GAMBARI ACHIEVES LITTLE IN BURMA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 RANGOON 001096

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR P, EAP/MLS AND IO
PACOM FOR FPA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/28/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL BM
SUBJECT: GAMBARI ACHIEVES LITTLE IN BURMA

RANGOON 00001096 001.3 OF 003


Classified By: CDA Shari Villarosa for Reasons 1.4 (b) & (d)


1. (C) Summary: We consider Gambari's most recent visit a
failure, and most of the diplomatic and UN community based
here agrees with us. He allowed himself to be held captive
in the isolated capital, he only met with people the regime
approved, and he obtained nothing but vague indications of
future action. In our experience, most the action the regime
does take are token gestures to get the international
community off their backs. We see no evidence that Than Shwe
has any intention of moving towards genuine dialogue or
political reform. End Summary


2. (C) Gambari met with diplomats in Nay Pyi Taw on November
7 to discuss the meetings he had to date in Nay Pyi Taw with
assorted Ministers, and ethnic, business, USDA, and womens
leaders. He expected to meet today in Rangoon with Aung San
Suu Kyi (ASSK),and we saw a UN car go to her home this
afternoon. The most senior official he met with was the new
PM Thein Sein, along with the new Secretary 1, who Gambari
claimed expressed full confidence in him, pledged their
continuing cooperation, and invited him back "again and
again," but with no specifics as to dates. It does not
appear that he will meet with Senior General Than Shwe,
unlike his previous three visits. The other ministers told
Gambari they had full authority, and that they did not need
to trouble Than Shwe. He admitted when questioned by Charge
that everyone with whom he had met were selected by the
regime. He also admitted during questioning that his request
to meet Generation 88 Students and monks had not been
granted, but said that he had received "indications that
something will happen regarding the release of Generation 88
Students, except those who would be charged with crimes."
The NLD Central Executive Committee was flown up first thing
this morning to meet with Gambari in Nay Pyi Taw.

Gambari's Advice to the Regime
--------------


3. (C) Gambari noted the Ministers expressed disappointment
that their "cooperation" with the UN had not prevented
further UN Security Council (UNSC) action. Gambari explained
that the PRST was unanimous and the best way to avoid further
UNSC attention was more cooperation and tangible progress by
the regime. He advised the various ministers that they need
to "broaden and enrich" the next steps of the roadmap, but
admitted during questioning that they rejected Gambari's idea
of a broad based constitutional review commission. So then
he offered to meet the recently announced Drafting Committee
to explain to them about constitution drafting processes in
other countries.


4. (C) Gambari told the diplomats that he had emphasized to
his various interlocutors that his good offices mission had
the full support of ASEAN, China and India and warned the
authorities that a return to the status quo ante was
unacceptable. He also told them that his UN good offices
mission must yield tangible results or it would be a waste of
everyone's time. He claimed to be ready to return to his
home country of Nigeria. He cited the key issues where
concrete progress was required: the release of all political
prisoners; ICRC access; "broadening and enriching" the
outcome of the National Convention through the drafting
committee; a timeline for the Seven Step Roadmap; and the
establishment of a Poverty Alleviation Commission, which he
said the Norwegians were prepared to support. He warned the
authorities that this was their best opportunity to restore
democracy through meaningful dialogue leading to national
reconciliation.


5. (C) The diplomats sought more details on getting a genuine
political dialogue going. Gambari said that he emphasized
that the dialogue must start without delay and discussions
with ASSK should begin "as soon as possible." He urged that
the restrictions on her be eased and she be treated like a
partner by the regime regarding timelines, "broadening
participation and enriching the constitution." Aung Kyi, the
designated liaison to ASSK, told Gambari that he would be

RANGOON 00001096 002.3 OF 003


meeting with her regularly. Thus far, he has met her once,
two weeks ago.


6. (C) The Singaporean Ambassador offered the usual effusive
support of ASEAN for the UN and Gambari. Gambari had a good
comeback: thanks for your support, but what is ASEAN
actually prepared to do? He urged the ASEAN nations to
demand tangible results and improvements in the capacity of
the Special Envoy. He pointed out that Lee Kuan Yew had
recommended Gambari have his own person in Rangoon to assist
his good offices mission.

Emphasize the Positive
--------------


7. (C) Gambari said that he would have to first report the
substance of his meetings to SYG Ban, but provided the
assembled diplomats a description of what he considered the
positive accomplishments of his mission: the lifting of the
curfew, the reduced military presence in Rangoon and
Mandalay, the release of over 2000 detainees, the appointment
of a liaison to ASSK. Although acknowledging that he must
discuss the positive and negative to retain credibility, he
did not describe any negatives. The Australian Ambassador
later informed Gambari that the military presence remained
significant in Rangoon and arrests were continuing.


8. (C) During questioning he offered further developments,
which if they happen, could be considered positive. He said
that "he believed ICRC access will happen," but it required
logistical arrangements with the Home Affairs Ministry (which
halted the previous access ICRC enjoyed). He stated that
ASSK would be allowed to meet with the NLD Central Executive
Committee (aka the uncles),but with no timetable. He also
said that Pinheiro would be allowed to visit on Nov. 11, but
did not know whether Pinheiro would be limited to Nay Pyi Taw
like Gambari or permitted to visit Insein Prison and freely
visit other places as he did in the past. Gambari admitted
that he only pushed for a date. Charge asked if he had
received agreement to have someone posted in Rangoon as his
representative. He said yes. When asked for the response,
he replied "it was not rejected."

Downplay the Negative
--------------


9. (C) The November 7 issue of the government mouthpiece,
New Light of Myanmar, was read by the diplomats on their way
to Nay Pyi Taw. They interpreted it as a rejection of almost
everything the international community sought. It noted that
the people still detained would be charged with crimes
involving explosives, violence and terrorism. The diplomats
know these detainees in fact to be peaceful protestors. It
claimed that Gambari was satisfied with his meetings with the
representatives of the national races and civil society, that
he did not reject the Seven Step Roadmap (nor did the
countries in the region),and "wished to see Myanmar as a
peaceful, developed, and democracy-flourishing nation." It
also reported that Gambari's suggestion of a tripartite
meeting among him, ASSK and Aung Kyi would not be possible.
If he wanted to meet with the Constitution Drafting
Commission, the newspaper reported he could meet with the
Culture and Information Ministers, who are on the committee
(and well-known hardliners). The report dismissed Gambari's
suggested Poverty Alleviation Commission on the grounds that,
if sanctions were removed, Burma needed no Commission.
Gambari downplayed this dismissal claiming the Planning
Minister remained interested.


10. (C) During the question period, the Charge pressed him
several times on his claims of continuing cooperation from
the regime, even thought it expelled the UN resrep on the eve
of Gambari's visit, and he was essentially being held captive
in Nay Pyi Taw. Charge noted that increasing restrictions
had been imposed on him during his subsequent visits, which
further appeared to contradict his claims of cooperation. He
acknowledged that that was one way of viewing it. He
repeated several times that he could only visit with the

RANGOON 00001096 003.3 OF 003


consent of the regime, expressed gratitude that they
permitted him to come sooner than they preferred, and
required the consent of the regime to any meetings. The
German Ambassador asked why he planned to leave November 8,
even though Gambari had earlier stated that he would stay as
long as it took to accomplish his goals. Again Gambari
replied that he was here at the invitation of the government
and the dates had been carefully negotiated. Charge
requested another opportunity to talk with him before he
departed, which the others also seconded. Gambari replied
that he would put in the request, but could not promise
anything.

Reaction: Negative
--------------


11. (C) The assembled diplomats reacted uniformly negatively
to Gambari's briefing. We expected that from European and
Australian colleagues. The Chinese Ambassador privately told
the Charge Gambari's report was not good. The Singaporean
Ambassador said this would be a major topic of discussion at
the upcoming ASEAN Summit with tough questions for PM Thein
Sein. The Indian Ambassador did not offer an opinion about
Gambari, but told the Charge that the US should concentrate
on Afghanistan and Pakistan and not worry about Burma. The
others took extensive notes and privately indicated to Charge
their disappointment. The countries which do not usually
make waves view Gambari's treatment by Than Shwe as a public
humiliation and disrespectful towards the UN. UN officials
also view this visit as a disaster, particularly Gambari's
unwillingness to protest against his confinement. And
ordinary Burmese, increasingly reluctant to talk politics
with Embassy personnel, approach us on the street telling us
that Gambari has failed and done nothing for the Burmese
people. They also charge him with accepting gemstones and
women from the regime during his visit, which we cannot
verify, but indicates how low Gambari's reputation has fallen.

Comment
--------------


12. (C) We do not see any significant concrete results from
Gambari's latest visit. Gambari has an ego and will no doubt
try to paint as rosy a picture as he can. Permitting ASSK to
meet the uncles is something, but given their age and
declining popular reputation, she needs to see a wider range
of people, if she is to be an effective participant in a
genuine dialogue. Gambari has disappointed Rangoon diplomats
and UN staff beginning with his second visit because he
appeared so easily manipulated by the regime. This visit has
shown to all how easily he has been led by the nose by the
regime. He parroted information to us fed him by the regime,
forgetting we live here and know the truth. He met with far
more regime flunkies than during his previous visits.
Basically Than Shwe has demoted Gambari as unworthy of his
time leaving him to the Prime Minister, who is considered
number three in the hierarchy with no independent authority.
Effectively this torpedoes the chances of some sort of
understanding between ASSK and Than Shwe. Gambari has
failed, and Than Shwe is betting that he can handle the
international community's demands with token gestures only.
He has no intention of opening up or reforming.
VILLAROSA