags:  PGOV PREL PHUM BM 
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FM AMEMBASSY RANGOON
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6828
INFO RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUCNASE/ASEAN MEMBER COLLECTIVE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 0701
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 4238
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 7792
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 5352
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RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1136
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 RANGOON 001111 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EAP/MLS, DRL, AND IO
PACOM FOR FPA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/14/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM BM
SUBJECT: PINHEIRO RETURNS TO BURMA


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Classified By: P/E Chief Leslie Hayden for Reasons 1.4 (b) & (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 RANGOON 001111

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EAP/MLS, DRL, AND IO
PACOM FOR FPA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/14/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM BM
SUBJECT: PINHEIRO RETURNS TO BURMA


RANGOON 00001111 001.2 OF 004


Classified By: P/E Chief Leslie Hayden for Reasons 1.4 (b) & (d)


1. (C) Summary: Pinheiro told the dip corps that cooperation
he had received from the GOB had been positive. He had been
given access to everyone he asked to see and taken to all the
places he requested to visit. He noted, however, that his
trip was not a "fact finding" mission because he had neither
the time or access to make it so. The most difficult part of
his mission will be developing reliable, credible estimates
of those detained, wounded, and killed. He reported he had
not been permitted access to individual prisoners at Insein,
but that the regime had promised he would be able to meet
with detainees before he departed Burma. He has requested
meetings with ASSK, U Win Tin, Min Ko Naing, and Ko Ko Gyi,
among others. Pinheiro lobbied hard for ICRC to regain their
former access and expressed hope there would be some positive
movement on this issue soon. Pinheiro expects to be invited
back to Burma again and stressed he and Gambari had two
separate but complimentary agendas. Unaware of Su Su Nwe's
November 13 arrest, Pinheiro promised he would take the issue
up with the regime immediately. During a brief pull-aside
afterwards, Pinheiro said his remarks had been intended to
send a message to the regime that they control the outcome of
his visit, and described his experience as "surreal." End
summary.

--------------
A Positive Start
--------------


2. (SBU) Special Rapporteur for Human Rights Paulo Pinheiro
briefed the diplomatic community at a regime-organized
meeting in Nay Pyi Taw on November 14. TV cameras filmed and
Foreign Ministry officials were present throughout the
meeting. Before opening the floor to questions, Pinheiro
told diplomats that he came to Burma specifically to address
questions relating to the implementation of the Human Rights
Council's latest resolution on Burma, specifically the
release of political prisoners and the conditions under which
they are being held. Pinheiro informed us he would present

his final report to the Council on December 11. His report
would focus on the current political crisis; its origins and
context; the government's response; its repercussions and
consequences; and provide recommendations.


3. (SBU) Pinheiro considered the invitation for him to visit
Burma after four years a good sign and noted that the regime
had allowed him to see everyone he requested. GOB officials
also took him to the places he requested to visit including
Yangon General Hospital, a crematorium, various monasteries,
police stations, and detention centers. Pinheiro also
requested the government provide him records of the injured,
the detained, and those released. He expressed hope the GOB
would provide the records to him. He noted that he had an
open and productive meeting with the commander of the police
in Rangoon and the head of the Yangon Peace and Development
Council. Although he had been allowed to visit Insein
prison, he had not yet been allowed to visit detainees. He
continued that the regime had said he would be permitted to
visit detainees at Insein Prison on November 15 before he
departed Rangoon. Pinheiro had also asked to meet with Aung
San Suu Kyi and U Win Tin (a 77-year-old journalist
imprisoned for more than 18 years),but had not yet received
a response to those requests.

--------------
Not a Fact-Finding Mission
--------------


4. (SBU) Pinheiro credited the government for working hard
to meet his demands, and stressed that his visit was not a
fact-finding mission. The conditions were not conducive for
such a visit, he explained, as there were too many
limitations on his time. He had met with the Ministers of
Planning, Foreign Affairs, Labor, and Religious Affairs. His
separate meeting with the Minister of Home Affairs had lasted
three hours and was positive. Pinheiro described his visit
as timely because ASEAN would sign a charter at the upcoming

RANGOON 00001111 002.2 OF 004


ASEAN Summit that included a human rights component. His
government interlocutors told him that Burma would sign the
charter, which Pinheiro would acknowledge in his report to
the Council.

--------------
No Psycho-Analysis Please
--------------


5. (SBU) Pinheiro singled out Burma's reconvening its Human
Rights Committee, headed by Minister of Home Affairs Maung
Oo, as a sign of progress. He stated that he favored any
such body, whatever the circumstances, established by any
country. The committee offered an opportunity to engage with
the Burmese on Human Rights, and could play a beneficial role
in a future political transition. When asked if it was
appropriate for the Home Affairs Minister to chair the
Committee, since the police forces under his control were
continuing to arrest pro-democracy activists, Pinheiro
cautioned the diplomats against psycho-analyzing the regime's
motivations. Instead, he recommended taking the Committee at
face value and encouraging the members to move full speed
ahead. He further requested diplomats not to express too
much skepticism back to their capitals. "If the Human Rights
Committee does not fulfill its mandate, I will be the first
to report it," Pinheiro stated.


6. (SBU) Australian Ambassador Davis expressed concern that
many of the monasteries Pinheiro had visited had been emptied
by the regime and filled with impostor monks before his
visits. Pinheiro responded that he had not had the
opportunity to meet with monks individually and was aware of
these allegations. He emphasized again that his visit was
not a fact-finding mission, but that such a visit could be
conducted at a later time. Davis added that he remained
concerned about the numbers of prisoners being processed
through special courts inside the prisons, without due
process, and sentenced to long prison terms. Pinheiro took
note of his concerns.

--------------
Bad Etiquette
--------------


7. (C) Pol/econ chief inquired about the November 13 arrest
of labor and human rights activist Su Su Nwe to which
Pinheiro and most of the dip corps expressed surprise.
Pinheiro replied that such a move during his visit would be
"very bad etiquette," and that he would immediately raise Su
Su Nwe's arrest with the regime. We subsequently heard from
the ILO rep that the Chinese, who only learned of the arrest
during the Pinheiro meeting, met with the regime after
Pinheiro's briefing to lobby for her release. The ILO told
us they were "furious" the regime had again arrested Su Su
Nwe on the eve of the ILO Governing Board meeting in Geneva.


8. (SBU) Responding to a question from the EU representative
regarding ICRC, Pinheiro said he had lobbied the Home Affairs
Minister for renewed access for the organization. He
explained to the Minister that the ICRC's methodology of
neutrality and confidentially was in the regime's interest
and that many nations had benefited from the ICRC's
activities. Pinheiro expressed confidence there would be
positive movement on the ICRC issue soon.


9. (SBU) When asked whether his report would be consistent
with Special Envoy Gambari's, Pinheiro emphasized that he and
Gambari had different but complementary missions. Pinheiro's
report would address only human rights issues and would not
delve into Burma's political transition or relations between
the regime and the pro-democracy activists.


10. (SBU) The Australian Ambassador informed Pinheiro that,
contrary to what Gambari had reported to them, there was
still a high level of military deployment in Rangoon, it was
just less visible. When the UK representative asked if
Pinheiro had been able to determine the number of protesters
and detainees that had been killed, Pinheiro replied that

RANGOON 00001111 003.2 OF 004


during his visits to both Yangon General Hospital and the
crematorium, officials at both sites claimed 14 people had
died and were subsequently cremated. Pinheiro added that he
had asked the government to allow both facilities to release
their records to him and awaited a response. Pinheiro
emphasized that developing reliable, credible estimates of
missing, dead, and detained would be the most difficult part
of his mission, but he expected to include such estimates in
his report.


11. (SBU) Pinheiro also said he had raised attacks by
regime-sponsored vigilante organizations on human rights and
pro-democracy activists, and had specifically raised the
arrest and beatings of members of Human Rights Defenders and
Promoters. He told the regime that such actions were
unacceptable.

--------------
No Finger-Pointing
--------------


12. (SBU) Pinheiro explained that he did not want to
finger-point or accuse the regime, but insisted in all of his
meetings that direct knowledge of the September events and
the resulting abuses was needed to help the Burmese
authorities account to its citizens. It was a simple
principle, and after the accounting, life would continue, he
stressed. Pinheiro expected he would be invited back by the
regime for follow-up visits and noted it was progress in
itself that they had let him visit Burma after four years of
refusing him entry. He considered face-to-face meetings with
the regime important.


13. (SBU) Because Pinheiro believed in full transparency, he
intended to report both the positive and the negative. In
his view, crises were often opportunities and he believed
this to be the case for Burma right now. He hoped that
neither the Burmese government nor the international
community would lose this opportunity, and urged the
diplomats to recognize small progress such as his and
Gambari's visits, as well as the appointment of Aung Kyi. He
closed by stating that he preferred private meetings with
diplomats, organized by the UN Country Team, and said he
would try to have such a meeting during his next visit.

--------------
"Surreal"
--------------


14. (C) In a short pull-aside after the meeting, Pinheiro
said his remarks had been meant to send a message to the
regime that they control the outcome of his visit. He noted
he had requested to meet with Min Ko Naing and Ko Ko Gyi at
Insein prison, but that other meetings we had recommended to
him would be impossible this visit. He described his
experience in Nay Pyi Taw as "surreal." Pinheiro's
assistant also said that their communications had been
restricted during the visit.


15. (C) Most of the assembled diplomats viewed Pinheiro's
briefing as positive. Many, however, also considered that
the control the regime exerted over his schedule was a
negative and questioned Pinheiro's ability to make an
accurate assessment under such restrictions. Australian
Ambassador Davis told us he had information that over 1000
detainees from September were now in the process of being
sentenced in secret prison courts, including thirty-eight
activists recently sentenced to 20 plus years.


16. (C) Davis also claimed to have seen a document outlining
a step-by-step plan by the regime to take minor steps to
cooperate with the international community and appear to
begin a dialogue with ASSK. Davis said the document also
asserted the regime would return to their normal restrictive
conditions once international pressure and attention had
subsided. Russian First Secretary Nikolay Barbanov tried to
argue that the regime was taking positive steps such as
drafting their constitution and moving toward a referendum

RANGOON 00001111 004.2 OF 004


and elections. However, he acknowledged the regime would
have to deliver something when P/E chief countered that the
regime would have to make compromises or lose all credibility.

--------------
Comment
--------------


17. (C) Pinheiro's message to the regime was clear: the
power to change rests with them, and he would give an honest
and transparent assessment of his trip. Pinheiro's reports
to date have been honest and authoritative, giving him
credibility. Unlike Gambari, he is not interested in
burnishing his reputation by only highlighting the positive.
He takes seriously his role reporting the true state of human
rights in Burma, regardless of the wishes of Than Shwe. End
summary.
VILLAROSA